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Abstract
It is commonly thought that exercise improves both our health and well-being. 
Indeed, prominent psychological researchers argue that exercise which makes us feel 
good necessarily enhances well-being. Their research employs a subjective 
conception of well-being, understood in terms of life-satisfaction and affect. 
Conversely, I argue that pleasure, enjoyment and desire-fulfilment do not necessarily 
enhance well-being. Subjective judgements of well-being can be mistaken. Exercise 
is of merely instrumental value in preserving functionings and capabilities that 
constitute well-being. This understanding of well-being draws extensively upon 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.
The biomedical case for the health benefits of exercise excludes subjective valuing, 
presupposing a dichotomy between objective scientific fact and subjective value. 
Health is understood in naturalistic terms, focusing upon the absence of disease and 
illness. In contrast, I argue health cannot be isolated from those functionings and 
capabilities constitutive of well-being which entangle fact and value. To be healthy 
is to be in a bodily and mental state that ensures the capability to function in valuable 
ways.
Rejecting the fact/value dichotomy paves the way for reflection upon those values 
central to well-being. I argue for an objective list theory of well-being, in which 
listed constituents, such as affiliation and play, are considered valuable independent 
of possibly flawed subjective valuations. The human body, however, is not merely a 
vessel for listed values. Griffin elevates our rational nature over our animality in 
proposing his theory of well-being. His theory appears distant from some of our 
most central concerns as embodied human beings.
Ageing, disease and illness mark some of the ways in which our bodies limit our 
capabilities. The capabilities and functionings proposed in Nussbaum’s approach 
reflect both our animal and rational nature. In conclusion, I argue that exercise offers 
one important way in which to preserve the physical preconditions of these valuable 
functionings and capabilities.
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Chapter One
I n t r o d u c t io n
In this thesis I argue that well-being is best understood as functioning in a valuable 
way, and as the capability to function in this way. Prominent psychological research 
employs a subjective conception of well-being, understood as how one feels, and the 
subjectively perceived level of satisfaction with life. From this psychological 
perspective, exercise that makes us feel better necessarily enhances well-being. 
Conversely, I argue that exercise is of merely instrumental value to our well-being. 
Exercise preserves those functionings and capabilities constitutive of well-being.
Politicians, physical educators and doctors have long espoused the importance of 
being physically active to our well-being. Indeed the contribution exercise makes to 
our well-being appears to have been widely accepted. The aim of the thesis is to 
critically examine this relationship between exercise and well-being. As part of this 
concern the thesis addresses the plethora of literature on the health benefits of 
physical activity. The concepts of health and well-being, often conflated in everyday 
discourse and policy discussions, are subjected to rigorous criticism. This critique, 
alongside its concern with the role of exercise in well-being also addresses the 
relationship between exercise and health. Research within the field of both exercise 
physiology and psychology, I argue, is hostage to certain theoretical assumptions 
asserting a dichotomy between fact and value. These assumptions and the resulting 
conceptions of health and well-being proposed, limit any analysis of the value of 
exercise to our lives.
In addressing the relationship between exercise and well-being, I critically examine a 
number of theories of well-being. These theories are often categorised in terms of 
their subjectivity or objectivity. Sumner, who proposes his own theory of welfare 
(but recognises that this label is akin to well-being, or what is in our interests), 
addresses this notion of subjectivity. Sumner (1996) recognises the association of 
subjectivity with consciousness, but eventually moves to suggest that the primary
8
understanding of subjective is from the subject’s perspective. I cannot do justice to 
Sumner’s lengthy exploration of the concept within the confines of this introductory 
chapter. For our purposes it is sufficient to move to his final characterisation of 
subjective and objective as these concepts relate to theories of well-being.
A subjective theory would understand my well-being as dependent upon the extent 
to which I consider my life to be going well. The extent to which I have favourable 
attitudes to my life as a whole, to which I enjoy it, am satisfied with it, feel happy 
and experience pleasure more than I experience negative moods. A subjective theory 
contends that well-being can only be enhanced by that which I view favourably 
(Sumner, 1996). Objective theories do not make well-being dependent upon these 
pro-attitudes and allow for something enhancing my well-being in the absence of my 
having a favourable attitude toward it.
Sumner (1996) makes an important qualification to the general subjective conception 
of well-being. He says that most subjective theories will not consider pro-attitudes as 
sufficient for well-being, but as only as necessary (Sumner 1996). My favourable 
attitude toward a sporting activity, for example, will not suffice for this activity to 
enhance my well-being. I could be addicted to exercise, or be over-training. For 
Sumner any defensible theory must be able to account for someone being mistaken 
as to their well-being.
I argue that favourable attitudes are neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
enhancement of well-being. An objective list theory of well-being contends that 
those values, capabilities or functionings on its list are of value independent of the 
favourable attitudes or pleasure with which they may or may not be associated. Thus 
these objective goods can improve well-being in the absence of subjective 
endorsement. Our subjective assessments can be mistaken, based upon poor 
reasoning. I argue that such flawed judgements should not entirely negate the value 
of those items on an objective list. This position can be maintained, however, whilst 
acknowledging that well-being would be better served by both the achievement of a 
value and subjective appreciation of its importance.
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The subjective approaches to well-being prominent in the psychological research are 
critically analysed in chapter two. Approaches utilising the psychological conception 
of subjective well-being consider values beyond the realm of objectivity and reason. 
Well-being is determined by the subject’s perspective on how well life is going; 
conceptualised as a subjective judgement of life satisfaction combined with the 
extent to which we experience positive over negative affect. This stance fails to 
accommodate Sumner’s recognition that enhanced affect or satisfaction will not 
necessarily enhance well-being. Yet it is not necessarily the case that the elevated 
feeling states associated with exercise reflect enhanced well-being. We can be 
mistaken in interpreting such pleasurable states positively. An individual might be 
addicted to exercise, or may undertake physical activity on the back of flawed 
perceptions of their body.
Chapter two concludes with an analysis of quality of life in the mainstream 
psychological research where the trend towards subjectivity is evident. These 
subjective approaches are fuelled by a rejection of previous attempts by 
psychologists to stipulate the constituents of ‘quality of life.’ Subjective approaches 
assert the right of the individual to determine what is best for her. These subjective 
theories of both quality of life and well-being overcome accusations of paternalism, 
but at the price of their plausibility. We are not always the best judges of what will 
improve our lives, we can be deeply mistaken, and these accounts fail to recognise 
this possibility.
The subjectivism inherent in the psychological research reflects a wider 
philosophical debate concerning the separation of fact and value. Distinguishing 
between these may at times be a helpful enterprise but the upholding of a fact/value 
dichotomy is often accompanied by assumptions regarding the objectivity of 
scientific fact, and the subjectivity of the value domain. That scientific evidence 
examining the relationship between physical activity and (primarily) health, offers 
the most authoritative, factual case for the benefits of physical activity is a 
possibility examined, and ultimately criticised in chapter three.
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This scientific evidence base fails to provide an adequate account of the health 
benefits of exercise because of its endorsement of the very same theoretical 
assumption that underpins the subjective psychological stances. Both uphold the 
fact/value dichotomy dear to the philosophy of positivism. The psychological 
concept of subjective well-being suggests that well-being is entirely the domain of 
individual choice and preference; the individual should be left to decide as to what 
constitutes his or her well-being. This appears to be based upon an assumption that 
there can be no objectivity regarding matters of value, and hence no objective 
judgments concerning well-being. The scientific evidence base aspires to a form of 
objectivity that is value-free. The health benefits of exercise are conceptualised in 
supposedly value-free terms, focusing on physiological research.
This scientific literature elucidating the benefits of exercise, encouraging an increase 
in our activity levels, typically focuses on the contribution exercise has to make to 
our health. The naturalistic conception of health employed, however, fails to 
recognise the entanglement of fact and value evident within concepts such as health, 
disease and illness. Recognising this entanglement encourages us to ask which 
values are central to these concepts. Being healthy cannot be reduced to 
physiological functioning. Healthy functioning entails, for example, being able to 
interact with others, reflect upon a range of valuable options available to us, being 
able to move without pain and play. These values are also constitutive of our well­
being.
The rejection of the fact/value dichotomy central to chapter three paves the way for 
more extensive reflection upon the values central to a defensible concept of well­
being. Thus I turn to two celebrated theories, James Griffin’s theory of well-being 
and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach proposing the constituents of a fully 
human life. Both approaches can be broadly described as list theories, stipulating 
those values or capabilities central to well-being or the fully human life. Griffin’s 
account of well-being certainly overcomes obstacles evident in the psychological 
research. Mental state accounts of well-being are criticised on the grounds that we
11
value more than just mental states. Actual desire accounts, in which well-being is 
conceptualised as the satisfaction of our actual desires, are criticised on the grounds 
that certain of our desires will leave us worse off on satisfaction. We are not always 
the best judges as to what is good for us.
These two theories, however, also differ in important respects. Griffin’s account, 
described and subjected to initial criticism in chapter four, has its origins in 
utilitarianism. Nussbaum’s approach (addressed in chapter five) seeks distance from 
utilitarianism and decides against using the term ‘well-being’ because of this 
intellectual heritage. Her reference to the fully and truly human life, influenced by 
both Marx and Aristotle, is a clear indication of how her specific capabilities 
approach is fuelled by a conception of the human being itself. When we consider the 
convergence of the lists provided by both Nussbaum and Griffin, however, it 
becomes clear that the subject matter of the theories have extensive overlap.
In those chapters that seek to introduce and conduct a preliminary critique of both 
Nussbaum’s and Griffin’s approaches, I remain faithful to the original texts. When 
describing Nussbaum’s theory I refer to the fully human life for example. My final 
conclusions, however, as to the value of exercise are made in terms of well-being. 
The reason for the use of ‘well-being’ is best understood having traced the argument 
of the thesis.
Having compared and contrasted Nussbaum and Griffin’s approach, (chapter six) I 
argue in favour of Nussbaum. I criticise Griffin for certain aspects of his theory that 
allow too greater credence to potentially flawed subjective judgements, for example 
his employment of an endorsement constraint (Griffin, 1986). Achieving one of 
Griffin’s prudential values, an accomplishment for example, cannot enhance well­
being unless it is endorsed by the subject. Our mistaken judgements, however, are 
not confined to desiring certain things that will fail to contribute positively to our 
lives. Our endorsements or failure to endorse certain goods may also be founded on 
flawed reasoning. In contrast to Griffin (1986) I argue for an objective conception in
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which desire and favourable attitudes are neither necessary nor sufficient for well­
being.
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach begins with the premise that the fully human life 
is best understood, not by mental states or satisfaction levels, but by what we can 
actually be and do. Nussbaum suggests that the fully human life is best represented 
by a list of central capabilities and it is this ‘capabilities approach’ that is the topic of 
chapter five. I focus in particular upon the approach presented in Women and Human 
Development (Nussbaum, 2000a) and Frontiers o f Justice (Nussbaum, 2006a). 
Nussbaum’s stance resembles an objective theory of well-being, listing the 
capabilities central to a fully human life, criticising any individual tendency to reject 
such items based upon flawed reasoning, or indeed as a consequence of adaptation to 
circumstance. Nussbaum’s approach is interesting from our perspective because it is 
rooted in extensive consideration of what it is to be human, but does not limit such 
an analysis to the biological or psychological. The capabilities may be described by 
Putnam’s apt phrase as ‘entangled.’
Nussbaum employs a list of those capabilities to function necessary for a fully 
human life. These are considered to have intrinsic value, and Nussbaum, although 
not dismissive of the role of desire, certainly favours her list as the best indicator as 
to whether a threshold level of capability has been achieved. Nussbaum’s approach 
is also keenly attentive to our animal as well as our rational nature. Nussbaum 
recognises both the trajectory our powers take as we age and health problems that 
may occur at any time as examples of how our animality defines the ways in which 
we function. The treatment of health within Nussbaum’s theory, although brief, 
assures the reader of its significance, and also lends itself to extension beyond the 
naturalistic conception criticised in chapter three. Conversely, Griffin contends that 
health is a mere means to such values and founds his prudential values in our 
reflective nature, separate from our biological concerns. I criticise this dualistic 
conception of human nature, arguing that Griffin’s approach understands the body 
merely as a vessel for those values we pursue, without fully contemplating how our 
embodiment defines both how we pursue and realise such values. Indeed Griffin’s
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elevation of our rational nature over our animality in proposing his theory of well­
being forms my central critique of his approach.
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach cannot be applied without adjustment to my 
ultimate question as to the contribution of exercise to well-being. Nussbaum is 
concerned with providing a political threshold. Capability is defined as our 
opportunity or freedom to function. The opportunity we have to engage in play 
through recreational activities, for example. Functioning is defined as what we 
actually are, or do. Actually engaging in the playful activity constitutes a valuable 
functioning. Nussbaum is mainly concerned with promoting capability, although she 
acknowledges that a life with just the opportunities to do valuable things, without 
functioning in these valuable ways, would not be fully human. From Nussbaum’s 
political perspective, however, capabilities are more likely to be endorsed by those 
who may not wish to fulfil the corresponding functioning. Nussbaum justifies her list 
of capabilities in political terms, as the object of a political consensus on the 
importance of the capabilities as freedoms that should be afforded to all members of 
a society. The framework does not insist that the corresponding functionings be 
endorsed as objectively valuable or central to well-being by every member of that 
society.
I propose certain adjustments or reinterpretations of Nussbaum’s theory. First I argue 
that the theory’s concern with capability does not damage its relevance to my 
concern with well-being. The functionings that correspond to such capabilities are 
not difficult to discern, and I recognise that it is these functionings that ultimately 
constitute well-being or the fully human life. Capability, however, also has a role in 
well-being. Being free to function in valuable ways and having a range of valuable 
options is in itself important to well-being. Second, I suggest that Nussbaum’s 
capabilities and corresponding functionings can be understood as of objective value 
to a life. I argue for Putnam’s internalist stance on objectivity as an appropriate 
understanding of how those capabilities and functionings might be seen as 
constitutive of well-being, but certainly not beyond further criticism, or as offering a 
solution independent of the human perspective.
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I also criticise the assertion that well-being is confined to the subject’s perspective 
and the sharp distinction between perfectionist and prudential value associated with 
such a stance. Those aspects of life that are central to our humanity, I argue will also 
be central to our well-being, regardless as to whether the individual concerned 
recognises this. This provides one clear justification for contemplation of the value 
of exercise in terms of well-being, whilst retaining the capabilities approach. We 
cannot achieve a threshold level of well-being without fulfilling our potential as 
human beings, without living a fully human life. Referring to well-being rather than 
retaining Nussbaum’s terminology also marks my shift of focus from the political 
importance of the capabilities, to addressing the value of the capabilities and 
functionings to a life.
This comparison and ultimate conclusion in favour of Nussbaum moves us to 
consider the value of exercise in terms of functionings and capabilities constitutive 
of well-being (chapter seven). The contention that exercise can both preserve and 
expand our capabilities is examined. I conclude that the role of exercise in capability 
preservation is most significant for well-being. Exercising may not be necessary for 
a current threshold level of well-being, but preserves those capabilities to function 
necessary for a threshold level of well-being throughout life. Exercise is 
instrumentally valuable through the preservation of those capabilities and 
functionings central to well-being. It is of special significance, however, because 
there are few ways in which we might act upon our health, the extent to which our 
bodily and mental state ensures capability to function in those valuable ways 
Nussbaum stipulates. Indeed the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list, whilst certainly not 
inferring an athletic interpretation, require a minimal level of physical activity to 
ensure capability beyond a reasonable threshold. The chances of retaining this level 
and protecting against capability loss in general, are increased by making the effort 
to ‘take exercise.’
Aware capability preservation is not the only way in which exercise enhances well­
being I consider further forms of physical activity, including sports, and suggest how
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structured properly they can represent instantiations of those functionings on 
Nussbaum’s list. Again, this argument is instrumental, there are other ways in which 
we develop relationships, or have pleasurable experiences; exercise is not 
constitutive of those capabilities Nussbaum stipulates. It is not an insignificant 
observation, however, to suggest that exercise is one important and effective way of 
realising those functionings central to an objective conception of well-being.
Exercise is not necessary for our well-being to exceed a threshold level. It is 
however, an important way in which we can preserve those valuable capabilities to 
function that constitute our well-being. These capabilities and functionings should 
not be understood in subjective terms. Their value cannot be reduced to the pleasure 
or enjoyment with which they are contingently related, and is not dependent upon 
subjective endorsement of their importance.
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Chapter Two
S u b j e c t i v e  w e l l - b e i n g  in  t h e  p s y c h o l o g y  a n d  e x e r c i s e  p s y c h o l o g y  
l i t e r a t u r e :  a  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  c r i t i q u e 1
2.1 Introduction
It is widely held both within and outside the academic community that physical 
activity enhances our well-being. Psychological research in the area has examined 
this relationship further, assessing the potential of physical activity to impact 
positively on a range of psychological outcomes including: mood (Biddle, 2000), 
self-esteem (Fox, 2000), anxiety, stress (Taylor, 2000) and depression (Mutrie,
2000).
It is the contention here that these psychological researchers are hostage to a 
particular conception of well-being, typically referred to in the literature as 
‘subjective well-being’, and that this has implications for both the research 
conducted and public policy decisions that spring from it. These implications can be 
seen in terms of two significant conceptual limitations. The first is that we can be 
mistaken in our judgements of what is good for us, what we consider to enhance our 
well-being. Exclusively subjective theories are unable to account for these mistaken 
judgements. The pleasure or satisfaction associated with an activity or fulfilled 
desire may be misleading. The short-term pleasure and enjoyment which are often 
associated with exercise induced well-being, for example, may mask activities that 
are doing us no good or even harming us (Loumidis and Wells, 2001). Second, 
focusing on pleasure excludes other ways in which our well-being may be enhanced 
through physical activity in non-hedonistic terms. Pleasure is, of course, a significant 
aspect of our well-being, but the status it is afforded within subjective psychological 
theories can be criticised. This discussion of subjectivity and theories of well-being 
draws upon the writings of philosophers James Griffin and Wayne Sumner.
1 A proportion of this chapter is taken in modified form from Bloodworth and McNamee (2007).
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2.2 Theories of well-being
The influence of the concept subjective well-being has led to an impoverished 
rationale for the value of sport and physical activity to our lives. Before detailing this 
argument, however, it is necessary to articulate both the conceptual distinction 
between subjective and objective theories of well-being, and the prominent 
psychological concept subjective well-being.
Understanding the conceptual distinction between objective and subjective theories 
should enable better understanding of the assumptions that underpin the 
psychological concept. A subjective theory of well-being suggests ‘that being well- 
off will depend (in some way or other) on having a favourable attitude toward one’s 
life (or some of its ingredients)’ (Sumner, 1996: 38). Sumner refers to ‘welfare’ as 
opposed to well-being, but this need not concern us. Welfare for Sumner concerns 
‘the condition of faring or doing well’ (Sumner, 1996: 1), which he acknowledges is 
‘more or less the same as her well-being or interest.’ (Sumner, 1996:1). Subjective 
theories ensure well-being is the dominion of the individual. For something to 
enhance our well-being we must have a positive attitude toward it.
Objective theories offer an alternative perspective, suggesting certain values or 
goods are central to an individual’s well-being regardless of her attitude toward 
them. That something can improve someone’s life, regardless of that individual’s 
attitude towards it entails, as Ameson observes, ‘that there is a fact of the matter as 
to what is prudentially valuable for a person, so that claims about what types of 
things are prudentially valuable are true or false, and thus can be mistaken’
(Ameson, 1999: 116). The ‘agent sovereignty’ (Ameson, 1999: 116) so evident in 
the subjective theories is absent here, replaced with a clear idea of what enhances a 
life, independent of the person’s attitudes towards it. Before moving on, however, I 
must clarify the term prudential value. Prudence, for Griffin (1996) concerns all that 
makes life good for that person.
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Subjective theories, according to Sumner, can recognise the possibility of someone 
being mistaken over her well-being; indeed for Sumner any adequate theory must be 
able to recognise such mistakes (Sumner, 1996). Sumner also acknowledges that a 
subjective theory need not insist that a person’s favourable attitude toward 
something is sufficient for welfare to be enhanced.
a theory is subjective if it treats my having a favourable attitude toward 
something as a necessary condition of the thing being beneficial for me. It need 
not also treat it as a sufficient condition, and most subjective theories will not 
do so.
(Sumner, 1996: 38).
That we can be mistaken over what is in our best interests is widely recognised. A 
further distinction is often made in relation to the nature of desires and their 
satisfaction. This distinction yields important consequences for the conceptualisation 
of well-being. Actual desire accounts of well-being, that define our well-being in 
terms of the extent to which our actual desires are satisfied, are particularly 
susceptible to the observation that a favourable attitude toward something does not 
guarantee enhanced well-being. The fulfilment of a desire will not necessarily 
improve a life.
Some of our strongest desires rest on mistakes of fact. I make my fortune, say, 
only to discover that I am no better off because I was after people’s respect all 
along and mistakenly thought that making a fortune would command respect. 
Or I want an operation to restore me to health, not realizing that some pill will 
do just as well.
(Griffin, 1986: 12).
The most obvious example of our desires going awry is in the case of simple 
mistaken beliefs. Not all cases of self-harming desires fall under this description. In 
sport, those who over train may certainly have a favourable attitude to training and 
believe it to be doing them good, but this is not enough to ensure their enhanced 
well-being on objective accounts. The potential for mistakes is not confined to 
instances in which we want or desire things that are not good for us or positively 
harmful, where upon satisfaction of this desire we recognise this and adjust our
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attitude. In exercise addiction there is the potential for the pleasure or satisfaction 
associated with exercise to be misleading and mask harm on an ongoing basis - such 
is the nature of addiction or simple self-deception. Loumidis and Wells (2001) 
discuss just this possibility in ‘Exercising for the Wrong Reasons: Relationships 
Among Eating Disorder Beliefs, Dysfunctional Exercise Beliefs and Coping.’ Here 
positive affect associated with exercise masks deeper problems, the individual is 
mistaken in considering the activity to enhance well-being; the attendant positive 
affect is misleading.2
The psychological concept of subjective well-being is less cautious as to the role of 
our subjective assessments. The conceptual tools required to recognise the possibility 
of such mistakes are absent from subjective well-being research, although within 
other mainstream psychological research there is greater recognition.3 Subjective 
well-being, the psychological concept, offers a bare subjectivity not necessarily 
reflected in other subjective theories of well-being.
Other subjective theories of well-being such as Sumner’s may be able to withstand 
and indeed accommodate criticisms of the psychological stance. We can clearly be 
mistaken on matters of well-being, and any plausible theory must account for this. 
Even limited reflection on this matter it seems, indicates the need for a theory to 
extend beyond naive subjectivism. Griffin suggests that reflection on the matter 
leads the terms subjective and objective to become somewhat redundant, he criticises 
those who place a great emphasis on these categories:
2 Further research provides evidence of how our ongoing attitudes toward exercise may be 
destructive. Davis and Kaptein (2006) found in anorexia nervosa patients who engage in excessive 
exercise, a condition closely related to obsessive-compulsive disorder. Research conducted by Davis 
and Woodside (2002) found that those with anorexia nervosa engaging in excessive exercise had a 
reduced capacity for pleasure. Over-exercising understood as a way of compensating for this 
‘adhedonia.’
3 Consider Kahneman’s (1999) ‘Objective Happiness’ where an individual’s remembered utility may 
not match up with the total of the instant utility states accumulated throughout the period in question. 
‘The individual’s own retrospective evaluation of the experience (its remembered utility)’
(Kahneman, 1999: 5) is deemed fallible. This, of course, is an entirely different form of objectivity to 
the philosophical objectivity discussed in the preceding passages. The psychologists’ objective, 
instant utility, is still based on subjective reports of good or bad states (Kahneman, 1999).
20
the dependence of prudential value on desire is much less simple, less a matter 
of all or nothing than they assume. The best account of ‘utility’ makes it 
depend on some desires and not on others. So the distinction between objective 
and subjective, defined in the common way that I have defined it, does not 
mark an especially crucial distinction. It would be better if these terms (at least 
in this sense) were put into retirement.
(Griffin, 1986: 33).
Griffin considers the fulfilment of certain ‘informed’ desires to enhance our well­
being. This removes from the equation those desires clearly mistaken, harmful to 
well-being. Nevertheless, Griffin suggests we cannot exclude desire and feeling 
altogether, indeed any successful account of well-being will need to bridge the 
subjective and objective.4
Moore (2000) questions Griffin’s conclusion that his account can be ‘both’ objective 
and subjective claiming that the distinction Griffin makes is exclusive. ‘By 
“subjective”’ states Griffin, ‘I mean an account that makes well-being depend upon 
an individual’s own desires, and by “objective” one that makes well-being 
independent of desires.’ (Griffin, 1986: 32). Griffin, Moore (2000) speculates, may 
consider a successful theory to have subjective and objective parts. Regardless, 
Moore considers the distinction a useful tool for the analysis of Griffin’s theory. I 
concur. Any defensible theory is unlikely to be exclusively subjective, or indeed 
entirely dismissive of the significance of subjective goods such as pleasure, 
enjoyment and satisfaction. Yet the distinction remains a useful way in which to 
approach a theory, to pick out where it stands, and indeed how it attempts to resolve 
conflicts that have long troubled philosophers.
A positive evaluation of sport and exercise, enjoying it, gaining pleasure from 
participation, is no doubt of great importance to well-being. Beginning and ending 
an analysis of the benefits of exercise here, as exercise psychologists do through 
their adoption or promotion of the subjective well being model, does not do justice to 
the nature of the activities themselves. Are all pleasures associated with physical
4 Griffin’s account of well-being is examined in depth in chapter four. Section 4.4 addresses his 
attempts to bridge the objective and subjective. He argues ‘if the question “Subjective or objective?” 
is pressed, then the answer has to be “Both”.’ (Griffin, 1986: 33).
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activity of equal merit? Are they all contributive to our well-being? Can sport 
enhance well-being in the absence of a favourable attitude toward it, or in the 
absence of enjoyment? A full response to such questions requires us to extend 
beyond talk of favourable attitudes to an analysis of the values associated with sport 
and physical activity.
Subjective theories consider well-being to depend upon the perspective of the 
individual. What improves my life, my overall well-being, is something over which I 
should have the ultimate say. Objective theories deny this agent sovereignty, and it is 
understandable that psychologists view this denial with some suspicion. In some 
cases it may entail saying, ‘I know what is best for you, and you are mistaken.’ This 
seems paternalistic,5 and any objective theory must respond to such accusations. 
Objective theories will not be defended, or even developed to any extent within this 
chapter. It is hoped that the positive case for a theory recognising the flaws of the 
psychological concept of subjective well-being, can be discerned from this initial, 
rather critical enterprise. The task of defending an objective alternative will be 
undertaken in later chapters of the thesis. I will now move on to address how some 
psychologists understand a distinction between objective and subjective theories of 
well-being, and to a discussion of the psychological concept of subjective well­
being.
2.3 Psychological theories of well-being
The common distinction between objective and subjective theories of well-being 
employed in the philosophical domain is not entirely shared within psychology. 
Kahneman (1999) has cited the growing importance of objective measures of 
happiness in psychological research, objective here also referring to fallibility. It is 
recognised that an individual’s own judgement of how happy they were at a given 
time, or in a particular month, may not match up with a more objective assessment of 
well-being (Kahneman, 1999). It is suggested that the retrospective nature of such
5 See Nussbaum (2000, pp. 51-9) for a convincing defence of her capabilities account against the 
‘argument from paternalism.’
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judgements might be flawed, such flaws attributable to errors of both logic and 
memory (Kahneman, 1999).
Remembered utility6 is contrasted with objective assessments of happiness.
Objective happiness is formed through a ‘bottom-up approach’ (Kahneman, 1999:
3), assessing instant utility (the good or bad states), and considering this to total up to 
an objective conception of happiness. This sense of objective does not match the 
widely shared philosophical sense. It is stated that instant utility is based upon 
subjective reports of good or bad states. An objective theory in a philosophical sense 
would not contain this subjective valuation.
The terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ are employed in a variety of ways, and this 
should certainly be noted as I progress through the critique. This is not to say, 
however, that I cannot conduct a philosophical analysis that spans academic 
disciplines. For the benefit of later argument it is worth examining the philosopher 
James Griffin’s (1986) criticism of the bottom-up approach to well-being. This was 
mainly in response to utilitarian theories, but clearly applies to the psychological 
approach to objectivity described above. Griffin questions whether a preference 
between different options is always based upon the amount of pleasurable mental 
states each option contains, and concludes that this is not necessarily the case. He 
takes as his example Freud’s preference for clarity of thought toward his life’s end, 
rather than accept medication that would have reduced pain but simultaneously 
clouded thought (Griffin, 1986).
Some preferences -  Freud’s seems to be one -  are basic. That is, preferences 
do not always rest upon other judgements about the quantity of some 
homogeneous mental state, found in, or produced by, each option.
(Griffin, 1986: 8).
Freud’s preference was to be able to think clearly at his life’s end, rather than accept 
medication that would have reduced pain but simultaneously clouded his thought
6 ‘Remembered utility is explained thus ‘The individual’s own retrospective evaluation of the 
experience’ (Kahneman, 1999: 5).
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(Griffin, 1986). Griffin contends that there is not ‘a single feeling or mental state’ 
(Griffin, 1986: 8) identifiable in terms of both of the alternatives presented. Thus 
Freud’s preference does not entail a comparison of mental states. His preference is 
‘basic.’ What we consider to enhance our well-being may not be the option that has 
accumulated the greatest total of positive mental states. We value things other than
n
the mere accumulation of pleasure or the absence of pain.
Kahneman (1999) however, is aware of such limitations. Extending beyond a mental 
state account he suggests that:
experiences such as those of a straining runner or a spectator watching a 
tragedy call for more differentiated descriptions. Even in such cases, however, 
it is usually possible to locate the moment on the Good or Bad side of neutral, 
by applying the additional criterion of whether an interruption would be 
welcome or resisted. Would the runner be relieved by an announcement that 
the race is cancelled? Would the spectator welcome the unexpected 
termination of the performance?
(Kahneman, 1999: 8-9).
It is not just the mental state itself that is important in Kahneman’s objective 
happiness account, but our attitude toward the mental state, whether we want it to 
continue. Sumner (2000) notes a similar argument against Griffin’s Freud example. 
Freud’s clarity of mind, the argument goes, is the mental state he prefers. This 
argument will be examined in more depth within the critique of the psychological 
concept of subjective well-being, introduced below. It is sufficient at this stage to 
recognise how ‘objective well-being’ means different things to the philosophers and 
the psychologists I have discussed thus far.
7 This standard criticism of utilitarian theories encourages Griffin to move beyond mental state 
theories, to contemplate desire theories of well-being. Having criticised certain of these theories he 
ultimately progresses to what basically amounts to a list account. Chapter four addresses this 
development.
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2.3.1 Subjective well-being in the psychological research
‘Subjective happiness ’ is assessed by asking respondents to state how happy they 
are’ (Kahneman, 1999: 5). The concept of subjective well-being8 also retains the 
sovereignty of the individual in defining her own well-being:
The term “subjective well-being” (SWB) refers to people’s evaluations of their 
lives. These evaluations include both cognitive judgements of life satisfaction 
and affective evaluations of moods and emotions.
(Diener and Lucas, 1999: 213).
Psychological research has tended to focus on the ends of ‘affect’ and ‘life 
satisfaction’, other factors being deemed contributory to, rather than constitutive of, 
well-being (Diener, 1984). An emphasis on the importance of experiencing more 
positive than negative affective states is a clear indication of how ‘pleasant 
emotional experience’ (Diener, 1984: 543) or feeling good is central to the concept 
of subjective well-being. Philosophical theories, by contrast, have included as 
constituents of well-being; friendship, or meaningful relationships of some kind (see 
for example Finnis, 1980; Griffin, 1986; Nussbaum, 2000a) and bodily health (see 
for example Nussbaum, 2000a). Those studying subjective well-being have not 
ignored these factors, but considered them solely in terms of their impact upon affect 
and satisfaction. Indeed an extensive amount of research has investigated the 
contribution of various factors to subjective well-being, including health, income, 
religion, marriage and age to name a few (Diener et al., 1999).
There has been recognition that in certain cases subjective factors may not weigh so 
heavily. Using the classic example from John Stuart Mill, Diener et al. (1998: 35) 
write ‘If we value intelligence and wisdom enough, we might choose to be an 
unhappy Socrates rather than a satisfied swine’. It would be unfair to suggest that for
8 Although this chapter concentrates upon subjective well-being and its use in psychological research, 
acknowledgement should be made of alternative psychological approaches to well-being that depart 
from purely subjective accounts. See Ryff and Singer (1998) on positive health, and for a review of 
research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being see Ryan and Deci (2001), prominent self- 
determination theorists, providing ample indication of how well-being is conceptualised from a self- 
determination theory perspective.
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proponents of subjective well-being, these subjective factors are all that matters to a 
good life. Affect and life satisfaction though, certainly retain an elevated status. 
Consider the following example:
Although physical health is valued by most of us, we would argue that we 
want it primarily because we hope that it will enhance our subjective well­
being.
(Diener et al., 1998: 37).
Is the value of health really best understood in terms of satisfaction and positive 
affect? Other conceptions of health suggest its proximity to autonomy,9 being 
healthy provides us with more life options, and this enhanced autonomy can be 
understood as of value to our well-being regardless as to whether our satisfaction or 
mood remains elevated. This leads us on to consider how the benefits of exercise 
may extend beyond these subjective factors. The argument does not amount to a 
dismissal of the subjective aspects of well-being, it is not unimportant to feel happy, 
or to recognise how good one’s life is, or indeed to experience pleasure. The 
following analysis will, however, question whether the concept of affect in particular 
does proper justice to the pleasures of physical activity.
2.4 Subjective well-being; a critique
2.4.1 The concept of affect
Psychologists typically assess subjective well-being in terms of both affect (both 
positive and negative) and life satisfaction. Griffin (1986) in his critique of mental 
state accounts of well-being, makes the convincing point that there is not one 
discemable mental state that runs through all that we consider to enhance our well­
being. The psychological research examined below, however, recognises that a 
single mental state is not responsible for enhanced well-being, adopting a more 
expansive concept of affect.
9 See Seedhouse (2001).
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Van Landuyt et al. (2000) utilised the circumplex model (Russell 1980) in their 
investigation of the relationship between exercise and affect. The model maps affect 
according to two dimensions, 1) high or low activation and 2) affective valence -  
pleasant or unpleasant.
These two dimensions divide the affective domain into four meaningful 
quadrants: (a) activated pleasant affect, characterized by energy, excitement, 
and enthusiasm; (b) unactivated pleasant affect, characterized by calmness and 
relaxation; (c) activated unpleasant affect, characterized by tension and 
distress; and (d) unactivated unpleasant affect, characterized by fatigue, 
boredom, or depression.
(Van Landuyt et al., 2000: 214).
The aim of their research was for the broadest possible range of affective states to be 
assessed, rather than limiting them at the outset by focusing on particular discrete 
emotions such as anxiety (Van Landuyt et al., 2000). The focus is upon the valence, 
(pleasant or unpleasant) and activation level of a mental state. In using such a model 
psychologists do not seem to be claiming that there is one mental state that runs 
through all exercise experience, but that the affective experience should be mapped 
more broadly.
Sumner (2000) examines a counter argument to Griffin’s criticism of mental state 
theories, stating that both Mill and Sedgwick did not consider pleasure in terms of a 
single mental state.
On their view what pleasures have in common is not something internal to 
them -  their peculiar feeling tone, or whatever -  but something about us -  the 
fact that we like them, enjoy them, value them, find them satisfying, seek 
them, wish to prolong them, and so on.
(Sumner, 2000: 5).
Sumner considers this an adequate counter to part of the basis of Griffin’s rejection 
of mental state theories.10 Freud chose what is ‘more satisfying or fulfilling’
(Sumner, 2000: 5), and this interpretation is the important aspect of the mental states
10 As we shall see Sumner is persuaded by Griffin’s further criticism of mental state theories. That our 
desires extend beyond states of mind. We consider our well-being to be more than just how we feel.
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experienced, not the type of the states themselves. This debate echoes the 
development and critique of utilitarian thinking. Utilitarian stances on well-being 
need not be hostage to the notion of homogeneity of pleasure. They need not claim 
that there is a single mental state identifiable within activities as diverse as running 
and reading, in order for such activities to enhance well-being. In understanding how 
pleasures enhance well-being we are encouraged to look beyond the state itself.
There are, however, two important and related responses to be made to this stance. 
First, I can make the seemingly convincing point that Freud’s preference makes little 
reference to his states of mind, but more to his desires (Griffin 1986). The upshot of 
this is recognition of what might be thought plain obvious: we value things other 
than states of mind. This point will be developed in the following section. Second, I 
ask if judging something as satisfying or fulfilling necessarily enhances one’s well­
being, or whether such judgements can be flawed?
2.4.2 Pleasure and well-being
Griffin (1986) rejects mental state theories of well-being on the basis that we value 
things other than just states of mind. It should be acknowledged that the concept 
subjective well-being does not just concern mental states (affect), its life satisfaction 
component extending beyond this, representing an overall assessment of how well 
things are going. Subjective well-being makes no reference to how we might achieve 
life satisfaction, or maintain affect that weighs on the positive side of the scale. This 
is no doubt tied in with the understandable reluctance of psychologists to stipulate 
what the good life consists in for all, maintaining apparent neutrality and avoiding 
accusations of paternalism. But there does seem to be something missing here. In 
this section I investigate the possibility that there are other things of value to us, and 
challenge the assumption that these can be deemed valuable solely because of the 
pleasure or satisfaction they generate.
Sumner’s conclusion that Freud chose the option that he found most satisfying or 
fulfilling has intuitive plausibility. Thinking clearly itself is a mental state, and this
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presumably is the one that Freud found most fulfilling. There are, however, plenty of 
other examples of preferences for things that cannot be conceived of as mental 
states: the sort of values that do not seem to be experienced. Griffin refers to 
authenticity in the realm of friendship:
Even if I were surrounded by consummate actors able to give me sweet 
simulacra of love and affection, I should prefer the relatively bitter diet of their 
authentic reactions. And I should prefer it not because it would be morally 
better, or aesthetically better, or more noble, but because it would make a 
better life for me to live.
(Griffin, 1986: 9).
The point Griffin makes is that authenticity does not enter experience at all, ‘all that 
can enter is what is common to both my truly having such relations and my merely 
believing that I do’ (Griffin, 1986: 19). The counter argument would be that if we do 
not know any better our well-being would remain unaffected. Sumner however, 
considers this defence of the mental state theory flawed.
If what you have treasured as an important ingredient of your well-being -  
your accomplishments, say, or your deep personal relations -  turns out to have 
been an elaborate deception, you are likely to feel hurt and betrayed. How else 
to explain this, except to say that, at least in this area of your life, what 
mattered to you was not merely how things seemed but how they actually 
were? Your reaction to the deception certainly looks, and feels, like a 
reassessment, in the light of your own priorities, of how well your life has been 
going for you. And that seems to place it squarely within the domain of 
prudential value.
(Sumner, 2000: 6).
Valuing authenticity over deception is what Griffin would deem a basic preference, 
here there is no comparison of mental states, because authentic friendships would be 
experienced in just the same way as a successful deception. This supports the point 
made by both Finnis (1983) and Griffin (1986): we do not just want the feelings that 
friendship provoke, but genuine friendships themselves. Genuine friendships are 
most important to us. This seems to extend to other areas as well, we may strive to 
accomplish something (another of Griffin’s examples), but we do not just want to 
feel we have accomplished (this could perhaps be achieved through the lowering of
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one’s expectations), but to truly accomplish. Having considered Griffin’s examples I 
suggest that though pleasure is not an inconsiderable good, we may enhance our 
well-being in its absence, and indeed consider the less pleasurable option to be better 
for us.
2.4.3 Can we be mistaken in judgements of our well-being?
The critique so far leaves itself open to following response. We may value a great 
deal more than just pleasure or positive affect, but subjective well-being is not 
another name for hedonism (Diener et al., 1998). The appreciation of the relation of 
pleasure to value, the response would claim, the need to understand how we do not 
judge our life and the options it provides by the positive/negative affect ratio is 
entirely encompassed within the domain of life satisfaction. This domain would 
reflect my want to have good relationships, make the most of myself, and 
accomplish this or that. It recognises these values and incorporates them.
Criticisms of the concept of ‘life satisfaction* strike at the very basis of subjective 
well-being. Life satisfaction retains agent sovereignty over decisions as to what 
enhances well-being. Asking whether an individual can be mistaken in such 
assessments concerns the efficacy of this concept in psychological well-being 
research.
It does seem that we can be mistaken in judgements of our own well-being. Those 
living in deprived circumstances, or perhaps suffering abuse or malnutrition may not 
always recognise their own deprivation; they may even rate their well-being 
relatively positively. Martha Nussbaum devotes an entire chapter to such ‘adaptive 
preferences’ in Women and Human Development (Nussbaum, 2000a). Subjective 
well-being would, with its emphasis on agent sovereignty, be unable to criticise such 
adaptive preferences. In acknowledging this indifference to instances of deprivation, 
we must recognise the limitations of subjective well-being as a foundation for public 
policy. Subjective ratings, it seems, can also be misleading at other end of the scale. 
Those more fortunate may have adapted to their favourable circumstances and
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adjusted their expectations accordingly, wanting more again, and feeling less 
satisfied at not having it. The crux of the matter seems to be that if we accept purely 
subjective measures, one can enhance one’s well-being just by wanting less. And 
any account of well-being which accepted this would be on worse than shaky 
ground.
2.5 Subjective well-being in the exercise psychology research
In this section I will consider two examples of research conducted in the field of 
exercise psychology utilising the concept of subjective well-being. Following brief 
descriptions of the studies, some criticisms of the use of a subjectivist conception 
follow.
A study investigating ‘Social relations, physical activity and well-being in older 
adults’ (McAuley et al., 2000) concerned a sustained period of either aerobic activity 
or stretching and toning for two randomised samples of previously sedentary 
participants. Subjective well-being was conceptualised through the measurement of 
two affective states, happiness and loneliness, and the cognitive evaluation of 
satisfaction with one’s life. The six month exercise interventions were found to have 
positive effects on subjective well-being (McAuley et al., 2000). Interestingly there 
was no significant difference between the different activity type and impact upon 
subjective well-being, suggesting that activity need not be aerobic or vigorous to 
enhance subjective well-being (ibid.). Structural analyses found a relationship 
between social relations and increases in life satisfaction as well as decreases in 
loneliness. Consistent with the hallmarks of subjective well-being identified earlier, 
social relations are considered as influences on well-being rather than a constituent 
of the concept. This could be interpreted as understanding the importance of social 
relations as a mere means to the end of how they make us feel.
A large scale population study also offered support for the case of exercise in terms 
of increased subjective well-being through identifying the lower stress and life 
dissatisfaction found in those who exercise (Schnor et a l, 2005). The study
31
comprised a survey of those participating in The Copenhagen Heart Study, asking 
about exercise habits and the participants’ well-being. Data was taken at two 
separate points, the first from 1976-8 the second 1981-3. The method employed lead 
to an acknowledged difficulty in establishing cause and effect (Schnor et al., 2005).: 
do those of higher well-being (or lower levels of dissatisfaction and stress in this 
study) engage in more exercise, or does exercise lead to reductions in stress and life 
dissatisfaction? Schnor et al., however, offer some support for the contribution of 
exercise to well-being. Sedentary individuals who became more active, (such 
individuals were considered sedentary in the first study 1976-8, with their increased 
levels of physical activity reflected in the second assessment of 1981-3) 
demonstrated reduced dissatisfaction and stress.
Well-being is again understood in subjective fashion, an affective (the stress 
element) and cognitive (dissatisfaction) component is evident. The measurement of 
stress and life dissatisfaction fails to assess positive affect in particular and unusually 
considers life satisfaction in the negative but nevertheless the concept has sufficient 
similarity to the psychological concept of subjective well-being.
Having described these methodologically different studies utilising a subjective 
conception of well-being, or aspects of this conception, I can now move forward to 
the critique, analysing the implications of such a stance in the exercise and sports 
domains.
2.5.1 The concept o f affect
Despite the conclusion that the concept of affect does not necessarily imply the 
presence of a single mental state that comprises well-being, there remains a 
persuasive argument for looking at affect (or more precisely the pleasures of 
exercise) in greater depth. A qualitative study of the effects of exercise on a 
depressed sample recognised that whilst participants reported positive mood after 
activity the effect was short-lived (Faulkner and Biddle, 2004). Certain forms of 
affect may be somewhat transient. Kupperman (2003) usefully distinguishes among
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felt pleasures and has considered the implications for public policy. Certain 
pleasures, for example, are short term; we adapt quickly through a process he refers 
to as the ‘hedonic treadmill,’11 and then the elevated feeling state disappears. Other 
affects though are less susceptible to this feature. An important conceptualisation of 
the more extended pleasures is found in the much utilised concept of ‘flow’.
The “flow” experiences (of being caught up in exercise of skills) reported by 
Csikszentmihalyi’s subjects also can be related to sense of self, especially 
when there is room to be proud of the skills involved; and these satisfactions 
too can be largely exempt from the hedonic treadmill.
(Kupperman, 2003: 26).
This forms part of Kupperman’s broader thesis that ‘increased satisfactions (or 
dissatisfactions) that are related to the sense of self are not subject to the hedonic 
treadmill in the same way’ (2003: 26). Kupperman’s suggestions here are not firm 
but they certainly provide food for thought. Attending in greater depth to the 
different types of satisfaction that exercise may provide may help us to understand 
those activities that provide a longer lasting satisfaction. The indications above seem 
to argue for more meaningful activities, perhaps sitting on an exercise bike and the 
following ‘buzz’ of endorphins rushing around our body upon completion may be 
short lived and therefore have limited implications for our well-being. A more 
meaningful activity, the learning of a new skill, mastering something, working with 
others, may encourage pleasures with greater meaning to our lives and offer greater 
benefit to well-being. In the mean time of course, as Kupperman indicates, we must 
be careful in advocating government policies that seek to enhance pleasures, without 
fully understanding the pleasures that have most relation to our well-being.
2.5.2 Pleasure and well-being
There is more to well-being than pleasurable mental states. Indeed, a focus on the 
state itself may be to over emphasise certain trivial or transient pleasures. As Griffin
11 The ‘hedonic treadmill’ refers to a process of adaptation to enhanced satisfaction, so even if the 
circumstances that promote the enhanced satisfaction are maintained, we may not continue to 
experience this elevated state.
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(1986) suggests, we also value things other than mental states and our choices reflect 
this. Friendship provides an example of something so valuable it should not merely 
be assessed in terms of the subjective states it promotes. Indeed, many of the things 
we value most, and presumably consider good for our well-being do not appear 
‘pleasurable.’ This philosophical position has found empirical support in recent 
psychological research (Vitterso, 2004) using quantitative methods to distinguish 
significantly between subjective well-being (which was associated with 
pleasantness) and openness to experience (interestingness and challenge). This 
provides empirical support for my philosophical contention that the methodology of 
subjective well being research is epistemologically inadequate on the grounds of 
reducing the latter (accomplishment, challenge, friendship, mastery and so on) to the 
former (felt pleasure).
Not only is it inadequate to say that our valuing sport and other forms of exercise is 
dependent on pleasure, there may even be some instances in which physical activity 
is not pleasurable, yet still enhances well-being. Pleasure may not be necessary or 
sufficient for physical activity to enhance well-being. Hochstetler (2003) refers to 
sport and claims that ‘Part of understanding sport, then, is paying attention to the 
prose, the everyday, the arduous, the repetitive’ (2003: 232). Nevertheless, we 
continue to participate because we consider our well-being enhanced regardless of 
this absence of the pleasurable aspects.
A commonly accepted benefit of physical activity is its potential to improve
1 9functioning. This may in turn improve one’s abilities to conduct household tasks, 
getting around the house itself may be easier, gardening, visiting friends, taking a 
walk, playing with the children or grandchildren may all be easier for the more 
active individual. This has formed an important aspect of the rationale for physical 
activity particularly for the older population. It is possible that these daily 
functionings were so important to an individual that they were miserable when they
12 For a detailed philosophical discussion of quality of life conceived of as capability to function see 
The Quality o f Life (eds. M.C. Nussbaum and A. Sen), 1993, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chapters five, 
six and seven of this thesis make extensive reference to Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.
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were less capable to carry them out and retained elevated subjective well-being after 
becoming more active and thus more capable of certain activities/functionings. 
Conversely, it is also perfectly feasible that - adaptable as we are - reduced capability 
to undertake certain activities did not impinge on subjective well-being. Moreover, 
having become more active it is reasonable to assume that we could simply take for 
granted the new found functionings and enhanced autonomy. Regardless of the 
extent to which these changes impacted upon subjective well-being it seems clear 
that they are not solely valuable in terms of the changes in subjective states they 
provoke.
The potential that physical activity has to increase our opportunities, not only to 
conduct daily tasks with greater ease but to learn new skills, get out of the house, 
meet new people, try new things, challenge ourselves and indeed accomplish feats, 
cannot be reduced solely to affect or satisfaction. Any policy decisions taken to 
enhance well-being must recognise the value of the above independently of the 
pleasure they may or may not be associated with. Kupperman (2003) aware of the 
transient nature of some pleasures has recognised this:
7/There is any justification for governments or nongovernmental organizations 
to attempt to change levels of felt well-being in the population, we need to 
discriminate among the kinds of felt satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) that one 
attempts to change. Money is better spent on increasing opportunities to 
acquire and exercise significant skills than on measures designed to increase 
comfort or improve the general ratio of pleasures to pains.
(Kupperman, 2003: 26).
Kupperman (2003) has suggested that pleasures associated with learning new skills, 
with greater relation to one’s sense of self, may be longer lasting. It is plausible, 
however, that in certain instances well-being is enhanced in the absence of pleasure. 
The relationships, mastery, enhanced freedom to conduct daily tasks, all associated 
with exercise, may be important to our well-being, without always impacting upon 
measures of positive affect.
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2.5.3 Well-being and mistaken judgements in exercise and sports domains
Measures of well-being that are entirely subjective do not have the capability to 
criticise behaviours considered by the individual to enhance well-being, but that 
appear from the outside to be doing just the opposite. They rely solely on the 
judgements of the individual concerned. Loumidis and Wells (2001) discuss those 
who exercise on the back of flawed perceptions of their body, or to enhance mood, 
covering up deeper problems. This certainly seems ill-informed and I question the 
relation of such behaviour to well-being. Our own subjective assessments, how we 
feel, or whether our desires are satisfied, may not always tell the whole picture when 
it comes to evaluating properly the contribution of exercise to well-being. The 
‘shifting goalposts’ effect, evident when body satisfaction and body image fail to 
improve through exercise, indicates the fallibility of such judgements. A gap is left 
between the subjective judgement of the physical self and physical condition as 
determined by fitness and other factors (Fox, 2000). Continued exercise motivated 
by flawed perceptions of the self, may be seen by the misconceived individual as the 
route to well-being, but in reality may lead to further frustration and negative health 
implications.
Further examples of how an individual may be mistaken in judgments of how sport 
or other exercise enhances well-being include over-training (Lehman et al., 1993; 
Meehan et al., 2004) or even exercise-addiction (for a review see Szabo, 2000). Here 
participation may be thought to enhance well-being, but in fact be doing damage. 
Again, the apparent pleasures of exercise, perhaps the rush of endorphins upon 
completing a hard run or training session, are misleading as to our well-being. The 
negative health implications aside, there is also the interesting question of balance in 
a good life. Someone who is addicted to exercise or trains to the exclusion of other 
activities may be excluding other important values from his/her life. Reference was 
made earlier to how exercise may expand our opportunities, referring amongst other 
examples to the potential to meet new people. For the exercise addict or the over 
trainer the opposite seems to be happening. The individual limits the extent to which 
other values such as friendship; or indeed just enjoying activities in a more playful
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manner may play a part in a good life. An objective stance on well-being would 
claim that certain values are essential to the individual having a good life, or 
achieving well-being. A further stipulation of some such theories is that all of these 
values must be present in a life; we cannot get by just by focusing on one or two. 
Nussbaum’s (2000a) list of central capabilities provides one important example of 
this.
The list is, emphatically, a list of separate components. We cannot satisfy the 
need for one of them by giving a larger amount of another one. All are of 
central importance and all are distinct in quality. The irreducible plurality of 
the list limits the trade-offs that it will be reasonable to make, and thus limits 
the applicability of quantitative cost-benefit analysis.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 81).
Subjective well-being, in its indifference to how we derive positive affect, or how we 
come to be satisfied with our lives, does not have the tools to criticise behaviours 
that seem to neglect what matters to us in the round. Exclusively subjective theories 
suffer in that they have little to say about obviously destructive behaviours such as 
over training or the types of exercising for the wrong reasons described by Loumidis 
and Wells (2001), so long as these seem to be satisfying some desire, however ill- 
informed, or enhancing feeling states, however much these cover up deeper seated 
problems (Loumidis and Wells, 2001). The extension of this argument, that a life 
must have some balance to it, containing certain central values, is contrary to the 
premise of subjective well-being. If one is satisfied with life and has a life 
characterised by positive emotional experience, it does not matter to the proponent of 
subjective well-being whether this is achieved through an obsessive focus with, say 
achieving something, a characteristic of the over trainer perhaps, or through a more 
balanced life. The notion of balance is based upon an objective theory that asserts the 
importance of each of its values and indeed details how such values support each 
other. That it would be better for us if we have a balanced life, rather than pursuing 
isolated values or goals does retain initial plausibility, and is a conclusion only 
available within a framework asserting the objective value of each of its constituents.
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That we can be mistaken in our judgements of what enhances well-being alludes to 
previous criticisms of subjective theories of well-being. Both Griffin (1986) and 
Sumner (2000) agree that well-being cannot be reduced entirely to how life feels on
• 13the inside. Loumidis and Wells (2001) also share a suspicion of an emphasis on 
feeling states, one may use exercise to feel better in the short term, but this might 
mask longer term problems. In order to conduct a proper assessment of the value of 
sport and exercise to our well-being, analysis must extend further than an exclusive 
emphasis on felt pleasure or similar sensations. Our well-being cannot be reduced to 
how we feel from the inside without distorted results.
It has been argued that the psychological concept of subjective well-being is flawed 
in important ways. In the many contexts of exercise and sport, it is no doubt central 
to their engagement with them that people enjoy the activities and find them 
pleasurable. Nevertheless, the emphasis upon this hedonistic aspect in the 
psychological research has two main disadvantages. First, short-term pleasure and 
enjoyment may mask activities that are doing us no good (Loumidis and Wells, 
2001). Second, even in instances where the behaviour is not necessarily harmful, an 
exclusive focus on pleasure or affect excludes the consideration of other ways in 
which something may enhance well-being. The mastery of new skills and the 
development of social relationships represent examples of how physical activity 
might enhance well-being quite apart from the pleasure with which it may be 
associated.
2.6 Psychological theories of quality of life
Well-being within the psychological literature is, in the main, hostage to a 
subjectivism, damaging to both our understanding of well-being itself, and to our
13 Nozick’s experience machine is the classic example of Sumner and Griffin’s argument here. Nozick 
asks if the reader would plug in to a machine that could simulate any experience desired. Realisation 
that we would not, it is contended, indicates our desire to do certain things and be a certain way, not 
just have the associated experiences. Plugging in, notes Nozick, also prevents our connection to 
anything further or deeper than that which is man made. Nozick’s concluding remarks of the section 
sum up. ‘Perhaps what we desire is to live (an active verb) ourselves, in contact with reality.’ (Nozick, 
1974: 45).
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understanding of how exercise might improve our lives. Quality of life, another 
concept used to express how well life is going; has also been addressed extensively 
within psychological research. This section will comprise of a brief examination of 
selected psychological theories of quality of life. Criticisms of such theories again 
refer to how an individual may be mistaken in their judgements. Subjectivism and its 
related flaws are again apparent within this research.
2.6.1 Psychological Quality of Life; Objective and Subjective
The terms objective and subjective, so prominent in the analysis of well-being, are 
also evident with the quality of life literature. Psychologists and philosophers, as we 
have seen, do not necessarily understand these terms in the same way. This has been 
noted in the case of Kahneman’s ‘objective well-being’ ultimately still dependent 
upon subjective judgements. Rapley (2003) also offers a differing interpretation of 
the terms. A distinction between objective and subjective indicators of quality of life 
at population level is made (Rapley, 2003). An objective indicator of quality of life 
may concern unemployment rate (Noll, 2000) for example, a figure intended to 
exclude subjective evaluations (ibid.). Associating objectivity with supposedly 
value-free measurements represents an acceptance of a particular metaphysical 
stance, the fact/value dichotomy.14 The contention that facts must be value-free, 
confining objectivity to a particularly narrow domain, dominated by science, has 
been damaging to both psychological and physiological understanding of health and 
well-being.15
Poverty is often represented in economic terms but such indicators fail to properly 
represent what matters to human life. Nussbaum and Sen (1993) refer to Dickens’ 
Hard Times in making this very point.
14 For a critique of this dichotomy between fact and value see Putnam (2002).
15 The following chapter addresses the fact/value dichotomy and the rationale for physical activity 
based on physiological evidence, claiming that this rationale is unable to disentangle itself from value 
judgements.
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We need, perhaps above all, to know how people are enabled by the society in 
question to imagine, to wonder, to feel emotions such as love and gratitude, 
that presuppose that life is more than a set of commercial relations, and that the 
human being -  unlike the steam engines of Coketown -  is an ‘unfathomable 
mystery’, not to be completely ‘set forth in tabular form’. In short, to think 
well about Sissy’s problem, we seem to need a kind of rich and complex 
descriptions of what people are able to do and be - a description that may be 
more readily available to the reader of Dickens’s novel than to those who 
confine their reading to the narrowly technical and financial document 
favoured by Sissy’s teachers.
(Nussbaum and Sen, 1993: 1-2).
It is my contention that the ‘rich and complex descriptions of what people are able to 
do and be’ required for a full understanding of quality of life must also extend 
beyond subjective assessments of life satisfaction and pleasure. Psychologists have 
of course recognised the limitations of objective indicators. They have been less 
attentive, however, to the limitations of the subjectivity so dominant in their 
individual level assessments of quality of life.
Psychological approaches are certainly moving toward this subjectivity, this trend in 
no small part due to the perceived inadequacies of more objective theories. Rapley 
refers to ‘The problem of objectivity’:
What all of these approaches share in, then, is their adherence to the theoretical 
(and hence methodological) position which suggests that -  in principle -  all 
states of being in the world are amenable to objective operational definition, 
and meaningful description in numerical terms.
(Rapley, 2003: 64).
This represents a second way in which theories claim objective status, but Rapley 
doubts this status himself. He questions whether quality of life can have the same 
status as objects or things, contrasting these objects with ‘hypothetical constructs -  
such as “intelligence”, “QOL” or “schizophrenia”’. (Rapley, 2003: 65). Concern is 
also expressed at the possibility of the ‘objective’ scores masking the value 
judgements that influence the development of the universal quality of life 
instrument, deciding upon ‘which domains should be measured’ (Rapley, 2003: 66) 
for example. It becomes clear that Rapley considers quality of life as varying
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according to individual and cultural differences, a kind of relativism clearly in 
conflict with theories aspiring to this form of objectivity.
This suspicion of universal measures of quality of life is widely shared within 
psychology. The individual quality of life movement will be discussed as an example 
of research intended to improve upon such measures. As I move on to examine the 
theory behind two selected quality of life measures, it becomes clear, as expected, 
that the psychological approach to quality of life research is based upon the 
perceptions of the individual. In terms of the philosophical distinction made earlier, 
the theories are subjective. Rapley is of course right; we are unable to make 
judgments concerning quality of life without making value judgements, but I 
question whether relying upon the subjective perceptions of the individual is the only 
available option to those of us concerned with quality of life. Can a concept such as 
quality of life so clearly normative, still retain an objective status? Psychologists 
advocating an individual or subjective stance seem to indicate that appropriate 
attention to the individual is incompatible with an objective stance on quality of life.
2.6.2 Psychological quality o f  life: The WHOQOL
In further analysing the manner in which quality of life has been conceptualised 
within the psychological research, two differing approaches will be addressed. As 
the concern is with the theory and assumptions behind such concepts, this section 
does not attempt to review the extensive literature on the subject, rather to illuminate 
the theoretical basis behind the instruments. The development of the WHOQOL is 
the first topic for discussion. The second the SEIQoL (Schedule for the Evaluation of 
Quality of Life), an example of a tool founded in the individual approach to quality 
of life.
The World Health Organisation initiated an international collaboration between 
researchers intended to develop an instrument to measure quality of life (Skevington, 
et al., 2004). The resulting WHOQOL, has also lead to the WHOQOL-old, a quality 
of life instrument for the over 60s, and the WHOQOL-Bref, a shortened version of
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the WHOQOL -  100. In line with the move toward specificity evident in the 
psychological quality of life research there are numerous modifications of the 
WHOQOL. For example the tool has been adjusted to assess the quality of life of 
children (Jirojanakul and Skevington, 2000).
The WHOQOL is certainly, within the philosophical framework, a subjective 
measure. Quality of life is understood as an:
individual’s perception o f their position in life, in the context o f the culture and 
value systems in which they live, and in relation to their goals, expectations, 
standards and concerns.
(WHOQOL Group, 1995).
The measure is concerned solely with the individual’s perception. This subjective 
focus is elaborated upon. Questions concerning perceived objective status, ‘How 
well can you walk?’ (Skevington, et al., 2004: 4) were not included, creating an 
instrument ‘developed entirely of statements at the subjective self-report level.’ 
(ibid.). The instrument was solely concerned with the levels of satisfaction with such 
behaviours, rather than the individual’s assessment of how well they can do them. 
Someone may for example, be aware that they lack mobility, but not be particularly 
dissatisfied or concerned with this.
The WHOQOL is clearly a subjective instrument, but it also strives for the sort of 
universalism Rapley (2003) is suspicious of. The WHOQOL may well be an 
instrument ‘designed by the users for the users’ (Skevington et al., 2004: 3), but it 
still asks its users to rate their quality of life according to a set of predetermined 
scales, and claims that ‘a high level of agreement among peoples from the most 
diverse backgrounds about what constitutes a good QoL and well-being’
(Skevington et al 2004: 7) provides support for a universalist stance. This suggests 
that the domains of the WHOQOL (Physical Health, Psychological, Levels of 
Independence, Social Relationships, Environmental, Spirituality, Religion and 
Personal Beliefs) are central to all of our quality of life, regardless of cultural 
differences.
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Finally, what of the role of health within quality of life, as conceptualised by the 
WHOQOL? It is clear that health is considered central to quality of life. Validation 
for the WHOQOL-Bref for example relies upon its adequately discriminating 
between ill and well groups. (Skevington et al., 2004). The importance allocated to 
health is of course unsurprising in light of the WHO definition of health, indicated as 
the starting point for the project.
We began with the WHO definition of health and took its positive orientation 
towards health as something that is ‘not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity’ as the main principle in the creation of an instrument that transcends 
the problem-centred boundaries necessitated by the clinical consultation and 
provides a holistic, more balanced view of QoL.
(Skevington, et al. 2004: 7)
The WHO defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well­
being and not simply the absence of disease or infirmity.’ (WHO, 1948). The 
definition refers to well-being and not quality of life, of course, but nevertheless, 
research influenced by this approach, such as that conducted by the WHOQOL- 
Group, is left in little doubt that being healthy is central to a good life. This may 
seem somewhat obvious, but in the following section, that concerning the Individual 
Quality of Life movement, this connection between health and quality of life is 
questioned.
2.6.3 Individual quality of life: The SEIQoL
Rapley (2003) is not alone in doubting the universal or generic measures of quality 
of life. Those researchers keen to retain maximum sensitivity to individual 
differences have sought to conceptualise quality of life in a different way. The 
Schedule for the Evaluation of Quality of Life and the theory behind it clearly 
sympathises with the stance of those such as Rapley. Its proponents describe the 
initial stages of the assessment:
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the interview takes between 30 and 45 minutes to complete. Its first objectives 
are to clarify the concept of QoL for the respondent and to elicit elements 
(cues) that the subject considers contribute to his own QoL. As few as three or 
as many as eight can be accommodated, but if the number is small, he is 
encouraged to nominate more. Preferably one will fall in each of the generally 
agreed QoL domains -  Cognitive, Affective, Social, Physical, Ecological, and 
Religious
(Joyce et al., 2003: 277)
The SEIQoL also allows the respondent to decide upon the importance of the elicited 
areas, through rating the quality of life of 30-50 hypothetical individuals, the profile 
of which are based on the cues derived from the process described above. The 
respondent is also asked to rate his satisfaction with those areas deemed central to 
his/her life.
This measure is subjective at core, although it hopes the respondent’s areas match 
with more generally recognised areas of importance. Basically the individual defines 
his/her quality of life, decides upon the importance of each area to a life, and 
indicates current satisfaction with these areas.
Proponents of Individual Quality of Life have also conducted a recent review of 
literature ‘Measuring Health-Related Quality of Life in Older Populations’. (Hickey, 
et al., 2005) They observe that the ‘majority of studies used a generic HR-QOL 
instrument’ (2005: 971), and questioned this approach. The concern is that these 
generic measures focus on physical function and are likely to elicit low scores of 
HR-QOL for the older population studied. This may not account for how 
expectations of physical function adapt with age.
This predefinition of scale items allows little flexibility for respondents, and 
the item content (although scorable) may be of little relevance to an individual 
in a particular context. For this reason measures may lack sensitivity to small 
but significant changes. More importantly, perhaps, such fixed-scale item 
scales impose an external value system on patients/respondents that may have 
little meaning for that person at that particular point in time.
(Hickey et al., 2005: 988-9)
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Individual Quality of Life measures such as the SEIQoL would overcome this 
difficulty. The authors also point to the numerous disease and population specific 
instruments that may overcome some of these problems.
Individual quality of life measures have also indicated that the relationship between 
health and quality of life is less straightforward than one would expect. They point to 
Waldron et al. (1999), where terminally ill patients with cancer still reported good 
quality of life, as established by the SEIQoL. This is a particularly interesting area 
for discussion. Ill health may lead to contemplation of what really matters, clarity 
previously absent. How one understands the relationship between health and well­
being, of course, depends upon the conception of health employed. Adaptive theories 
of health suggest that with the certainty of chronic illness for many of us, our health 
is best conceptualised by how we adapt to such challenges. ‘On this view then, to be 
healthy is not to correspond with some fixed norm, but to make the most of one’s life 
in whatever circumstances one finds oneself (Boyd, 2000: 14). In this sense, being 
healthy is not incompatible with having one’s life impacted upon by disease or 
illness. There is however, a danger that a conceptualisation of health and well-being 
grounded entirely in subjective assessments is indifferent to the formation of 
adaptive preferences. An individual may adjust to poor health, malnutrition for 
example, and put up with things, rating both their health and quality of life 
favourably. The need to be respectful of the fulfilment and clarity that some gain 
during serious illness must be balanced with a need to recognise and indeed question 
certain adaptive preferences, such as those formed in instances of deprivation and 
malnutrition. We must be careful that the astounding ability of many to be happy in 
instances of deprivation does not undermine the necessity to challenge such 
circumstances as unacceptable. Indeed this discussion serves to indicate the 
difficulties that surround any theory of well-being or quality of life. Any objective 
theory must certainly remain open to the diverse ways, and indeed circumstances, in 
which the values on its list might be pursued.
Quality of life within the psychological literature does not represent a single stance, 
but a wide variety of sometimes conflicting definitions. I have selected two examples
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of quality of life instruments, and focused upon the theory that underpins them.
Three themes have come to the fore and warrant further philosophical analysis. The 
first is the familiar theme of subjectivity. Both of the instruments above focus upon 
subjective perceptions of quality of life, and this I can safely indicate is 
representative of the psychological literature. The second theme is that of specificity. 
Disease specific and population specific measures are common, intended to be more 
sensitive to those issues salient to the studied population. Third, I will make a start 
on the analysis of the role health might play in quality of life. This discussion will 
form an introduction to the topic; continued in the following chapter.
2.7 Psychological quality of life: A philosophical critique
Psychological research has retreated to subjective stances on well-being in response 
to a previous rigidity that lacked attention to individual difference. Nussbaum 
recognises this reaction to the ‘simplified mathematical representation of complex 
human matters’ (Nussbaum, 1993a: 233)
a reaction by now itself well entrenched in the social sciences. This alternative 
approach insists on restoring human self-interpretations to the sphere of social 
analysis in all their richness and variety. But itxs proponents frequently give up 
on practical reason, holding that there is no way in which reason can really 
resolve evaluative disputes.
(Nussbaum, 1993a: 233).
Those supporting an individual approach to quality of life should be commended for 
their attention to individual difference, but these approaches offers no way in which 
to question or criticise those concepts of quality of life put forward by the individual. 
We may have a rich picture of what that person says makes up his or her quality of 
life, but we cannot enter into any form of critical discussion regarding the 
constituents of someone’s well-being, whether for example they have adapted to be 
happy with less. The sole emphasis on the individual here seems at odds with how 
we consider our judgements. It is common for someone, looking back on his/her life 
to say that ‘I got my priorities mixed up’ at a certain stage. My analysis of subjective 
well-being indicated how certain desires for goods can be misinformed, their
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satisfaction failing to enhance life.16 The propensity for such mistakes is likely to 
distort measures such as the SEIQoL. Ratings of importance of certain areas of life 
may be based on ill-informed desires, or beliefs that success in a certain area would 
improve a life more than it actually would. There is also the possibility that our 
preferences adapt to circumstance, we may express satisfaction with very little, even 
in deprived circumstances, or only be satisfied with extreme luxury. Neither of these 
preferences should pass without critical comment.
This critical point, however, does not seek to dismiss the importance of subjective 
judgements altogether. No doubt we vary in the importance we attach to certain 
domains or values within our lives. Any successful quality of life instrument needs 
to recognise this, as the SEIQoL does. Enjoying and being satisfied with life are also 
of great importance. Approaches such as the SEIQoL, however, are so entrenched in 
the subjective perspective that they are unable to account for mistaken judgements in 
the domain of quality of life, and for the possibility that quality of life might be 
enhanced in the absence of favourable attitudes. The latter, I argue is a possibility 
that should not be dismissed at this early stage. The increased functioning associated 
with exercise, discussed earlier, may not be accompanied by any increase in 
pleasure; indeed the individual may be indifferent to this apparent advantage. The 
possibility, however, that well-being or quality of life might still be said to be 
improved by the increase in function certainly warrants consideration.
One way of overcoming some of the limitations of generic instruments, particularly 
if the instrument is being used with certain populations, is to make the measure 
population specific.
Assessing change over time in health-related quality of life (HRQL) requires 
instruments capable of capturing any changes that, even if small, are important 
to patients. This instrument property, referred to as responsiveness, guides 
researchers’ choices of HRQL measures for clinical trials.
(Wiebe et al., 2003: 52).
16 Griffin’s (1986) rejection of an actual desire account of well-being elaborates upon the ways in 
which desires can be ill-informed.
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Indeed Wiebe et al., (2003) concluded that specific instruments offer this enhanced 
responsiveness. Does such a conclusion amount to a challenge to universality or 
objectivity? If an objective theory of quality of life claims that certain values are 
important to us all, can we reconcile this with the trend toward measures of quality 
of life specific to a population? This trend certainly, on the face of it, points toward 
some kind of relativity.
Specificity may not, however, threaten universality, or indeed objectivity, if it is 
understood in a certain fashion. Griffin argues that certain prudential values are 
central to all of our lives, but recognises that conceptions of quality of life may vary:
We need the broad conception of quality of life (that is, the list of prudential 
values) for the reasoning about how to make our lives go best. Doctors need it 
for decisions about certain patients. But there are many reasons, both moral 
and practical, to work with a narrower conception of the quality of life in 
taking certain social decisions. And it may be (I strongly suspect it is) that we 
need several different conceptions of the quality of life for different sorts of 
social decisions. That is, we need both the broad conception and also an 
understanding of the various considerations at work in generating narrower 
conceptions.
(Griffin, 1993: 139).
The broad conception could still in some way inform other conceptions of quality of 
life. For example, those concerns that help us generate a disease specific measure 
may still relate to the general values of the broader conception, but be specified so as 
to relate to the relevant population. Nussbaum (2000a) suggests that her list of 
universal capabilities can be realised in a number of ways, context central to how 
these broad values may be specified.
It is beyond the scope of this brief foray into quality of life measures to argue that 
this is precisely the manner in which the plethora of disease specific measures 
operate, i.e. that they are concrete specifications of a universal value profile. 
Regardless as to whether this applies to the psychological literature, it is clear that 
specificity of this kind need not contradict an argument for broad universal values 
constituting quality of life.
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Rapley (2003: 67) questions whether ‘any given set of domains identified by the 
questionnaire designer is itself genuinely representative of QOL\ He points towards 
earlier research (Rapley et al., 1998) suggesting that enforced sterilization; the denial 
of adulthood; the absence of autonomy; stigma, belittlement and rejection; and an 
awareness that these were the results of being identified as an ‘intellectually disabled 
person’ (Rapley, 2003: 67) are essential to the understanding of the subjective 
quality of life of those with mild intellectual disabilities. Without questioning the 
importance of such factors, it is also possible to locate them within Griffin’s broad 
prudential value profile. This includes the values autonomy, choosing one’s course
1 7through life; liberty, and deep personal relationships. Indeed, in criticism of the 
relativistic argument, there are dangers in suggesting that certain values, commonly 
perceived as essential to living a good life are not central to certain populations. 
Nussbaum (2006a) still considers her single list of central capabilities to be
1 ftimportant to those with severe mental impairments. There is a danger in an 
alternative list providing an excuse for policy not delivering on matters central to 
human life. Nussbaum is anxious that difficult or expensive goals are not avoided on 
the grounds that good living for those with mental impairments is a different matter 
than good living for those without such impairments. This would ultimately result in 
denial of the ‘prerequisites of a good human life’ (Nussbaum, 2006a: 190), on the 
grounds that flourishing is an entirely different thing for those with mental 
impairments.
Finally, I move onto discuss the relationship between health and quality of life.
Those behind the WHOQOL are clear that they consider health and quality of life 
closely related, this follows from the WHO’s definition of health, connecting so 
closely with well-being. Hickey et al. (2005) indicate that the relationship is more 
complex, those in seemingly poor health, rating their quality of life highly. After 
extensive discussion of well-being and quality of life, it is easy to forget that health 
itself is a contested concept. The way in which someone understands their health will
17 See Griffin (1986: 67) for the full list and an extended discussion of its components.
18 See Nussbaum (2006a) pp. 186-95.
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have a bearing on how one understands such relationships. If one conceptualises 
health in purely biological terms, quality of life can be seen as operating more 
independently from health. Certain diseases or conditions may exist without really 
impacting upon the individual’s quality of life. The following chapter considers 
different theories of health, arguing against the biomedical model in which health, 
disease and illness are conceptualised in an apparently scientific value-free fashion. 
These concepts, I argue, entangle fact and value. Health, I contend, cannot be 
isolated from considerations of those aspects central to our well-being.
2.8 Conclusion
The basis of subjective well-being, that the individual should retain ‘agent 
sovereignty’, being the sole judge of his/her well-being has been questioned. We do 
not always know what is best for us. We may continue with a particular route, as in 
the examples of over training and exercise addiction, convinced it is of benefit when 
in fact it is doing us harm. The subjective theories of both well-being and quality of 
life examined here have no way of questioning such behaviour, having handed over 
epistemic authority solely to the individual.
The majority of the argument has been in negative terms, setting out the 
disadvantages of adopting a subjective conception of well-being. A positive 
argument, for an objective conception, has been implied at best. Support of such a 
conception while muted, is nevertheless evident throughout the chapter. Reference 
has been made to the value of sport or exercise in the absence of subjective 
endorsement, to the importance of expanding opportunities, meeting new people, 
conducting daily tasks with greater ease, and the claim that these benefits of physical 
activity cannot be meaningfully reduced to increased levels in satisfaction or positive 
affect. In addressing the trend toward disease and population specific measures of 
quality of life, I have also suggested how objective values may retain the ability to 
account for individual and cultural differences. Any objectivist must develop a 
theory sensitive to such differences. This chapter has not sought to dismiss the value 
of pleasure derived from or found in sport or exercise, but to recognise why we enjoy
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it. I argue that a proper recognition of the values we hold central to our lives may 
help us to understand and construct physical activity in a way that reflects these 
values, thus maximising the benefits to our well-being.
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Chapter Three
H e a l t h , w e l l -b e in g  a n d  t h e  f a c t /v a l u e  d ic h o t o m y
3.1 Introduction
The subjective theories of well-being and quality of life prominent within the 
psychology and exercise psychology literatures have been examined and criticised. 
These criticisms have been based upon the subjectivity that these theories 
presuppose and their inability to accommodate our being mistaken as to what is in 
our best interests. With this inadequacy of the subjective theories exposed, I turn to a 
rationale for physical activity, emphasising its health benefits, based on biomedical 
‘facts.’ The objectivity that this research claims may overcome certain of the 
limitations inherent in the subjective theories.
It is argued, however, that both the subjective psychological theories of well-being, 
and the objective biomedical theories of health are hostage to a metaphysical 
doctrine (Putnam, 2002) affirming a dichotomy between fact and value. The 
subjective theories assert that any matters of value are entirely down to the 
individual’s judgment; the agent determines her own well-being and such 
conclusions are beyond criticism. The biomedical case examined within the third and 
final section of this chapter understands concepts such as health, illness and disease 
in value-free terms. The case for the health benefits of exercise appears to be 
afforded primacy because of its apparent distance from matters of value. This 
dichotomy between fact and value is untenable. I argue that concepts such as health 
disease and illness, central to the World Health Organisation’s rationale for physical 
activity, rely upon ideas of how we as humans need to function in order to live good 
lives. The entanglement of fact and value within concepts such as health, disease and 
illness urges us not to dismiss these critical concepts as subjective, but rather to place 
their scientific, value-free form of objectivity under scrutiny. This paves the way for 
objectivity within the realm of value, applicable not only to concepts such as health, 
disease and illness, but also to well-being.
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Prior to the critique of the World Health Organisation’s rationale, however, it is 
important to properly frame this debate. The structure of the chapter will therefore be 
as follows. First (section 3.2) I will provide a brief description of how philosophical 
theories of health have been classified. The following section concerns the 
entanglement of fact and value. Putnam’s (2002) work helps us understand not only 
how scientific facts are laden with value, but also how concepts that entangle fact 
and value can retain objective status. This provides a foundation for the 
consideration of objective conceptions of well-being in later chapters. In light of the 
above, in examine a mainly biomedical case for physical activity provided by the 
World Health Organisation (section 3.4). The rationale, in its implicit support of the 
dichotomy between fact and value, affords primacy to the biomedical research 
associating physical activity with disease prevention. The rationale is unable to 
afford a proper place to those values entangled with concepts such as health, disease 
and illness and thus fails to recognise how such values offer alternative ways in 
which to understand the contribution of physical activity to health and well-being.
3.2 Theories of health
Approaches to conceptualising health have often been distinguished in relation to 
whether they consider its most basic aspects value-free or not. Theories that consider 
health at root to be a value-laden concept can be termed normative. Richman (2004) 
provides a useful explanation of the distinction.
Some theories tell us how things are and imply nothing about whether it is 
desirable that things be that way. Others tell us how things should be, are 
supposed to be, or ought to be, how it is best for things to be. They identify 
certain states of affairs as having positive value, as being better than (at least 
some) of the alternatives. They are evaluative or, as I say, normative.
(Richman, 2004: 5-6).
Richman goes onto describe the reluctance to accept normative theories of health on 
the basis that they cannot be scientific and lack objective basis. This stance 
presupposes an acceptance of a fact/value dichotomy. Decisions concerning values
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are deemed to be matters of personal taste, with no objective basis. Conversely the 
scientific realm of value-free facts offers firm ground for rational decisions.
Nordenfelt (1987) makes a further distinction that is both related to and expands 
upon that made between normative and non-normative theories of health. This is the 
distinction between holistic and analytic theories of health. The holistic perspective 
‘focuses on the general state of a human being and considers whether or not the 
person is healthy. This means asking questions such as the following: How does this 
person feel? What is he able to do? Can he function in a social context?’ (Nordenfelt, 
1987: 11-12). The second perspective concerns the structure and function of the 
body. ‘One asks questions such as: Is this organ normal? What is the pulse rate of 
this man? What does the tissue of a liver look like? What capacity do the lungs 
have?’ (Nordenfelt, 1987: 12). The analytic theory seems closer to non-normative, or 
naturalistic theories, focusing upon the biology of organs, and defining health in this 
apparently-value free sense. The holistic perspective appears to start from 
evaluations (and is thus normative) about what a person can do. Nordenfelt refers to 
the conceptual relatedness of health and disease (Nordenfelt, 1987: 13), and how the 
choice as to which concept is basic is likely to correspond to the perspective on 
health that one holds. Defining health in terms of disease fits with the analytic 
perspective and its emphasis on the organs of the body and whether they are 
functioning normally. Starting with health fits with the holistic perspective and its 
emphasis on the more normative factors concerning what one is able to do.
This brief summary offers some insight into how theories of health have been 
classified. This will be of particular use for the final section of the chapter, an 
examination of the World Health Organisation’s rationale for physical activity. Here 
I argue that the concept of health central to the rationale cannot be understood in 
value-free terms. Nordenfelt’s ‘Holistic Theory o f Health' (Nordenfelt, 2007a: 7) it 
is contended, starting from evaluations of what we are able to do, offers a more
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suitable perspective within which to contemplate health and indeed the health 
benefits of physical activity.19
3.3 The fact/value dichotomy
It is the contention of this chapter that health is a value-laden concept. This, 
however, need not mean that the concept has no objective description, or that it does 
not connect with fact. On the contrary I argue for an objective conception of health 
(and indeed well-being) within this thesis as a whole. This objectivity clearly differs 
to the scientific, value-free form. Health, disease and illness, I contend in the final 
section of this chapter, are concepts that entangle fact and value. This section focuses 
upon entanglement itself, understanding its implications, not just for health related 
matters but also for ethics as a whole.
The significance of Putnam’s contention that certain concepts entangle fact and 
value is best observed having considered the fact/value dichotomy, and its continued 
support:
The idea that “value judgements are subjective” is a piece of philosophy that 
has gradually come to be accepted by many people as if it were common sense. 
In the hands of sophisticated thinkers this idea can be and has been developed 
in different ways. The ones I shall be concerned with hold that “statements of 
fact” are capable of being “objectively true” and capable, as well, of being 
“objectively warranted,” while value judgements, according to these thinkers, 
are incapable of object truth and objective warrant. Value judgements, 
according to the most extreme proponents of a sharp “fact/value” dichotomy, 
are completely outside the sphere of reason.
(Putnam, 2002: 1).
Putnam (2002) points out that making a distinction between facts and values in
9  1certain situations need not have any harmful repercussions. The dichotomy 
described above, however, accompanies a distinction with ‘a highly contentious set
19 This perspective is not accepted uncritically, however. The subjectivity inherent in Nordenfelt’s 
approach is criticised later in this chapter.
20 Following John Dewey to whom he makes extensive reference.
21 These distinctions may not have ‘any implications at all as to whether value judgements can or can 
not be true or false, justified or unjustified’ (Putnam, 2002: 61)
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of metaphysical claims’ (Putnam, 2002: 61) regarding the objectivity of facts and 
subjectivity of values, banishing a substantial proportion of our language to a sphere 
beyond reason. An acceptance of the dichotomy ‘functions as a discussion stopper, 
and not just a discussion stopper, but a thought stopper’ (Putnam, 2002: 44). This, of 
course, would prevent any real discussion as to what constitutes our well-being. Our 
only option would be to conclude that such judgements are purely a matter of 
subjective preference. The first chapter marked the initial stages in the debate as to 
how best to understand well-being, rejecting the exclusively subjective 
psychological approaches. This chapter, and succeeding chapters, rely upon 
Putnam’s criticisms of the dichotomy to justify objective judgements concerning our 
well-being, as well as to justify more general conclusions on physical activity’s 
contribution to well-being.
Recognising the entanglement of fact and value paves the way for a proper 
consideration of objectivity in the realm of value judgements. This objectivity has 
not been contemplated by the psychologists whose assumptions were subject to 
criticism in the previous chapter; or the physiologists and epidemiologists whose 
research underpins the scientific rationale criticised in this chapter. That value 
judgments can achieve this objectivity is of course, good news for anyone hoping to 
debate the value of exercise to well-being. Entanglement itself encourages thorough 
reflection upon well-being and other related concepts, with the hope of real progress.
3.3.1 The entanglement o f fact and value
The suggestion that science offers a value-neutral route to objectivity is extensively 
criticised by Putnam, who argues that epistemic values such as coherence and
99simplicity are ‘presupposed by physical science’ (Putnam, 2002: 142).
When a theory conflicts with what has previously been supposed to be a fact, 
we sometimes give up the theory and we sometimes give up the supposed fact
(Putnam, 2002: 141).
22 See Putnam (2002) pp 30-3 for a discussion of epistemic values.
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These epistemic values are central to making a decision in such a conflict. That 
science is founded upon these normative judgements must remain at the forefront of 
our minds as we examine the rationale for physical activity. But perhaps more 
important for our purposes is Putnam’s description of the ‘entanglement’ of fact and 
value within ‘thick’ ethical concepts.23
Putnam, (2002) having conducted a rigorous critique of the positivist conception of 
fact, turns to what have been described (by Bernard Williams (1985)) as ‘thick 
ethical concepts,’ in his critique of the fact/value dichotomy. The very narrow realm 
of scientific fact fails to encompass a great deal of the vocabulary we use in our 
every day life. Logical positivists had concluded that ‘the language of science was 
the whole of “cognitively meaningful” language’ (Putnam, 2002: 34), and this lead 
to some uncomfortable conclusions. Putnam refers to ‘cruel’, and its normative use, 
describing someone as cruel for example constitutes a negative evaluation. The 
word, however, can also be used in a descriptive manner:
as when a historian writes that a certain monarch was exceptionally cruel, or 
that the cruelties of the regime provoked a number of rebellions. “Cruel” 
simply ignores the supposed fact/value dichotomy and cheerfully allows itself 
to be used sometimes for normative purposes and sometimes as a descriptive 
term. (Indeed the same is true of the term “crime”). In the literature, such 
concepts are often referred to as “thick ethical concepts.”
(Putnam, 2002: 34-5).
Putnam refers to the plethora of terms that would come under this umbrella, and 
notes a widespread reluctance to deem this important and extensive aspect of our 
vocabulary as ‘cognitively meaningless’. Putnam argues that such concepts entangle 
fact and value, and in supporting this contention describes and criticises two 
alternatives; the first that these thick ethical concepts are factual and therefore value- 
free and second, that these concepts can be understood as separable into a descriptive 
and attitudinal component.
23 See Putnam (2002) pp. 34-45.
57
3.3.2 Thick ethical terms as factual and non-normative: Putnam’s rejection
First I will trace Putnam’s critique of the contention that thick ethical terms are non- 
normative. Putnam criticises Hare’s (1981) contention that ‘rude’ is descriptive 
because in certain instances the term may be used without a corresponding negative 
evaluation.24 Hare refers to a child (an example from Lawrence Kohlberg (1970)) 
who accepts that an act is rude, spitting at another class mate, without evaluating it 
negatively. Hare’s argument however rests upon the foundation that a value-laden 
term requires ‘anyone who uses such an adjective without hypocrisy or insincerity 
must be motivated to approve (or disapprove) of it.’(Putnam, 2002: 36).
The criticism of this stance, however, brings us back to our analysis of psychological 
theories and their assertion that value must correspond with our actual desires. 
Putnam refers to the response of Elizabeth Anderson to this point. ‘One of the 
functions of value judgements is to note when one’s motivational states are deficient 
because they fail to track what one judges to be good.’ (Anderson, 1993: 102). Thick 
ethical concepts help us integrate our motivations with our value judgements 
(Anderson, 1993). I have contended that well-being should not be aligned merely 
with actual desires, but rather should help us to understand when certain actual 
desires, more exercise for the over-trainer for example, are flawed. I argue the 
behaviour (over-training) is contrary to well-being, not that the person’s well-being 
is best represented by the subjective satisfaction with (over) training.
That ‘rude’ is not always evaluated negatively does not imply that it is a purely 
descriptive term.
24 Hare’s argument (1981, pp. 74-5) is in response to Philippa Foot’s (1958) ‘Moral Arguments.’ Hare 
concludes ‘I hope this case will convince Mrs. Foot that it is possible to accept that an act satisfied the 
descriptive conditions for being called “rude” without being committed to evaluating it adversely, 
even though “rude” is normally an adjective of adverse evaluation.’ (Hare, 1981: 74-5).
25 ‘Thus, no evaluative considerations necessarily motivate choice, for there can always be a gap 
between what one judges to be valuable and what one finds oneself actually caring about at a given 
time. Engaging in objective discussion with others is one of the ways we try to get our attitudes in line 
with what makes sense.’ (Anderson, 1993: 103).
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It is because “rude” has evaluative force that the remark that it is sometimes 
right to be rude is worth making, while the remark that, “It is sometimes right 
to go to a restaurant” is not.
(Putnam, 2002: 37).
The thick ethical term ‘rude’ entangles fact and value. It is not purely descriptive; 
that it does not always correspond with disapproval tells us nothing as to its content. 
There are many instances in which value judgements do not correspond with the 
anticipated motivation. It is used in a descriptive manner, but this description also 
entails a certain evaluation.
3.3.3 Thick ethical terms as having two components: descriptive and attitudinal: 
Putnam’s rejection
A further response of those unwilling to recognise the possibility of concepts that 
entangle fact and value is to suggest that certain thick ethical concepts can be split 
into two separate components. Hare (1981) seems to suggest this in the case of 
‘cruel’, but, suggests Putnam, Hare’s understanding of entanglement itself is flawed. 
Putnam refers to the below as Hare’s ‘motivational requirement’ (Putnam, 2002: 37).
It is being suggested that this kind of action is somehow inherently motivative; 
if it did not motivate us in this way, or otherwise touch our feelings, it would 
not be that kind of action (not, for example, cruel). So there are properties 
which are in themselves evil, and moral words which are inseparably both 
descriptive and prescriptive.
(Hare, 1981: 72-3).
First, Anderson’s point that thick ethical concepts are not necessarily motivative in 
this way applies here. There may be some distance between the thick ethical concept 
and actual motivation or desires. (Anderson 1993). Hare’s apparent26 argument for 
two components is founded upon the rejection of the motivational requirement he 
himself inserts. Someone can, suggests Hare, accept that someone ‘was caused to 
suffer deeply’ (Hare, 1981: 74), but not consider it wrong, or undesirable. If an act
26 Putnam (2002) is not convinced that Hare intentionally endorses a two component argument.
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was really cruel, however, its failure to initiate a negative response in onlookers, or 
indeed the perpetrator, might say more about them than the concept itself.
Hare is taken to suggest that the descriptive component of cruel is the deep suffering 
and its evaluative component (that does not necessarily follow) that it is wrong 
(Putnam, 2002). Putnam refers to his own work, as well as that of McDowell and
9 7Murdoch, as effectively criticising this suggestion. This whole idea, he states:
founders on the impossibility of saying what the “descriptive meaning” of say, 
“cruel” is without using the word cruel or a synonym.
(Putnam, 2002: 38).
Entangled terms, even used in a descriptive sense, require one to ‘identify 
imaginatively with an evaluative point o f view.' (Putnam, 2002: 39) Understanding 
and using them appropriately requires one to connect with the term in a manner that 
necessitates evaluation:
That is why someone who thought that “brave” simply meant “not afraid to 
risk life and limb” would not be able to understand the all-important distinction 
that Socrates keeps drawing between mere rashness or foolhardiness and 
genuine bravery. It is also the reason that (as Iris Murdoch stressed in a 
wonderful book, The Sovereignty o f Good) it is always possible to improve 
one ’s understanding of a concept like “impertinence” or “cruelty.”
(Putnam, 2002: 40)
Attempts to split concepts such as cruel into two parts are likely to lead to a similarly 
value-laden term, or one without the same meaning. Putnam illustrates how causing 
great pain does not necessarily mean that an act is cruel, referring to operations prior 
to the introduction of anaesthesia.
The rejection of these two ways of upholding the fact/value dichotomy ultimately 
supports the notion of entanglement. Certain concepts, such as cruel, can be clearly 
normative, but must still connect with facts. This paves the way for the suggestion 
that well-being might be considered an entangled term; it is not purely nor merely an
27 McDowell’s (1998) Mind, Value and Reality and Murdoch’s (1970) The Sovereignty o f Good.
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expression of actual desire or preference. It is the contention here that health, illness 
and disease are also entangled terms. They are, it is argued, concepts bound up with 
ideas about what we need in order to live good lives.
Indeed, common understandings of well-being seem to indicate its entanglement of 
fact and value. Griffin (1986; 1996) describes how an individual may criticise their 
own desires. They may question, having observed someone else’s genuine 
accomplishment, whether their own more happy-go-lucky existence is lacking 
something because of the absence of this value. This reflection over what is good for 
ourselves and others suggests that reasoning is not restricted to the scientific domain 
but that the way we think about our well-being reflects our search for some degree of 
objectivity in the ethical domain as well. This manner in which we speak of our 
well-being, or indeed our health, begs the question, ‘what status does our 
conclusions regarding these concepts command?’ And from this we may more 
generally ask: ‘Do entangled concepts have objectivity?’
3.3.4 Values and Objectivity
The recognition of entanglement has not prevented other forms of defence of the 
fact/value dichotomy. Williams (1985), for example accepts the possibility of 
entanglement, but differentiates between truth and absoluteness. The former being 
applicable to thick ethical concepts, the latter reserved for scientific knowledge.
Thick ethical concepts, Williams indicates, may be truthful from a particular 
perspective. There may be cultural agreement on the use of ethical terms such as 
cruel. Absolute knowledge, however, extends beyond this local agreement. For 
knowledge to be deemed absolute it must correspond to a world independent of our 
beliefs, indeed independent of the human perspective altogether.
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We can select among our beliefs and features of our world picture some that 
we can reasonably claim to represent the world in a way to the maximum 
degree independent of our perspective and its peculiarities. The resultant 
picture of things, if we can carry through this task, can be called the “absolute 
conception” of the world.
(Williams, 1985: 138-9).
Williams elaborates, clarifying the distinction further.
This notion of an absolute conception can serve to make effective a distinction 
between “the world as it is independent of our experience” and “the world as it 
seems to us.” It does this by understanding “the world as it seems to us” as 
“the world as it seems peculiarly to us”; the absolute conception will, 
correspondingly, be a conception of the world that might be arrived at by any 
investigators, even if they were different from us.
(Williams, 1985: 139).
Well-being and health are not independent of the human perspective in the manner 
Williams requires for absolute knowledge. Putnam doubts that this concept of 
absoluteness is intelligible at all. He is adamant that the idea of non-perspectival 
objectivity is a non-starter. The idea that science is independent of perspective is, 
suggests Putnam ‘just a new version of the old ‘correspondence theory of truth” 
(Putnam, 1993: 150), a theory Putnam has argued persuasively against. I will not 
repeat Putnam’s arguments here,28 nor attempt to do justice to this vast and complex 
terrain within the confines of this short section. The idea that scientific statements
9 0correspond with mind-independent objects, explaining science’s convergence to a 
single theory, seems unintelligible in itself, before we even consider Putnam’s more 
detailed objections. Instead I will end with Putnam’s observation that science is 
unlikely to converge on one theory:
28 see Putnam (1993, 2002) for a full discussion of these matters.
29 see Putnam’s (1993) pp. 151 explanation of the correspondence theory of truth
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It is, indeed, the case that ethical knowledge cannot claim ‘absoluteness’; but 
that is because the notion of ‘absoluteness’ is incoherent. Mathematics and 
physics, as well as ethics and history and politics, show our conceptual 
choices; the world is not going to impose a single language upon us, no matter 
what we choose to talk about.
(Putnam, 1993: 150).
Putnam carries this dismissal of the absolutist view of the world into his own 
thoughts on truth:
we need no better ground for treating “value judgements” as capable of truth 
and falsity than the fact that we can and do treat them as capable of warranted 
assertibility and warranted deniability.
(Putnam, 2002: 110).
Dewey30 concludes that for something to have objective value it must have 
undergone criticism: ‘it is by intelligent reflection on our valuations, intelligent 
reflection of the kind that Dewey calls “criticism,” that we conclude that some of 
them are warranted while others are unwarranted.’ (Putnam, 2002: 103). Putnam 
describes the process by which we can decide on the warranted and unwarranted 
further:
We do know something about how inquiry should be conducted, and the 
principle that what is valid for inquiry in general is valid for value inquiry in 
particular is a powerful one. In this connection, I mentioned the principle of 
fallibilism (do not regard the product of any inquiry as immune from 
criticism), the principle of experimentalism (try out different ways of resolving 
problematical situations, or if that is not feasible, observe those who have tried 
other ways and reflect carefully on the consequences)
(Putnam, 2002: 110)
Again, a proper analysis of how value inquiry might result in conclusions of 
warranted assertibility is beyond the bounds of this thesis. Nevertheless, it has been 
worth reviewing briefly how entangled concepts such as ‘cruel,’ or indeed well­
being and health, for our purposes, might command an objectivity in the absence of 
an absolutist view of knowledge. My conclusions in this thesis, concerning well­
being and health, are best understood as working towards this warranted assertibility.
30Dewey (1939) provides a short statement of his position.
63
The thesis itself can be understood as engaging in the sort of criticism that Dewey 
speaks of. There will be no final answers here, indeed both Nussbaum and Griffin, 
despite adapting quite different views of how their theories might claim objective 
status, also recognise that their conceptions are initial stages in a long process of 
reflection.
It would seem wise to maintain this stance on concepts such as health, well-being 
and the quality of life. The observation that reflection upon such concepts should be 
infinite seems a wise and humble way in which to understand the conclusions 
reached within both this thesis and indeed philosophical reflections upon well-being 
in general. This need not prevent conclusions being deemed objective, but does 
necessitate a rejection of the absolute knowledge, independent of perspective 
Williams (1985) attributes to science. Putnam describes how objective conclusions 
are founded upon discussion and criticism.
But recognizing that our judgements claim objective validity and recognizing 
that they are shaped by a particular culture and by a particular problematic 
situation are not incompatible. And this is true of scientific questions as well as 
ethical ones. The solution is neither to give up on the very possibility of 
rational discussion nor to seek an Archimedian point, an “absolute conception” 
outside of all contexts and problematic solutions, but -  as Dewey taught his 
whole life long -  to investigate and discuss and try things out cooperatively, 
democratically, and above all fallibilistically.
(Putnam, 2002: 45)
This approach to objectivity contextualises the following discussion of health, illness 
and disease, as well as subsequent discussion and critique of the philosophical 
approaches to well-being and quality of life presented by both James Griffin and 
Martha Nussbaum.
3.4 Physical activity and health: naturalistic arguments
I now move on to the final and more applied section of this chapter. This will entail a 
critique of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) rationale for physical activity,
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arguing that the concepts of disease, illness and health upon which it is built are 
entangled concepts.
The leading international agency for health, the World Health Organisation, 
considers physical activity largely as a means to the ‘prevention of chronic 
noncommunicable diseases and Health Promotion’ (Puska, 2004: 17). It is contended 
here that concepts such as disease and illness are only intelligible when considered in 
association with ideas of human need, what we need to do, how we need to function 
in order to live a good life. They are not purely natural or physical concepts, but 
indicate how we want to live our lives and what we require to do this. The analysis 
of these concepts encourages us to consider further ways in which physical activity 
might contribute to our lives.
Critical consideration of the concepts of ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ may encourage us to 
reflect upon the necessary requirements of good living, but we should not be seduced 
into thinking that an absence of disease or illness, or even being in good health 
amounts to well-being or a good life. A focus upon disease and illness fails to 
recognise or appreciate the further ways in which exercise may impact upon our 
well-being.
3.4.1 What counts as ‘physical activity * and ‘health ’? The WHO position
The concept of physical activity is interpreted very widely within the WHO’s 
rationale. When referring to the recommended amount of physical activity per day it 
is stated:
This level of activity can be reached through a broad range of appropriate and 
enjoyable physical activities and body movements in people’s daily lives, such 
as walking to work, climbing stairs, gardening, dancing, as well as a variety of 
leisure and recreational sports.
(WHO, 2003: 3).
65
This broad definition of physical activity has its advantages. Those who are less 
‘sporty’ have an ample range of alternative activities with which to make up the 
recommended thirty minutes of moderate physical activity per day. There are 
however, difficulties with a definition of such breadth. The WHO’s rationale for 
physical activity makes extensive reference to its physical benefits. It fails to 
differentiate between activities such as cleaning or walking to work and sport or 
exercise. Failing to distinguish between these activities leaves it easy to under 
emphasise the benefits the latter activities offer, extending beyond the physical 
domain. Recreational sport or exercise may offer social opportunities, challenge, or 
enhance perceptions of control, benefits less evident in the more basic forms of 
physical activity, despite the similar energy expenditure.
The WHO defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well­
being and not simply the absence of disease or infirmity.’ (WHO, 1948). It is 
somewhat paradoxical that this definition insists upon the positive aspects of health 
when the rationale for physical activity is in mainly negative terms. This extremely 
broad definition of health, also suffers from a reluctance of the WHO to properly 
conceptualise well-being. The WHO often emphasise the mood enhancing effects of 
physical activity, in providing evidence for increased well-being, indicating that the 
concept is interpreted in subjective terms.
3.4.2 The World Health Organisation’s rationale for physical activity 
Death, disease and physical ailments
In advocating a ‘Move for Health’ day, The World Health Organisation summarise 
the benefits of physical activity, of which a large percentage of the bullet points 
concern the prevention of disease.
Benefits of physical activity (taken from online advocacy material; WHO, 2007a).
■ reduces the risk of dying prematurely reduces the risk of dying from heart 
disease or stroke, which are responsible for one-third of all deaths
■ reduces the risk of developing heart disease or colon cancer by up to 50%
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■ reduces the risk of developing type II diabetes 50%
■ helps to prevent/reduce hypertension, which affects one fifth of the world’s 
adult population
■ helps to prevent/reduce osteoporosis, reducing the risk of hip fracture by 
up to 50% in women
■ reduces the risk of developing lower back pain
■ promotes psychological well-being, reduces stress, anxiety and feelings of 
depression and loneliness
■ helps prevent or control risky behaviours, especially among children and 
young people, like tobacco, alcohol, or other substance use, unhealthy diet 
or violence
■ helps control weight and lower the risk of becoming obese by 50% 
compared to people with sedentary lifestyles
■ helps build and maintain healthy bones, muscles, and joints and makes 
people with chronic, disabling conditions improve their stamina
■ can help in the management of painful conditions, like back or knee pain.
The potential of physical activity to reduce disease and illness, and control pain, 
forms the central part of this rationale. The primacy afforded to research identifying 
the health benefits of physical activity, in both developed and developing countries, 
is evident in the joint collaboration between the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and the World Health Organisation concerning ‘Global Advocacy for 
National Physical Activity Plans.’ (CDC/WHO, 2006). The table on page fourteen of 
the ‘Preliminary Workshop Report’ provides a summary of benefits of physical 
activity:
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Figure 1. Summary of evidence of the benefits of physical activity -  developing and 
developed countries compared. (CDC/WHO, 2006: 14).
Chronic Disease Prevention Primary Prevention 
(Developing nations)
Primary Prevention 
(Developed nations)
CHD, AMI + + + +
Other CVD / stroke 0 + + +
Colon Cancer + + + + + +
Breast Cancer + + + +
Diabetes + + + + +
Hip Fracture / Falls + 0/+
Other Cancers 0/+ 0/+
Osteoporosis 0/+ 0/+
Depression 0 0/+
Anxiety 0 0/+
Well being 0 0/+
Key: 0 no evidence, + some evidence, + + consistent evidence, + + + repeated strong 
evidence, + + + + RCT evidence
The report suggests that evidence for the health benefits of physical activity in both 
developing and developed countries is substantial. It could be suggested, however, 
that the standard for assessing the strength of research appears to favour a scientific 
approach to assessing the benefits of physical activity. The sort of values discussed 
in the previous chapter as possibly constitutive of well-being may not lend 
themselves to the sort of quantification and replication required for the ‘strong’ or 
‘repeated strong evidence’ categories.
The rationale for physical activity provided by the World Health Organisation 
prioritises scientific research that has focused upon the role of exercise in preventing 
disease and illness. This scientific research stands apart from other benefits of
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physical activity; addressed but less prominent within the rationale. This 
prominence, however, cannot be justified on the grounds that the scientific research 
offers a value-free objectivity, and thus a stronger rationale. Indeed this is one way 
on which the fact/value dichotomy is upheld, conceiving of concepts such as disease 
or illness in scientific, naturalistic terms.31 Disease and illness are not, however, 
natural categories, but value-laden:
What, they will protest, are there no diseases in nature? Are there not 
infectious and contagious bacilli? Are there not definite and objective lesions 
in the cellular structures of the human body? Are there not fractures of bones, 
the fatal ruptures of tissues, the malignant multiplications of tumorous 
growths? Are not these, surely, events of nature? Yet these, as natural events 
do not constitute illnesses, sicknesses, or diseases prior to the human social 
meanings we attach to them. The fracture of a septuagenarian’s femur has, 
within the world of nature, no more significance than the snapping of an 
autumn leaf from its twig
(Sedgwick, 1982: 30).
If these natural events Sedgwick speaks of, are insignificant in themselves, why do 
we attribute such significance to them? Sedgwick suggests that we ‘consider as 
“illnesses” or “diseases” those natural circumstances which precipitate death (or the 
failure to function according to certain values)’ (Sedgwick, 1982: 30-1). So we 
categorise something as a disease or illness, this line of argument suggests, if we 
associate it with death or the prevention of functions, central functions we could 
hypothesise bearing in mind the almost universality of certain disease classifications, 
and the importance that we attribute to them. Disease and illness are understood in 
relation to certain central ends, they are not simply natural facts.
In summary, the WHO has provided a rationale for physical activity focusing upon 
its potential to prevent disease. It refers to heart disease, hypertension, osteoporosis 
and back pain amongst other conditions. These conditions, it is argued, cannot be 
understood independently of certain central functions, central to our leading good 
lives or achieving well-being. The WHO rationale for physical activity does not 
explicitly recognise this entanglement, seeming to presume the apparent obvious
31 The World Health Organisation is, of course, not explicit in its affirmation of fact/value dichotomy. 
I contend that the primacy the rationale affords to scientific research indicating the health benefits of 
physical activity marks an implicit acceptance of the dichotomy.
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nature of the ‘badness’ of the diseases and illnesses discussed. Some may concur 
with this, perhaps suggesting that these illnesses are so entangled or intertwined with 
the negative social meaning to which we ascribe them that there is no room for 
argument. This seems a defensible retort. But recognising this entanglement allows 
an analysis of the benefits of physical activity in broader terms. It shows how 
physical activity impacts upon central human needs. Illness and disease certainly 
reflect the most serious need frustration (von Wright 1996), but an argument for 
physical activity couched in terms of the needs that it satisfies could investigate a 
greater range of its benefits, not just in preventing disease and illness but in 
positively effecting the satisfaction of needs above the illness threshold.
This would expand upon the WHO’s penultimate statement in the bullet points 
above, referring to healthy bones and stamina. Schramme (2002) speaks of ‘basic 
abilities’ ‘the very abilities we need to find and realize our own well-being’
' y ' j
(Schramme, 2002: 65) and suggests locomotion as one of these basic abilities. 
Instead of understanding the benefits of physical activity only in terms of the 
diseases that frustrate this ability, we could seek to understand how physical activity 
can promote it. Exercise improves our strength and flexibility, and therefore our 
ability to conduct daily tasks such as playing with the children, gardening, and 
having the necessary strength to get out of a chair with ease. This would surely be a 
worthwhile step, one that would take us from a rationale for how physical activity 
can stop us becoming ill or diseased, to how it can contribute to the foundations for 
our living any sort of good life.
3.5 Nordenfelt’s theory of health
Renowned philosopher of health Lennart Nordenfelt understands the concepts 
health, disease and illness in relation to certain central ends. In examining his theory 
of health in more depth I will begin with the ‘Reverse Theory of Disease and Illness’ 
(Nordenfelt, 2007a: 7). Nordenfelt tells a story in which the terms illness and then 
disease developed from a ‘perceived problem’ (ibid.).
32 Schramme is anxious that this basic ability includes those with disability ‘I think that it is surely 
wrong to generally deny a bodily disabled person the basic ability of locomotion’ (Schramme, 2002: 
66)
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In the beginning there were people who experienced problems in and with 
themselves. They felt pain and fatigue and they found themselves unable to do 
what they normally could do. They experienced what we now call illnesses, 
which they located somewhere in their bodies and minds. Many people came 
to experience similar illnesses. This led to the giving of names to the illnesses, 
and hereby the presence of the illnesses could be effectively communicated. 
This was the phase of illness recognition and illness communication.
(Nordenfelt, 2007a: 7).
Nordenfelt goes on to explain how ‘connections between certain bodily states and 
the symptoms of their patients’ (2007a: 7) lead to disease classification. Illness and 
disease, it bears repeating, arise out of a perceived problem. An illness and the 
internal state connected with it, the disease, are by definition some sort of problem 
that ‘quite often concerns pain, other kinds of suffering or disability’ (ibid.).
Nordenfelt, as is well known, also proposes a definition of health. It is worth bearing 
in mind that within this approach not all health problems would automatically be 
deemed illnesses. Nordenfelt refers to health as a ‘dimension ranging from a state of 
complete health to a state of maximal illness’ (Nordenfelt, 2007b: 30). Nevertheless, 
Nordenfelt’s theory of health helps us understand just what a ‘problem’ or suffering 
might mean. Nordenfelt understands health thus:
A is completely healthy if, and only if, A is in a bodily and mental state which 
is such that A has the second-order ability to realize all his or her vital goals 
given a set o f standard or otherwise reasonable circumstances.
(Nordenfelt, 2007c: 54).
There are of course a number of pivotal concepts within this definition, but for our 
purposes I will focus upon ‘vital goals.’ A Vital goal is ‘a state of affairs that is 
necessary for this person’s long term-happiness’ (Nordenfelt, 2007c: 54). Health is 
understood with reference to a concept of happiness, or ideas of valuable ends. This 
would not only enable us to understand disease and illness as a severe frustration of
331 refer the reader to Nordenfelt (2007c) for further explanation of the concepts ‘second order 
ability’ (pp. 55-6) and ‘standard or otherwise reasonable circumstances’, (pp. 36-7). The latter, as well 
as Nordenfelt’s reference to bodily and mental state are briefly examined within the final chapter of 
this thesis.
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these ends, but to consider the value of sport and exercise in terms of vital goals, 
expanding the framework within which the value of physical activity can be 
contemplated.
This picture of disease, illness and health is persuasive. It provides a more positive 
conception of health, not limiting it to just the absence of disease or illness. This 
seems to fit with how we talk about health on a day-to-day basis; we would not 
conclude that someone is in great health just because they are not ill. Nordenfelt’s 
theory resonates with Sedgwick’s observation that diseases, even broken bones are 
not of natural significance. Putnam’s observation that a non-perspectival objectivity 
is impossible is salient here. Medicine is at core concerned with human interests, 
those illnesses and diseases that it addresses have been borne out of our notions of 
human interest. It is surely a misperception to suggest that we can understand these 
categories independently of any evaluative perspective.
It is central to Nordenfelt’s concepts of health, disease and illness, to examine the 
concept of happiness he proposes. The definition of minimal happiness is, after all, 
the primary concept, through which we understand the vital goals, and of course the 
dimension of health. Nordenfelt’s concept is at root subjective, although it does 
overcome certain of the problems inherent in the psychological concept addressed in 
the previous chapter.34 Here I turn to Nordenfelt’s (2000) explanation of vital goals 
and happiness, as they are understood within the theory.
For Nordenfelt (2000) happiness is an emotion. This conclusion is justified by 
Nordenfelt because emotions have objects, and happiness, of course, within this 
theory is understood in terms of the realisation of certain goals or wants. This, 
however, appears to take us back toward the mental state account, subjected to heavy 
criticism in the previous chapter. Not quite, because Nordenfelt does not insist that
34 Interestingly Nordenfelt (2000) states that his work in this area has been inspired by, amongst 
others, James Griffin and his book Well-Being, the subject of the following chapter. Griffin’s theory 
of well-being is also criticised for, in certain instances, sliding towards subjectivity. The account, 
however, clearly recognises the flaws of classical utilitarian stances, and like Nordenfelt, offers a 
stance that overcomes a number of the problems inherent in the psychological concept of subjective 
well-being.
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emotions such as happiness will be continually experienced, indeed at times 
happiness may not be associated with any feeling at all (Nordenfelt, 2000). 
Nevertheless, Nordenfelt accepts that happiness is connected to feeling happy.
Nordenfelt’s happiness is ultimately an internal state, an emotion. The theory is, 
however, sensitive to the potential for certain desires and wants to be flawed, failing 
to make us happy. Not all wants are associated with happiness, just those vital goals. 
These vital goals are said to be related to long term happiness. This prevents the 
identification of destructive wants with happiness, the alcoholic’s desire for a drink, 
for example. Nordenfelt’s theory therefore does not offer an unqualified subjectivity. 
It is not, for example, an actual desire theory of well-being. Instead it focuses upon 
those goals considered vital; these are in part determined by their association with 
our long term happiness.
Nordenfelt’s theory of health ultimately relies upon his conception of happiness. His 
definition, however, does allow for the two (health and happiness) to ‘come apart’, 
i.e. one can be healthy but not happy. First, someone might have the ability to realise 
these vital goals but choose not to (Nordenfelt, 2000). Also Nordenfelt 
acknowledges that someone may be considered healthy, but their external
•} c
circumstances might prevent happiness, i.e. living through war for example.
After this brief summary of Nordenfelt’s position on happiness, I will now turn to 
Nordenfelt’s comparison of his stance with that of Amartya Sen. This is particularly 
pertinent as Sen is a capability theorist, an approach that will be addressed, and
 ^Aultimately supported, within this thesis. Nordenfelt defends his theory against a 
common accusation that subjective theories of this kind cannot account for adaptive 
preferences, as Nussbaum (2000a) calls them. Someone in extremely deprived 
circumstances might adjust their expectations and report high subjective levels of
35 It is unlikely that war would be deemed a standard or reasonable circumstance, neither it seems 
does it concern the bodily or mental state that facilitates pursuit of the vital goals.
361 however, advocate the capabilities approach as proposed by Martha Nussbaum, which differs 
significantly from Sen, not least in that Nussbaum proposes a list of those capabilities central to well­
being. Sen decides against this move, proposing a conceptual space, what a person can be or do (Sen, 
1993), where judgements of quality of life can be made.
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well-being. Likewise, someone who enjoys a luxurious lifestyle may report mediocre 
levels of subjective well-being, an effect perhaps associated with the hedonic 
treadmill discussed earlier. Nordenfelt makes the valid point that in most instances 
one would not be satisfied in extreme deprivation, indeed it is more likely that one 
would be suffering and that these circumstances would be reflected within his theory 
as a frustration of certain central goals. This, however, is not always the case. 
Nussbaum (2000a) provides numerous examples of women in deprived 
circumstances who are not really aware of how things could get better. With the lack 
of options present they adjust their expectations, although this adjustment is not 
necessarily a conscious process. Nordenfelt summarises Sen’s position and 
ultimately disagrees:
If I understand him correctly we must still consider this person as severely 
lacking in well-being. The functionings of nourishment, being sheltered, and 
having health are so important in themselves (having an absolute value?) that 
whatever the person’s expressed wishes or lack of wishes, it would absurd to 
attribute a high degree of well-being to this person. In judging this case, if I 
understand Sen correctly, he and I part company. I can imagine circumstances 
when this person has a high degree of well-being. And I would, accordingly, 
find a theory of well-being which cannot account for this possibility to be a 
defective theory.
(Nordenfelt, 2000: 102).
Nordenfelt goes on to consider some situations that appear to distort the original 
point. First, a situation in which the individual is under nourished but can 
compensate and flourish. Indeed Nordenfelt refers to being able to live the same kind 
of life of those with more varied nutrition, here the absolutist approach is deemed 
‘absurd’ (Nordenfelt, 2000: 102). The second example refers to a despotic regime in 
which someone is able to concentrate on the development of certain talents, and 
maintain a level of happiness despite the harsh circumstances.
In referring to the absurdity of the absolutist approach in the first example, I assume 
that Nordenfelt would consider it absurd for nourishment to have absolute value. The 
example, however, seems to infer that the level of nourishment can be compensated 
by the subject’s strength (Nordenfelt, 2000). First, I am not sure that this is the sort
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of under nourishment that Sen is referring to. Neither am I sure that nourishment 
itself is of absolute value, but this does not dismiss out of hand the idea that there 
might be other values or capabilities deemed important to a life regardless of our 
attitude toward them. It is my contention that those capabilities of objective value to 
our lives are the best means by which to understand health, not goals subjectively 
conceived, as Nordenfelt argues. Under this objective framework nourishment might 
fit within a broader conception of health (roughly) understood as the extent to which 
we are capable to achieve those valuable functions stipulated on Nussbaum’s list. I 
develop this argument in the final chapter of the thesis.
With regard to the second example, Nordlenfelt refers to the possibility of growth in 
harsh circumstances. Nordenfelt ultimately argues that Sen cannot account for this 
growth being important to well-being because of his failure to provide some ‘final- 
end theory of value’ (Nordenfelt, 2000: 102). For Nordenfelt it seems that either a 
lack of shelter, or lack of nourishment be viewed as of absolute value (as he 
interprets Sen), or we revert to a theory o f  happiness, where growth in the sense 
above ultimately refers to being able to» be happy (a mental state) within the harsh 
circumstances. I have some sympathy with Nordenfelt’s discontent here. Nussbaum 
(2006b) argues that Sen’s failure to produce a list of those capabilities central to 
quality of life is the downfall of his approach. In a way this echoes Nordenfelt’s 
dissatisfaction, but the end point Nordenfelt speaks of, need not be a subjective 
conception of happiness. As we shall see Nussbaum fills the lacuna in Sen’s 
approach through providing a list of those capabilities central to well-being, and it is 
through such an objective list, I suggest, we might be able to determine whether an 
individual has grown in a fashion that best supports their well-being or merely 
adjusted to circumstance. Such a judgement, however, can only be made with use of 
a substantive list of goods whose value is: independent of any positive attitude of the 
subject.
This is ultimately where Nordenfelt’s approach, and the objective theory of well­
being supported in this thesis differ. Nordlenfelt considers happiness from the 
perspective of the individual. A certain state of affairs is valuable in that it satisfies
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certain goals, and ultimately promotes happiness conceived of as a mental state.
Such an approach is of course attentive to the way in which health and social care 
can help people adjust psychologically, where a change in circumstances is less 
possible (Nordenfelt, 2000). It should be noted, however, that Nordenfelt does not 
recommend psychological adjustment as a political strategy. An objective 
conception of well-being differs at core in arguing that certain values, capabilities 
perhaps, contribute to a life independent of the individual’s attitude toward them. A 
positive attitude is not necessary for such capabilities to be of value to our lives. 
Someone can be mistaken in rejecting the importance of those items on an objective 
list, and we can question the apparent happiness of someone whose life appears to 
lack certain central capabilities.
The only possible way in which Nordenfelt might be able to accommodate such a 
stance is through his recognition that our desire for certain vital goals may not 
always be conscious. ‘It is possible that the bearer does not dare to express her 
wants, or that she does not dare to make them conscious. But it is hardly conceivable 
that she does not want any change at all.’ (Nordenfelt, 2000: 103). Nussbaum herself 
acknowledges that our desire for certain capabilities on her list will be less 
susceptible to adaptation, and may not be completely eroded, even in the harshest of 
circumstances. Objective lists such as Nussbaum’s are often founded in a conception 
of human nature. This would indicate that desires for central capabilities or goals 
would be stubborn. This would also suggest that our informed desires and those 
goods on an objective list ought to converge. Nussbaum certainly places primary 
emphasis on her list of capabilities, independent of our attitudes towards them. Yet if 
such capabilities were never desired, the content of the list would be rightly 
questioned. It would be dissatisfactory if we did not desire, at some level, that which 
is deemed essential to our humanity.
I remain firmly in the objective camp. There are examples of adaptation to even the 
most deprived of circumstances. There are also a range of faulty reasons for which 
we may fail to endorse a good. What appears favourable from the subject’s 
perspective may not reflect well-being. It is of course, and this is a point Nordenfelt
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makes, often the case that subjective desires and goals converge with the constituents 
of an objective list. This is indicative of both an informed set of desires, and of the 
importance of those goods on an objective list. There are many conditions, however, 
not conducive to the development of informed desires, deprivation providing an 
example. There are also further examples of faulty reasoning and ill informed 
desires, not attributable to poverty, but nevertheless damaging to well-being. In light 
of this I concur with Nussbaum in relying upon a list of capabilities considered 
central to well-being or quality of life, independent of our attitude toward them.
In short, I favour Nordenfelt’s theory of health, but disagree with the understanding 
of happiness in terms of vital goals subjectively conceived. The normative approach 
provides an excellent framework within which to contemplate those values integral 
to concepts such as health, disease and illness, but the theory of happiness does not 
get to the core of what is valuable to our well-being. Such a conclusion, in favour of 
a more objective conception of well-being rejects the fact/value dichotomy; I 
consider these goals and capabilities in objective terms. What constitutes well-being, 
and therefore what constitutes being healthy, is not dependent on the goals an 
individuals deems central to his or her life, that would be to slip back into 
subjectivity and all of its associated problems.371 argue that what best represents our 
well-being is a topic for the kind of rational debate conducted in the remainder of 
this thesis. After extensive debate and inquiry of the form both Putnam and Dewey 
recommend, conclusions are entitled to claim objectivity. In the final and 
penultimate chapters of the thesis I argue for an objective conception of well-being, 
founded in Nussbaum’s central capabilities and functionings, that helps shape the 
normative concept of health.
Where have we arrived at as a result of the foregoing discussion? We may rely upon 
a conception of well-being through which to understand health, but must guard 
against the conceptual inflation of health to encompass the whole of the prudential 
domain. Rescher (1972) includes health as a central aspect of welfare but insists that 
welfare is a fairly minimal concept, not reaching the breadth of well-being. Von
37 Chapter seven argues for the use of capabilities as the basis for a theory of well-being and health.
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Wright has stated that the ‘privative notion of health’ (von Wright, 1996: 62) ‘is 
conceptually allied to the needs and wants of beings and to the notions of the 
beneficial and the harmful’ (von Wright, 1996: 62). He goes on to associate pleasure 
with a more positive concept of health. With regard to our critique of the rationale 
for physical activity provided by the WHO, the perspectives of both von Wright and 
Rescher resonate to a degree. Although it seems likely that those factors necessary 
for a minimal level of well-being will also be important to a more ambitious level of 
flourishing, we should remain open to the possibility that other values, not implied in 
this analysis of disease and illness, are important to well-being. Griffin’s prudential 
value of accomplishment may provide such an example.
Our brief analysis of the concepts of disease and illness may promote a broader 
understanding of how physical activity contributes to our well-being, how it may 
help to satisfy certain central needs. These needs, however, may not prove sufficient 
for a good life, or a life of well-being. Although the question of the adequacy of 
needs accounts as theories of well-being requires further debate,38 this need not be 
resolved here. The WHO have not proposed a theory of well-being, but indicated in 
some depth the potential of physical activity to prevent disease. The diseases 
incorporated within the rationale may well be entangled with certain needs, and basic 
functions, but these will not necessarily encompass all those functions and needs 
required for a good life, they may be incomplete as far as a needs account of well­
being goes, apart from the discussion as to whether needs accounts are suitable 
theories at all.
Indeed, it seems likely that the WHO have omitted or ignored certain benefits of 
physical activity, or at least failed to give such benefits adequate emphasis. The 
rationale for the health related benefits of physical activity recognises some benefits 
of physical activity that extend beyond both the prevention of disease and illness as 
well as psychological benefits. These benefits are not included in the bullet points 
summarising the overall benefits, but mentioned in the discussions of the benefits of
38 See Griffin (1986) chapter III for an argument against the basic needs account as an adequate 
theory of well-being.
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physical activity for particular populations. For ‘Children and Young People’
(WHO, 2003: 4) it is recognised that. ‘Engagement in play and sports gives young 
people opportunities for natural self-expression, self-confidence, relief of tension, 
achievement, social interaction and integration as well as for learning the spirit of 
solidarity and fair play.’(WHO 2003: 4).
There is no doubt that the WHO considers these benefits to be valuable. They are 
not, however, included in the bulk of the rationale that appears to focus upon 
inactivity, health and obesity. As a result, benefits not fitting within this naturalistic 
framework are easy to ignore, or fail to appreciate, and one can envisage a policy 
maker persuaded by the rationale concentrating more upon the physical benefits, and 
prescriptions for 30 minutes exercise a day without concerning themselves too much 
with what else physical activity might promote. Physical activity may offer further 
benefits to both health and well-being including the engagement with others, 
developing and mastering skills, and offering a challenging environment within 
which one can achieve. Activities that foster such achievements are surely more 
likely to be associated with longer lasting benefits and continued participation, than 
those activities concerned solely with calorific expenditure.
The WHO has not provided a rounded picture of the ways in which physical activity 
might improve our lives. Benefits of physical activity such as social integration, self- 
expression, achievement or accomplishment are given little emphasis within a 
rationale that focuses upon the prevention of disease. There is potential for a more 
comprehensive and integrated argument for how physical activity contributes to 
well-being. This would of course require a developed concept of well-being, a 
concept that extends beyond conclusions that well-being is entirely subjective, a 
result of desire satisfaction or pleasure,39 and concludes that certain values are 
necessary to our leading a good life. These values may include those recognised by 
the WHO as promoted by sport in its best form; accomplishment, expression and 
social integration, for example. This would of course require a significant 
epistemological shift. Not only recognising that values are inherent in disease and
39 See Griffin (1986) chapter I for a discussion of the inadequacy of unrefined versions of these 
theories.
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illness but also suggesting that there is scope for an objective conception of value. 
This stance would be further strengthened by the rejection of an exclusively 
scientific, non-perspectival objectivity, a rejection that there is a ‘view from 
nowhere’ (Nagel, 1986). Value judgements need not be understood as unable to 
attain a special sort of objectivity reserved for science. For well-being to be objective 
does not require timeless truths, but an acceptance that we can apply reason within 
the domain of prudential value, and that conclusions regarding well-being can be 
warranted having conducted value inquiry that fulfils certain principles (Putnam, 
2002). An objective conception of well-being does not seem so far fetched when we 
consider for example that we are often mistaken in the judgement of our own well­
being, and we often question whether people are really aware what is best for them. 
Understanding the values that inform such conclusions may help us to understand 
how exercise may contribute to our lives in a significant way apart from its influence 
upon disease and illness.
A rationale for physical activity that places greater emphasis on those aspects of our 
well-being less related to the negative sense of health has further implications. 
Establishing that certain values such as accomplishment or enjoyment (Griffin 
1986), or indeed those suggested by the WHO itself (self-expression, achievement, 
social interaction) are constitutive of our well-being provides a strong case for the 
forms of physical activity most likely to instantiate these values. This may entail an 
argument for more meaningful forms of physical activity including but not limited to 
sporting activities and active types of play that offer more in the way of these values 
than opting to take the stairs rather than the escalator. The broad definition of 
physical activity employed by the WHO may have its advantages, as I have 
discussed, but greater reflection on what makes up our well-being would help us 
develop ideas about the structure physical activity should take to best enhance our 
well-being.
The second part of this chapter argued for the entanglement of concepts such as 
disease and illness (central to the WHO rationale for physical activity) with notions 
of basic human need and central human functions. The WHO concentrates on
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physical activity and prevention of disease, but this necessarily entails considerations 
of human need, or central functions. Thus there is room for a broader understanding 
of the value of physical activity, considering its benefits more directly in these terms. 
The analysis of disease and illness will not encompass the whole of well-being; sport 
and exercise in its mere meaningful forms in particular, are of value to us in further 
ways. The WHO recognise these ways but are reluctant to incorporate these benefits 
in a more formal framework. Instead, primacy is given to parts of the rationale with a 
more scientific learning. It may be, however, that certain values are integral, indeed 
constitutive of our well-being, conceiving of well-being in this fashion may help us 
to suggest ways in which physical activity and sport enhance our well-being beyond 
disease prevention.
3.6 Physical actiivity and Obesity
A further benefit of physical activity indicated by the WHO concerns its potential to 
address an apparent obesity problem. The benefits of physical activity summarised 
by the World Health Organisation include the below:
■ helps control weight and lower the risk of becoming obese by 50% 
compared to people with sedentary lifestyles.
(WHO, 2007a).
With reference to women in particular we are told
Regular physical activity combined, with adequate diet has shown to be one 
of the most effective means of controlling mild to moderate obesity and 
maintaining am ideal body weight in women.
(WHO, 2007b).
The WHO rationale for the health benefits of physical activity appears to embrace 
the current view of olbesity as an epidemic. Such talk surrounding obesity is not 
unusual; the popular press contains a great deal of reference to the topic and the 
urgency of the problem.
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Evans (2003) has provided comprehensive criticism of this stance, obesity, like 
health disease and illness is a normative concept:
First, while ‘fat’ can be considered, at least in part, a physical/visceral 
condition, ‘weight’, ‘overweight’ and ‘obesity’ cannot. They are each a ‘social 
arbitrary’, measured constructions in the thinking of someone (e.g. researchers 
or the medical profession, or the insurance companies for whom indexes of the 
body mass index (BMI) type were originally designed).
(Evans, 2003: 88)
Evans argues that the health consequences of obesity are uncertain. Indeed the 
literature surrounding the whole area seems somewhat uncertain, the criteria for 
classification of obesity vary, for example (Evans, 2003). Evans does not seek to 
dismiss obesity as a health problem out of hand, but urges proper reflection on the 
uncertainties the data presents. The WHO, states Evans, are one of the organisations 
that fail to recognise this uncertainty.
What is most concerning about this association of physical activity with an ‘ideal’ 
body weight (with particular reference made to women), is the consequences for 
those individuals towards such campaigns are aimed at. The obesity research, with 
all the doubt surrounding it cannot help us establish what this ideal body shape is, 
and why exactly this mysterious ideal would be beneficial. The health consequences 
of ‘obese’ or ‘overweight’ remain uncertain (Evans, 2003). Concern should also be 
expressed at the apparent association between health and an ideal body weight, 
suggesting that being healthy is confined to a certain shape and size. This again fails 
to recognise the complexity of the research addressing size and health.
As in the case of disease, the WHO has paid limited attention to the concept of 
obesity, accepting it and the evidence associated with it at face value. The 
implications of this inadequate conceptual attention to obesity, though, are very 
different from those concerning disease. In the previous section I argued that the 
rationale was incomplete, failing to recognise the range of ways in which physical 
activity might improve our lives. The implications stemming from the WHO’s 
emphasis on obesity are different. The focus on body shape is misplaced and
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potentially very damaging bearing in mind the complexity and uncertainty that 
surrounds the association between size and health (Evans, 2003). Evans cites that his 
arguments resonate with the ‘Health at Any Size (HAAS) movement’ a very 
different approach to that advocated by the WHO here and its emphasis on weight 
reduction.
The contention that health is achievable at any size may be associated with 
subjectivity out of keeping with the basic premise of this chapter. I have discussed 
Schramme’s suggestion that mobility is a basic ability it is ‘necessary for every way 
of living your own life’ (Schramme, 2002: 64), not so much constitutive of well­
being, as necessary for our pursuit of well-being or the good life (Schramme, 2002).
Complete paralysis withdraws our capacity to interact with our surroundings,
and, therefore, hinders us in finding out what is good or bad for us.
(Schramme, 2002: 66).
An individual may adapt their preferences to compensate for an inability to interact 
with their surroundings due to their size, and report satisfactory well-being. 
Conversely, an objective conception of well-being may indicate that the person is 
neither healthy nor able to achieve a certain level of well-being. An objective 
conception however, must remain independent of both the flawed perceptions of a 
subject, as well as the misplaced but widespread association of an ideal body shape 
with health. In certain instances size may only threaten unreasonable society ideals, 
but not an objective notion of well-being (that in turn enables us to understand what 
is healthy). A decent test of an objective conception would be that it differentiates 
between such a case and one in which a certain size threatens that which is central to 
our lives.
The scientific data on the topic of obesity, or at least the conclusions that have been 
drawn from it, have been subject to extensive criticism. Recognition that obesity is a 
value-laden concept would perhaps initiate a more critical look at the evidence and 
more considered policies resulting from this examination. Again, I should state that 
to recognise the entanglement of fact and value, and to question scientific
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objectivity, need not lead to the abandonment of objectivity or reasoning in the area 
altogether. Putnam (2002) rejects the possibility of non-perspectival knowledge, but 
provides ample evidence for how fact and value entangle in the ethical domain, 
including extensive reference to Sen’s capabilities approach to the quality of life. 
There seems to be no easy way of justifying how certain ethical viewpoints and 
indeed theories of well-being or quality of life offer something more than just 
someone’s view point. Putnam has dismissed the possibility of metaphysical 
explanations of objective ethics,40 but this need not mean we give up on the idea of 
objectivity altogether.
With reference to obesity and the rationale for exercise, to recognise the concept as 
shaped by culture need not render it incapable of possessing any form of objectivity. 
Evans’ criticism of the manner in which the concept is commonly employed is a 
welcome contribution, prompting the sort of critical investigation and discussion 
necessary for a value judgement to be warranted or capable of objectivity (Putnam, 
2002). An extension of this critical thinking would no doubt employ concepts such 
as ‘need’, ‘well-being’ and ‘goals’ referred to in the last section. This form of debate 
would provide an interesting way of testing where obesity may genuinely have 
negative impact on the central functions of our lives, and where its impact upon 
these areas may be questioned. An objective conception of well-being should help us 
understand when advocating an ‘ideal’ body shape has more to do with culturally 
defined approaches to beauty than with maintaining central human functions and 
basic human needs.
3.7 Physical activity and psychological well-being
Further benefits of physical activity are recognised by the WHO. Physical activity 
promotes ‘psychological well-being, reduces stress, anxiety and depression’ (WHO,
40 See Putnam (2002) pp. 44-5. ‘Indeed the long history of failures to explain in metaphysical terms 
how mathematics is possible, how nondemonstrative knowledge is possible (the so called “problem of 
induction”), and so on, suggests that nothing much follows from the failure of philosophy to come up 
with an explanation of anything in “absolute terms” -  except, perhaps, the senselessness of a certain 
sort of metaphysics.’
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2003: 3). This draws upon the work of exercise psychologists such as Biddle and 
colleagues (2000). Such work is certainly helpful in demonstrating increases in 
mood and self-esteem as well as decreases in negative symptoms such as anxiety and 
depression; not only important consequences, but also valued motivation for 
continued participation.
In emphasising the subjective aspects of well-being, we can again trace an implicit 
acceptance of the fact/value dichotomy. A focus on the subjective aspects complies 
with the dominant approach to well-being in the psychological literature, subjective 
well-being, subject to extensive critique in the previous chapter. In short, such 
accounts are unable to recognise that we can be mistaken as to our own well-being, 
and how to act in its best interests. Subjective accounts of well-being also rule out 
rational discussion on the topic, and this seems at odds with how, in fact, we discuss 
and decide what is in our, and others best interests.
A fully considered rationale for physical activity; how, and in what instances it 
improves our well-being, must account for the possibility of mistaken judgements. 
This may require reflection upon certain values central to our well-being, desires for 
which we could describe as informed.41 This would require a rejection of the 
fact/value dichotomy, and in particular a rejection of the subjectivity of value. This 
would also encourage reflection upon the activities that best instantiate these values.
3.8 Conclusion
An implicit adherence to the fact/value dichotomy, and an uncritical acceptance of 
scientific data, has limited the attempts of the WHO to provide an adequate rationale 
for physical activity and resulted in an impoverished understanding of its value. The 
entanglement of fact and value within concepts such as ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ opens 
up the possibility of a more expansive rationale for the value of physical activity.
4 1 The process of recognising the fallibility of our actual desires, moving to correct these desires, via 
a notion of informed desire shaped by a list of prudential values is described in Griffin (1986).
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Accepting that values and facts entangle prompts critical consideration of scientific, 
value-free conceptions of objectivity, apparently independent of perspective. 
Objectivity is best understood not as an accurate description of the world, 
independent of perspective, but as possible only after criticism and reflection. The 
following chapters, addressing celebrated philosophical theories of well-being can be 
understood as part of this process, striving toward a defensible concept of well­
being, sensitive to, but not hostage, to subjective factors.
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Chapter Four
G r i f f i n ’s t h e o r y  o f  ‘w e l l - b e i n g ’ : a  c r it iq u e
4.1 Introduction
The subjective psychological theories of well-being fail to capture adequately all of 
the ways in which exercise might be of value to us. These theories are also unable to 
account for instances in which we might think exercise is benefiting us, when it is 
fact deleterious to our well-being. The scientific rationale for physical activity, 
embedded in a naturalistic conception of health, also offers a restricted picture of 
how exercise might enhance our well-being. Research undertaken in both of these 
fields appears hostage to a metaphysical position that supports a fact/value 
dichotomy. These researchers are unwilling to undertake any form of debate 
regarding the values that might be central to our well-being. Values are construed as 
subjective and beyond rational debate.
The implicit case made in the criticism of these theories has been for an extensive 
analysis of what constitutes our well-being, an analysis that extends into the value 
domain. The celebrated philosophical theory of well-being offered by James Griffin 
conducts a rigorous analysis of the concept. Griffin’s main text on the topic Well- 
Being (Griffin, 1986) offers answers to three questions. The first concerns the 
understanding of well-being itself, the second its measurement, and the third the role 
of well-being in morality and politics. Griffin recognises the expansive nature of the 
last question in particular and that the answer is unlikely to be comprehensive. This 
chapter will focus mainly upon the first section of the text, also referring to Griffin’s 
(1996) Value Judgement, again restricting focus to Griffin’s theory of well-being.
This chapter introduces and critically analyses Griffin’s theory of well-being. The 
emphasis is on how the theory improves upon those presented in previous chapters. 
An extensive debate on theories of well-being, continued in the following chapters,
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provides the foundations from which to contemplate the relationship between 
exercise and well-being.
4.2 Foundations
Griffin begins with the utilitarian notion of well-being, roughly tied to self-interest.
Utilitarians use our rough, everyday notion of ‘well-being’, our notion of what 
it is for a single life to go well, in which morality may have a place but not the 
dominant one. This does not mean that our job is merely to describe the 
everyday use. It is too shadowy and incomplete for that; we still have to be 
ready for stipulation.
(Griffin, 1986: 7).
Nevertheless, Griffin’s commencement with this notion of well-being is indicative of 
his utilitarian leanings. Other theories, such as Nussbaum’s Aristotelian conception 
of the fully human life, sees an individual’s good as intertwined with the good of 
others. (Nussbaum, 2006a). Griffin, however, is not an uncritical proponent of the 
utilitarian tradition. Classical utilitarian stances that consider utility to be a single 
psychological state, namely pleasure, are dismissed on the basis that ‘we cannot find 
any one state in all that we regard as having utility’ (Griffin 1986: 8). An individual 
may enjoy playing sports, spending time with friends, and reading crime novels, 
considering these to enhance their well-being. There does not, however, seem to be a 
single mental state evident in these diverse activities. This rules out any crude mental 
state theory of well-being conceived of as a pleasurable mental state found in all that 
enhances our lives.
One way of overcoming such criticism is to allow for well-being to consist in 
various mental states tied together by the fact that they are all desired. This has been 
referred to as Preference Hedonism (Parfit, 1984), but is also rejected by Griffin. The 
main deficiency of such theories is that we have desires other than those concerning 
our mental states (Griffin, 1986).
Even if I were surrounded by consummate actors able to give me sweet 
simulacra of love and affection, I should prefer the relatively bitter diet of their 
authentic reactions.
(Griffin, 1986: 9)
Here the desire for authentic friendships is clearly more important to Griffin than any 
particular mental state. Indeed Griffin prefers the less pleasurable authentic relations. 
We could argue that Griffin’s preference consists in, ‘a better mental state’ (Parfit, 
1984: 494). It is clearer though, and employs a less tenuous use of pleasure if we 
accept that satisfaction of a desire for authentic relationships, is better for Griffin’s 
well-being than ‘simulacra of love and affection’ (Griffin 1986: 9), despite the latter 
entailing more pleasurable mental states. This amounts to an acceptance of the 
‘preference’ but rejection of the ‘hedonism’ inherent in preference hedonism.
We value things other than states of mind. Authentic friendships, despite being 
experienced in the same way as the simulacra, better serve our well-being.42 In 
recognising this Griffin has already extended beyond the subjective conceptions of 
well-being that reduced such values to the experiences of satisfaction and affect. We 
want our lives to turn out a certain way, not just to feel as though they have.
Griffin considers well-being to concern more than just how we feel from the inside. 
Rejecting the idea that delusions of friendship can be of equal value to genuine 
relationships, Griffin explores desire theories as an alternative. This is a logical step; 
a desire theory is a ‘state-of-the-world theory, since the actual occurrence of a 
desired state of affairs is one necessary condition of the analysis’ (Sumner, 1996: 
128). If I desire authentic friendships, the satisfaction of this desire requires me to 
actually have authentic friendships, not just perceive that I have, or have simulated 
experiences of friendship.
In examining desire satisfaction and well-being, Griffin begins with actual desire 
theories, well-being understood as the fulfilment of our actual desires. Actual desire
42 Griffin makes this point later in his discussion of the ‘experience requirement’ discussed in section 
4.8 of this chapter.
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theories preserve agent sovereignty; it is the fulfilment of our own desires that 
constitute our well-being. This emphasis upon the individual determining her own 
well-being has proved an attractive element of actual desire theories. A fatal flaw in 
such theories, however, is that we can be mistaken as to what is best for us (Griffin, 
1986). We might desire and ruthlessly pursue fame, or wealth, but find upon 
fulfilment of such desires that we are no better off. Our mistaken judgements are not 
limited to such faults, corrected upon fulfilment however. Griffin (1986) discusses 
how we may become trapped in cycle of insatiable material desires. He also refers to 
our desires for the possession of something, and how this focus might be due to a 
lack of value concepts that might have encouraged greater reflection upon the kind 
of life we would like to lead (Griffin, 1986). These limitations of actual desire 
accounts result in Griffin turning to informed desire accounts of well-being which 
locate well-being within the fulfilment of those desires in some way validated, so 
mistaken desires such as those above do not enter the equation.
4.3 Griffin’s Theory of Well-being
Griffin, however, does not just move to account for those faults or mistakes in logic 
associated with ill-informed desires. His standard for informed is much more 
stringent, referring to ‘desires that persons would have if they appreciated the true 
nature of their objects.’ (Griffin, 1986: 11). This places a great deal of emphasis on 
the objects of desire and their features (Griffin, 2000) and does not seem far away 
from an objective account, one in which ‘certain things are good or bad for people, 
whether or not these people would want to have good things, or to avoid the bad 
things’ (Parfit, 1984: 499). There is a question as to how much work desire is doing 
within Griffin’s account.
Griffin (2000) has more recently acknowledged that his account progresses to a list 
account, close to what is often labelled an objective list account. In developing the 
notion of informed, Griffin emphasises certain objects of desire, prudential values, of 
general importance to human beings. Well-being is essentially located in these
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prudential values, although the account still retains a role for desire.43For the purpose 
of illuminating the basic tenets of the theory, I will trace this progression to a list 
account of well-being.
The notion of ‘appreciation’ is central to Griffin’s informed desire. Griffin goes 
some way to explaining what ‘appreciation’ entails in detailing his particularly 
strong concept of ‘informed.’ He makes the simple but significant observation that 
the only way we can avoid all faults relevant to utility is by ‘understanding 
completely what makes life go well’ (Griffin, 1986: 13). It becomes clear at this 
early stage that Griffin intends to go beyond the correction of faults such as failing to 
match up what we actually want with what we choose. An individual may seem fully 
informed of the consequences of continued excessive alcohol consumption, but 
continue to over-indulge. Just listening and being aware of the disbenefits of 
excessive consumption is not enough. The individual must ‘realise fully what is at 
stake’ (Griffin, 1986: 314 nl8). A proper realisation of this would necessarily lead to 
limited alcohol intake. An informed desire is not just one in which all the relevant 
facts have been considered but one that reflects an understanding of life itself.
Griffin states that ‘“utility” is the fulfilment of informed desires, the stronger the 
desires, the greater the utility’ (Griffin, 1986: 14), but the manner in which Griffin 
uses these terms requires clarification. In order to avoid slipping back into mental 
state theories Griffin sees the fulfilment of desire as rather like a fulfilment of a 
contract. This prevents desire satisfaction being reduced to the experiences 
associated with it.
The notion of strength also requires further explanation. Griffin (1986) argues 
desires have a structure. He differentiates between local, higher order and global 
desires, the latter for a particular way of life, right the way down to the former for a 
drink or some food for example. Griffin’s notion of strength relies upon global 
desires. These desires for ways of life have a greater relevance to our well-being.
This makes sense; I may have a local desire at the moment to stop work, watch
43 This role will be discussed in more depth in the following section.
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television, but resist this desire in favour of pursuing my more global desire to finish 
this chapter, or indeed thesis in a timely manner.
I will make two final qualifications before examining further Griffin’s concept of 
informed. First, whilst this standard for ‘informed’ is particularly stringent, Griffin 
accepts that ‘minimally informed’ (Griffin, 1986: 348 nl9) desires can enhance our 
well-being. Excluding all but the fully informed would make it difficult for us to 
enhance our well-being in Griffin’s terms, the standard for informed being so high. 
Nevertheless this footnote could be interpreted as back tracking to a certain extent 
and warrants the further investigation conducted in the section below (4.9) 
addressing less informed desires and their role in well-being.
Secondly, Griffin (1986) requires that for something to improve our well-being we 
must desire it upon satisfaction. Section 4.5 is dedicated to this ‘Endorsement 
Constraint’ (Ameson, 1999: 135). It places greater emphasis on the agent and her 
actual desires than an objective list theory and its contention that something may be 
valuable for someone regardless of their attitude toward it.
As we have seen in developing his theory of well-being Griffin places emphasis only 
on ‘a certain range of features or qualities’ (Griffin, 2000: 282; Griffin, 1986: 67-8) 
of the objects of desire. These are included in a list of prudential values:
a) Accomplishment ‘We all want to do something with our lives, to act in a way 
that gives them some point and substance’ (Griffin, 1986: 64)
b) ‘The components of human existence’ (Griffin, 1986: 67), Autonomy, 
liberty, ‘the minimum material goods to keep body and soul together’ (ibid.).
c) Understanding ‘Simply knowing about oneself and one’s world is a part of 
the good life. We value, not as an instrument but for itself, being in touch 
with reality, being free from muddle, ignorance and mistake.’ (ibid.).
d) Enjoyment ‘pleasures, the perception of beauty, absorption in and 
appreciation of nature’ (ibid.).
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e) Deep personal relations ‘deep, authentic, reciprocal relations of friendship 
and love’ (ibid.).
Griffin has more recently claimed that, with regard to well-being ‘only those desires 
count the satisfaction of which is subsumable under one or other of the value notions 
on the list’ (Griffin 2000: 284). This is an attempt to further restrict the informed 
desire account, that otherwise may be too broad to retain its links with utility. My 
brother being cured of a disease without my knowledge (Sumner, 2000), will not be 
considered to enhance my well-being because of a failure to correspond to the values 
on the list (Griffin, 2000). It is not clear whether the list itself can achieve what 
Griffin wants here. A sibling’s cure may not, as Griffin (2000) indicates, be either 
pleasurable for me, or reflect my own accomplishment. If I had been close to my 
brother in the past, however, this relationship may have been important in my life. 
Does this suggest some significance to my well-being, impacting upon the prudential 
value deep personal relationships? This possibility needs examining further before 
concluding that Griffin’s list can perform this function. This argument, concerning 
well-being and its bounds is closely related to ‘the experience requirement.’ Whether 
we need to experience something, be aware of it, in order for our well-being to be 
enhanced. Griffin thinks not, although this leads to some very interesting 
conclusions, reflective of some quite different understandings of what well-being is 
on the part of philosophers. Section 4.8 of this chapter addresses Griffin’s rejection 
of the experience requirement and the implications of this.
Having rejected actual desires as an adequate account of well-being Griffin proposes 
a strong sense of informed desire. Well-being is enhanced through satisfaction of 
informed desires for the prudential values. This approach has similarities to an 
objective or list theory of well-being, a point accepted by Griffin (2000). There are 
however, important ways in which desire enters into the theory marking differences 
with standard objective list accounts.
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4.4 Bridging the subjective/objective divide
Griffin (2000) accepts that his use of the tag ‘desire account’ in Well-Being is 
misleading. It is essentially the features of certain objects of desire that constitute 
well-being, the prudential values Griffin lists. In this sense, states Griffin (2000) his 
account is not far away from those often called list accounts, or objective list theories 
of well-being. Sumner (2000) has also noted Griffin’s increasing distance from 
desire accounts. Indeed Well-Being refers to the necessity of some sort of 
endorsement of a value for well-being to be enhanced. I must desire something, upon 
satisfaction for well-being to improve. That which I do not want will not enhance my 
well-being, regardless as to whether it is one of those values on Griffin’s list. This 
endorsement constraint is not mentioned in Value Judgement. Despite this apparent 
change of emphasis, Griffin (2000) certainly does not aspire to a purely objective 
account. He has continued to reject the subjective/objective dualism.
Griffin (1996) cites the role of desire in explaining his prudential values as a reason 
not to accept this subjective/objective dualism as well as grounds for rejecting the 
dualism between reason and desire. He contends that we do not just desire something 
because it is valuable, but neither does he accept the ‘valuable because desired’ 
reversal. Griffin argues that well-being is both objective and subjective (Griffin, 
1986). Griffin’s list of prudential values certainly articulate what is of value to us (as 
opposed to reducing such values to mental states) and help us steer clear of the 
fatally flawed actual desire account. Griffin is also anxious that in employing a list of 
prudential values he does not ignore the different ways in which we realise our well­
being. For example, Griffin considers those values on his list as important to 
everyone’s well-being, but admits exceptions. Accomplishment may, in an 
exceptional case conflict with the anxiety it generates, meaning it is not of value for 
that person (Griffin, 1986).There is scope for personal variation in how (and in some 
instances whether) it is best that a particular value is realised.
It has been indicated that an important way in which the theory spans the 
subjective/objective divide is in its explanation of how desire enters into the
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explanation of prudential value. At first glance the features of the objects of desire 
(Griffin, 2000) have sole responsibility for this. Indeed, we cannot just make 
something prudentially valuable by desiring it, ‘We all have to be able to connect 
what we value to some generally intelligible desirability feature’ (Griffin, 1986: 27). 
Griffin accepts that such features make objects valuable but argues desire has an 
important role in explaining these features. In explaining this role Griffin argues 
against the recognition/reaction and reason/desire dualisms. This stance endures 
beyond Well-Being; Griffin continues to assert the role of desire in explaining 
prudential value, the entanglement of recognition and reaction, after dropping the 
‘desire theory’ tag. Thus I will take Griffin’s (1986) explanation in Well-being, 
defended in the more recent Replies (2000) to articles written in Griffin’s honour, as 
part of a coherent whole arguing that desire forms part of the explanation of 
prudential value, that recognition and reaction cannot be separated. 44 As is common 
in Griffin’s writings, accomplishment is taken as an example. We do not just 
understand something as accomplishment, recognising its features, and then desire it, 
argues Griffin. Understanding has no priority over desire the two are inseparable:
It is mistake not only to keep understanding out of all desire but also to keep 
desire out of all understanding. Some understanding -  the sort that involves 
fixing on certain features and seeing them in a favourable light -  is also a kind 
of movement.
(Griffin, 1986: 29).
In his section ‘Dubious Dualisms’ in Value Judgement (Griffin, 1996: 32) we can 
further discern Griffin’s thinking. Griffin, aims to reject the dualism between reason 
and desire.45 We do not just recognise a prudential value and then desire it. To 
recognise something as accomplishment involves viewing it favourably, desiring it.
44 The following section attributes Griffin’s use of the endorsement constraint to his earlier work in 
Well-Being (1986). It is not cleat that Griffin continues to favour the presence of the constraint.
45 See his ‘Replies’ (Griffin 2000: 290) for an explanation of how the role of reason and desire in the 
explanation of prudential value is not merely intertwined but inseparable. ‘Dancy is wrong that my 
aim is merely to “blur” the distinction “a bit”, that it is merely to show that in real life recognition and 
reaction are “mutually intertwined”. On the contrary, I say explicitly that the role of neither can, in 
itself, be understood without the other (VJ32); the one is essentially involved in the other. “It is not 
that the recognitional and reactive components are there in this complex mix as separable, still 
independent parts. That separation itself is what seems impossible to maintain’” (VJ 56).
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To recognize the nature of the relevant object is to see it under some 
desirability characterization, such as ‘accomplishment’ or ‘enjoyment’. These 
desirability characterizations give reasons for action, and those reasons in turn 
mesh with characteristic human motivation. So what one recognizes embodies 
some element of human reaction. That, it seems to me, is the element of truth 
in desire accounts of value; it is not nothing, but it certainly is much less than 
what a desire account is ordinarily thought to be.
(Griffin, 1996: 36).
Griffin offers a reduced role for desire in the explanation of prudential value. A 
prudential value such as accomplishment is not just understood as valuable and then 
desired, but neither is an accomplishment, or autonomy, valuable because desired.
Moore (2000) has questioned whether Griffin demonstrates a role for desire in 
making something valuable, or whether he just describes the entanglement of 
recognition and reaction. It does not follow from this entanglement, that part of 
understanding something as valuable involves seeing it in a favourable light, (Griffin 
1986) that part of what explains prudential value is desire (Moore 2000). Desire may 
well be involved in the recognition of value, but does it enter into the explanation of 
value itself? Griffin agrees that the entanglement of recognition and reaction need 
not infer a role for desire in explaining value. He argues, however, that his 
explanation extends beyond a mere description of inseparability. Using the example 
of pain, he illustrates that recognition and reaction are inseparable, and that our 
reaction is in fact central to something being valuable or a dis-value. One of the 
criteria through which we come to define a sensation as painful is that we don’t want 
it, and try to avoid it, (Griffin, 2000) just as part of what makes something 
accomplishment is that we view it favourably, as giving our lives a point. This is 
enough, suggests Griffin, to transform his thesis from being about the inseparability 
of recognition and reaction, to being an explanation of prudential value.
Griffin argues for a reduced role for desire in explaining prudential value, in 
comparison with more traditional actual or informed desire theories. There is a role 
for desire nonetheless. Sumner (1996) considers a theory subjective if it considers
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favourable attitudes of some kind necessary for well-being. Griffin suggests that the 
value of accomplishment depends in some way upon the person viewing it 
favourably. This favourable attitude is necessary for something to be an 
accomplishment and thus for well-being to be enhanced. Griffin, however, would not 
appreciate his account being labelled ‘subjective;’ he considers this dichotomy to 
distort the true role of desire in well-being. Indeed, considering the account 
subjective because of this role for desire would fail to acknowledge the subtlety of 
the position.
One reason that we should not label Griffin’s explanation ‘subjective’ is provided by 
his description of how someone may come to understand a value such as 
accomplishment as being of value to their life, without previously contemplating its 
value. Reason and desire, Griffin argues, cannot be separated. One does not, 
however, need to have a pre-existent desire to accomplish to come to understand its 
value. Griffin details the process by which a ‘fool-like person living for day-to-day 
pleasures’ (1996: 24) may come to the conclusion that accomplishment is of value to 
them. The desire for accomplishment is not already established. Desire enters into 
the equation as we come to understand what accomplishment is. We do not 
understand what accomplishment is in a value-neutral way, but in a manner that 
entails value-laden language. Understanding accomplishment as something that 
provides a life with point and substance is to view it favourably. Griffin’s conclusion 
as to this reduced role for desire seems some way from subjectivism:
So the final subjective set of desires that you or I happen to end up with seems 
to play no real role here, while understanding what accomplishment is seems 
to be playing a large role.
(Griffin, 1996: 25).
Griffin’s entanglement of practical reason and desire, his assertion that ‘practical 
reason has to mesh with characteristic human motivation’ (Griffin, 1996: 35) does 
not even need to hold at an individual level. Griffin acknowledges that someone may 
be so deeply unhappy that they may recognise a prudential reason but not care. Of
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course, I am moving beyond a debate as to what explains prudential value and what 
contributes to our well-being, to the debate about how we recognise reasons for 
action. The point, however, is that Griffin does not endorse the subjective line, 
valuable because desired. In certain instances, such as that outlined above, 
understanding appears to be doing the most work. Thus I am reluctant to criticise 
Griffin specifically on the grounds that this complex picture of desire and 
understanding reduces to a subjective explanation of prudential value. Yet Griffin’s 
approach, and in particular his earlier account does offer other ways in which desire 
enters more strongly into the equation. The employment of an endorsement 
constraint is one of these aspects. This will be addressed in the following, where it is 
argued that this constraint does allow too greater credence to potentially flawed 
subjective judgements.
4.5 The Endorsement Constraint (Arneson, 1999)
One way in which desires retain a key role in Griffin’s (1986) theory is through his 
employment of an ‘endorsement constraint’ (Arneson, 1999). It is stated that for 
something subsumable under Griffin’s list of prudential values to enhance well­
being, it must still be desired upon satisfaction. There is, however, a broad definition 
of desire:
Even then we should have to stretch meanings here a bit: I might get 
something I find that I like but did not want before because I did not know 
about it, nor in a sense want now simply because I already have it; or I might, 
through being upset or confused, go on resisting something that, in some deep 
sense, I really want.
(Griffin, 1986: 11).
There are echoes of Nordenfelt (2000) and his recognition that our desire for vital 
goals may not always be conscious (Nordenfelt, 2000). This acknowledgement may 
provide some common ground between my objective line and those with a more 
subjective stance. To suggest that a desire is necessary for well-being to be enhanced 
need not suggest that the desire is explicit, and even allows for some resistance 
provided that there is some deeper endorsement. There are, however, possible
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situations in which there is no identifiable endorsement, in which I would still wish 
to argue that well-being can be enhanced. Here I follow Ameson’s (1999) rejection 
of an endorsement constraint. We can be mistaken in our rejection of certain goods 
as contributing to a life, for weak or non-existent reasons (Ameson, 1999). Indeed 
Griffin acknowledges that our judgements concerning our well-being can be faulty. 
Yet he allows these judgements, with their potential flaws, such a central role 
through the employment of the endorsement constraint.
Griffin (1986) argues in Well-Being that favourable attitudes of some sort are 
necessary for well-being. If I do not endorse the achievement of a prudential value, it 
cannot enhance my well-being. This, I think attributes an unjustifiable weight to 
flawed judgements concerning our well-being:
Suppose Samantha writes a brilliant poem but denies that this achievement has 
any value or in any way enhances her life. Her ground for this dismissal is a 
shallow and silly aesthetic theory which she has thoughtlessly embraced. In 
these circumstances, her failure to endorse her achievement does not negate its 
value for her.
(Ameson, 1999: 136).
Ameson (1999) acknowledges that life may be improved further by endorsement of 
the accomplishment, experiencing pleasure in succeeding for example. This point is, 
however, compatible with the idea that well-being can be improved in the absence of 
endorsement of a value attained (ibid.). Indeed I would certainly contend that life is 
better if one both fully understands the significance of an accomplishment and 
enjoys it. These subjective attitudes are not insignificant to well-being; indeed they 
may have a place within a list theory (both Griffin and Nussbaum make some 
reference to enjoyment or pleasure). It is not necessary, however, for the 
achievement of a value such as accomplishment to be endorsed, or enjoyed, in order 
for well-being to be enhanced.
One contention is that the objective stance illegitimately conflates perfectionist and 
prudential value. This distinction between perfectionist and prudential value is one 
that Sumner (1996) takes as being important in the critique of objective theories. I
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follow Ameson in rejecting this counter argument. There may be any number of 
flawed and poorly thought through reasons for failing to endorse a good that need 
not completely prevent a value enhancing well-being. Using my own (Ameson 
inspired) example, I do not endorse the completion of my thesis as an 
accomplishment. I have worked hard, but more out of an obligation to those around 
me than due to a commitment to its value. The development of knowledge and 
increased understanding of philosophical issues is not something I value. I have 
developed these skills, but only because I was too weak of will to stop and pursue 
something else that fits better with my own values. I have not genuinely valued the 
process. I argue that my failure to either recognise or endorse those values associated 
with pursuing the thesis does not entirely negate those values central to it. Examples 
of such values could be the accumulation of knowledge and understanding. I reject 
the contention that because from my perspective the values are not important that 
they can have no impact upon my well-being. An extension of this line of argument 
would be that attainment of such values concerns something other than my well­
being. They may improve the value of my life from a perfectionist perspective, but 
not from a prudential perspective.
This debate gets to one of the core issues of well-being. The extent to which our 
attitudes and desires should determine the concept. Griffin’s (1986) theory employs 
an endorsement constraint that leaves his list somewhat hostage to possibly flawed 
subjective judgements. If a value is not endorsed it will not enhance well-being. I 
would take a stronger objective line here and conclude that my well-being can be 
enhanced in the absence of such endorsement. Indeed this represents an unashamed 
conflation of the perfectionist and prudential that Sumner discusses, understanding 
well-being as a concept to represent more than just how well life is going from the 
subject’s perspective.
Griffin’s theory of well-being moves our understanding of well-being further 
forward in a number of ways. In recognising the possibility of an individual being 
mistaken as to her well-being, Griffin follows an argument right through to the 
proposal of values generally thought to improve the life of a human being.
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Nevertheless, the work this list can do, might as Hurka (1988) observes, be limited 
by the theory retaining an endorsement constraint. I now move on to discuss the list 
itself, its attempts to attend to individual differences, and the thorny issue of how the 
goods on the list are justified.
4.6 The prudential values
An important part of Griffin’s account is his list of prudential values, ‘that are 
valuable in any life’ (Griffin, 1986: 70). These values, according to Griffin provide a 
‘standard forjudging (most) ordinary lives’ (Griffin, 1986: 70). Griffin, however, is 
keen to acknowledge the various manners in which such values can be realised, and 
indeed that people may be better suited to the realisation of some values than of 
others. Griffin’s acknowledgement that accomplishment may not be of value for a 
certain person demonstrates a concern with just how these values impact upon a life:
In just the way that we can make a fetish of goods -  by using them, and not 
their effect on our lives, as our index of well-being -  we can make a fetish of 
values: even objective universal values matter only by making individual lives
Griffin, therefore, is not proposing that such values amount to an ideal form of life. 
Indeed he rejects that such an ideal exists. The values are general enough to be 
realised in innumerable ways. Although not stipulating an ideal form of life Griffin 
does suggest that ‘A life with only one or two of them, even in large quantities, 
would not be the best life.’ (Griffin, 1986: 35). This retains some critical force for 
the list of prudential values. This force, however, could be deemed significantly 
blunted by Griffin’s acknowledgement of exceptional cases, as well as recognition 
that less informed desires will impact upon well-being, albeit to a lesser extent.
Griffin’s acknowledgement of exceptional cases is indicative of his commitment to 
accounting for individual variation. Again, however, there are question marks over 
the role of the prudential values in the theory in light of these qualifications.
better.
(Griffin, 1986: 55).
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Generalizing from Griffin’s unfortunate accomplisher cases, it is possible to 
enjoy a life of well-being without any deep personal relations or 
accomplishments. Furthermore, any instance of a prudential value, considered 
on its own, makes a contribution to a good life for the individual in question, 
but, in general, it will not contribute enough on its own to make life as a whole 
go well. In short, neither accomplishment nor any other prudential value is 
necessary or sufficient for a life of well-being.
(Moore, 2000: 77).
I have described a range ways in which Griffin has attempted to bridge the 
objective/subjective distinction. Griffin’s (1986) employment of an endorsement 
constraint and his recognition of exceptional cases, the anxious accomplisher, all 
reflect ways in which the theory claims to span the objective and subjective. They 
also, however, threaten the role of the prudential values in the theory. It becomes 
difficult to question a life in which they be neglected in the absence of a threshold 
level of well-being, within a framework that acknowledges the utility of less 
informed desires, and still places high emphasis upon the endorsement of such 
values by the individual. In most cases a life without those prudential values on 
Griffin’s list is less valuable than a life with that includes their achievement. But the 
strength of this conclusion is perhaps a little disappointing bearing in mind the strong 
conception of informed Griffin proposes.
We can learn a great deal about Griffin’s theory of well-being by clearly 
demonstrating what the approach rejects. As we have seen, the account does not 
prescribe an ideal from of life. Neither does it consider utility to be a substantive 
value. Utility is not a super value to which the other values on the list are reduced, 
but rather a formal analysis of how these values combine to give an overall idea of 
prudential value for that person. Well-being is essentially a label for the contribution 
the combination of prudential values make to a life. Thus we do not talk of achieving 
well-being, but only of more or less well-being.
The form of judgement is, this combination makes a more valuable life than 
that. And the notion ‘a valuable life’ used here does not serve to summarize
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further, more substantive notions; judgements about more or less ‘valuable 
life’, in those terms are basic.
(Griffin, 1986: 36)
This reckoning of value, working out which combination of prudential values best 
serves our well-being, is still achievable in the absence of a single value that places 
all prudential values on the same scale (Griffin, 1986). This approach is in line with 
Griffin’s discussion of incommensurability and his contention that we often compare 
quite different values in terms of their value to our life.
Griffin rejects a totting up approach to well-being in which pleasurable experiences 
for example are ‘totted up’. Griffin is concerned with informed global desires for a 
particular way of life. He acknowledges that such a desire might entail, for example 
the maximisation of daily pleasures, but the final assessment is ultimately the 
comparison of this approach to life with the alternatives (Griffin, 1986). This 
approach also applies to the prudential values, although Griffin acknowledges that 
certain values such as pleasure may lend themselves to some short term addition, the 
final assessment of well-being requires an assessment of all the prudential values 
together.
So the amount of value cannot be decided by attaching a value to each 
separately and then adding. There is a notion of the amount they contribute to a 
life that is independent of anything we can say about each end on its own.
(Griffin, 1986: 36).
Short-term pleasure or local desire satisfaction may not reflect what is in our best 
interests over the longer term. The values on Griffin’s list concern how well a life is 
going and are not concerned with isolated periods of time. Griffin’s theory considers 
well-being in terms of more and less, rejecting the notion of a substantive value we 
achieve. As I have said we do not achieve well-being, our life is just improved or 
worsened, as success with which we pursue the prudential values varies. There is a 
potential problem here, however. Well-being conceptualised in this fashion, without 
talk of threshold levels of well-being, alongside acknowledgment of special
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situations in which the values may not improve a life, may leave the theory 
somewhat lacking in critical power.
The prudential values themselves require further elaboration. Again, some sort of 
threshold level may be useful. Moore makes this point with reference to 
accomplishment.
his prudential value profile leaves a large gap between non-accomplishments, 
such as goldfish swallowing and flagpole sitting, and accomplishments, such 
as poetry that expresses deep understanding, major research breakthroughs, 
and giving children good starts in life. He does not specify the thresholds good 
enough for accomplishment, and it is no easy task for him to do so.
(Moore, 2000: 86).
Moore is concerned with what constitutes an accomplishment, and whether 
something slightly below the standard indicated above would impact positively on 
our well-being, but to a lesser degree. Griffin’s position on desires that are not fully 
informed but still enhance well-being to some extent would indicate the feasibility of 
this. Although he acknowledges that the establishment of thresholds is a difficult 
enterprise Moore, suggests greater detail is required.
The pleasure associated with deep personal relationships, accomplishments and the 
other prudential values is not discussed in depth. That Griffin considers enjoyment 
and pleasure to be important to well-being is clear, enjoyment appears on his list of 
prudential values. Yet it is not discussed in terms of its relationship with the other 
prudential values. This is in contrast to other approaches that consider pleasure to 
complete those goods that make up well-being (see for example Finnis, 1980). Both 
Griffin and Finnis would understandably be opposed to such goods being reduced to 
the pleasure they generate, but neither would they wish to dismiss the value of a 
pleasurable experience. Such a position is not inconsistent with Griffin’s; it is just 
that he does not often discuss the pleasures of such goods. His criticism of mental 
state accounts certainly illuminates the difficulties in emphasising pleasure, both 
authentic and non-authentic friendships may be equally pleasurable, but authentic
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friendships are of more value. Alternative conceptions of pleasure and how they 
relate to an activity may prove beneficial here. MacIntyre, by contrast, notes that:
in the Aristotelian view pleasure supervenes upon activity successfully carried 
through; it cannot be the end of activity. And moreover in the Aristotelian view 
since pleasure is specified in terms of successful activity and not vice versa, 
pleasure cannot be a criterion for choosing among ends.
(Maclntrye, 1971: 175)
Pleasure is not understood in isolation but as supervening upon successful activity. 
The pleasures of sports participation supervene upon the activity, and one could 
hypothesise are often associated with certain inherent goods of that activity, the 
mastery of one’s body, the interaction with others, the joy of movement. In 
understanding pleasure in this fashion the activity itself and the values with which it 
is associated are understood as the primary goods. Indeed, one can understand 
pleasure as supervening upon the valuable activity in this sense, without requiring 
that in order for well-being to be enhanced pleasure, or indeed endorsement of some 
kind, must necessarily accompany the valuable activity. This understanding of 
pleasure also has the advantage over approaches that would conceive of pleasure in 
isolation from the activities themselves, the affect discussed in the psychological 
research for example that fails to differentiate between that pleasure central to our 
well-being, and that which is transitory and of lesser significance.
Griffin considers his values to be of general importance, and seems to consider 
instances in which they are not as isolated exceptions. Thus Griffin remains 
convinced that his theory, and the values central to it enable the judgement of ‘most 
(ordinary) human lives.’ (Griffin, 1986: 70) I have observed, however, that this 
critical power not be as strong as first appears. This contention seems to be of 
particular relevance to earlier incarnations of Griffin’s theory that employ an 
endorsement constraint. Any defensible theory must recognise that its goods should 
be the object of desires and be associated with pleasure and enjoyment. Objective 
lists, however, should also help us understand when the attitudes and desires of the 
individual have gone awry. It is because of the potential for unreasonable and
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mistaken judgements that I argue in favour of an objective conception of well-being, 
one that unequivocally expresses the centrality of certain values to a life independent 
of our attitudes toward them.
4.7 The explanation of value and the role of human nature
The justification of the values on any list theory of well-being is an integral, yet 
notoriously problematic, aspect of such theories. As we have seen from Griffin’s 
remarks on desire, whilst it has a role in explaining prudential value, this role does 
not fully explain what makes something good for us or prudentially valuable. If 
desire is not sufficient for the justification of the values on the list, how else do we 
explain them? This question moves us onto difficult philosophical terrain that Griffin 
explores with admirable clarity.
In his book Value Judgement, Griffin (1996) devotes considerable time to exploring 
issues concerning the good life and the nature of prudential value. As we shall see 
from a brief description of the arguments presented, a great deal of the explanation 
of prudential value utilises a particular conception of human nature.
Prudential values, suggests Griffin, meet human interests,46 interests grounded in our 
human nature:
Suppose, then, that I am right in thinking that non-biological interests, such as 
accomplishment and deep personal relations, are as firmly embedded in human 
nature as biological ones are. To put it roughly, biological ones are embedded 
in our animal nature, and non-biological ones in our rational nature.
(Griffin, 1996: 55).
The prudential values are, suggests Griffin, the result of us being reflective beings. 
Griffin’s speculations in his previous chapter give us an idea of where he is heading:
Suppose that prudential values -  cases of meeting interests -  should earn their 
way into the world of facts. Suppose, that is, that we found a place for them in
46 See Griffin, (1996) pp. 59.
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our everyday world, without resorting to anything remotely like a ‘value 
realm’. That would then be to accept what seems to me immensely plausible 
about naturalism. In talking about prudential values, we are not talking about 
entities in such an other-worldly realm -  detectable, say, by intuition -  but, 
rather, about certain things that happen in the only realm that values need: 
mainly, what goes on in human lives, that this or that meets an interest, and so 
makes a life go better.
(Griffin, 1996: 50).
Griffin wants to expand naturalism47 to a point at which it includes prudential values. 
Prudential values, ingrained in our reflective human nature, are cases of interests 
being met. Meeting an interest is considered similar to the notion of soothing. Griffin 
thus asks whether the property of meeting an interest and hence the prudential values 
are real. In arguing that they are real he proposes a rough test for reality48 (Griffin, 
1996).
We attribute reality to some kind of thing -  any kind at all, including values -  
in assigning a certain explanatory role to it. One sort of explanatory role that 
would seem to have these existential implications -  sufficient for them, but 
perhaps not necessary -  is causal. This gives us a test of realism in terms of the 
best causal explanation: realism about a kind of thing is the view that things of 
that kind must appear in the best account of what happens in the world. The 
test is quite general; it is not confined to causation in which humans as 
experiencers or perceivers are involved. If entities such as electrons appear in 
the best account of what happens in the world, then there are electrons; if 
properties such as electrical charges appear in the best account of what 
happens in the world, then there are electrical charges. But we are interested in 
prudential values, and they are unlikely to interact with things other than 
persons (and animals).
(Griffin, 1996: 61)
Accomplishment provides an example of how the prudential values can play this 
explanatory role. The absence of the value accomplishment is said to explain a vague 
dissatisfaction with life. This is not merely a belief that life is empty for Griffin 
(1996) argues that this dissatisfaction has its similarities to an irritation that might be 
soothed by an ointment. For Griffin both the irritation and the dissatisfaction at the
47 See Griffin (1996) pp. 51.
48 This test is considered by Griffin to be ‘the best available’ (pp. 63), having cited some problems it 
may contain (see pp. 62-3).
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absence of accomplishment, are attributable to our human nature, a human interest 
has not been achieved (Griffin, 1996).
Prudential values are real and part of the natural world in the expanded sense of 
‘natural’ that Griffin suggests. The way they meet our interests has been related to 
the way in which an ointment may soothe. At the core of the explanation is the 
conception of the person as a reflective human being. It is this potential to reflect 
that is said to ground values such as accomplishment and deep personal 
relationships. Griffin does not spend much time explaining how the profile of 
prudential values follows on from this reflection. He describes our natural tendency 
as reflective beings to form ‘second order desires’ (Griffin, 1996: 54).49 ‘These 
course-of- life desires open a space for a certain range of prudential values.’ (Griffin, 
1996: 54). There may be a question as to whether only those values on Griffin’s list 
would follow on from reflecting in this way. Or over the extent to which our being 
reflective explains the presence of these prudential values on Griffin’s list rather than 
others. There may be gap in Griffin’s explanation here but surely any such theory is 
likely to be open-ended and tentative. These values satisfy our interests in the same 
manner that nutrition satisfies our interests (Griffin, 1996). Nutrition may be 
ingrained more in the animal nature, the values in our reflective (Griffin 1996), but 
all this forms the explanation of what we are and what is in our interests.
Griffin is concerned with whether prudential values are real of because this may 
have implications for their reliability. Can our judgements regarding these values be 
reliable or true? His attempt to expand naturalism would indicate the reliability of 
judgements concerning prudential value. Griffin, however, recognises that any such 
conclusions are provisional. He suggests his grounding prudential values in human 
nature indicates ‘reasonable prospects of our being able to add some judgements 
about non-core prudential values to the list of especially reliable beliefs.’ (Griffin, 
1996: 66). Moreover, he goes on to say ‘I speak merely of reasonable prospects, 
rather than of solidly bankable assets, because we have not got far with the necessary
49 Following Frankfurt (1988).
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work’ (Griffin, 1996: 66) urging us to ‘re-focus attention on the good life’ (Griffin, 
1996: 67).
The prudential values, central to Griffin’s well-being meet our interests as reflective 
human beings. There is a concern here that Griffin’s concept of well-being is 
insufficiently attentive to our animal nature or indeed to our physical form as human 
beings. Admittedly Griffin is proposing a fairly rough picture here but the picture of 
two distinct natures, one concerned with the biological and the other with the 
reflective, the latter grounding the values that make up our well-being, can be 
questioned. We are animals and this surely has implications for our well-being. 
Griffin is anxious that the prudential values are considered in terms of their impact 
upon a human life, but fails to recognise that a human life is that of an animal. A 
plausible conception of well-being must understand how our animality impacts upon 
that concept, not just through the contemplation of biology and nutrition, but 
recognising that all those values we pursue, indeed all we do, we do as embodied 
human beings.50
4.8 The boundaries of a theory of well-being: The experience requirement
The experience requirement contends that in order for something to enhance well­
being it must be experienced. Griffin’s position is that the satisfaction of informed 
desires need not enter into the experience of the individual in order to increase well­
being. This is an important aspect of Griffin’s theory because it clearly distances the 
account from those mental state theories that locate well-being ‘on the inside.’ What 
exactly is meant by something entering into my experience is not entirely 
straightforward. It does not mean, according to Griffin, that something is 
experienced as a mental state. Consider Griffin’s test definition of enjoyment, used 
to assess whether the concept represents an adequate account of well-being. 
Enjoyment is defined as ‘not anything so narrow as experiencing a single mental 
state, or one of a range of states’ (Griffin, 1986: 18) but within the same definition it
50 The critical point is central to my eventual rejection of Griffin’s account as an adequate theory of 
well-being, and will be developed in chapter six.
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is stipulated that ‘all the objects of enjoyment fall within our experience’ (ibid.). 
Sumner (1996) perhaps offers a more straightforward definition of the experience 
requirement, equating experience of something with awareness of it. Sumner argues 
that something has the potential to increase my well-being if I am aware of it, if I am 
not aware of it, this potential is lost.
Griffin rejects the idea that something needs to enter into my experience in this way 
for it to enhance well-being. I need not be aware of something in order for it to have 
an impact upon my life. In explaining why enjoyment does not offer an adequate 
account of well-being we get an indication as to why:
My truly having close and authentic personal relations is not the kind of thing 
that can enter my experience; all that can enter is what is common to both my 
truly having such relations and my merely believing that I do.
(Griffin, 1986: 19).
The difference between authentic friendships, and ones in which I am deceived or 
deluded, is significant to well-being but does not enter my experience. Griffin is 
concerned that the experience requirement, as it stands in this particular 
conceptualisation of enjoyment as well-being, brings us too close to a mental state 
account. There is little emphasis on the value itself (in this case authentic 
relationships). Conceptualising well-being as enjoyment and suggesting that 
enjoyment needs to enter into your experience does not distinguish between the well­
being of someone who has authentic friendships and someone who is deluded by 
those around her into thinking that they are her friends. Both of these instances are 
experienced in the same way. Griffin wants to conclude that actually having 
authentic relationships would lead to greater well-being than merely being deluded 
into thinking so. An experience requirement does not allow primacy to this value.
The focus on the experience appears to ‘distort’ (Griffin 1986: 19) the value, 
precisely what Griffin aims to avoid. Take accomplishment, ‘If I want to accomplish 
something with my life it is not that I want to have a sense of accomplishment’ 
(Griffin, 1986: 19), states Griffin. The enjoyment account offered above would offer
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no means of distinguishing between someone who is aware of their accomplishment 
and someone who wrongly believes that they have accomplished. The crucial 
difference between these two does not enter in to the experience of the individual.
Sumner, (1996) however, has argued that an experience requirement can be 
employed successfully within a desire theory, without being susceptible to the same 
criticisms levelled above.
A state-of-mind theory treats verdical and illusory experiences which are 
phenomenologically indistinguishable as equally valuable. Adding an 
experience requirement to the desire theory has no such implication. Any 
version of a desire theory is a state-of-the-world theory, since the actual 
occurrence of a desired state of affairs is one necessary condition of the 
analysis. An experience requirement makes awareness of this occurrence a 
further necessary condition. In doing so it does not, and cannot, convert the 
theory into a mental state theory.
(Sumner, 1996: 127-8).
Sumner’s point is that we would desire for example, to accomplish, but that we must 
be aware of this accomplishment in order for well-being to be enhanced. This 
incorporation of the experience requirement would not distort the value 
accomplishment. Our desire is for a state of the world; that I accomplish, not just for 
a sense of accomplishment. The desire for a state of the world differentiates between 
the alternatives of an authentic and non-authentic friendship in the same way. 
Authenticity does not enter my experience, I am not aware of the difference between 
someone who is deceiving me into thinking I am his friend and someone who is truly 
my friend. But the desire is for a state of the world, my having true friendship, not 
being deceived. Thus the desire is only satisfied by authenticity despite the 
alternatives entering into experience in the same way.
This is a difficult matter, and whilst Sumner’s response does seem to have some 
plausibility, it certainly does not go to the heart of the matter. The experience 
requirement may not necessary entail returning to a mental state account of well­
being. Griffin, however, is not just concerned with protecting against this, but with
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the general point that we do not need to be aware of something in order to enhance 
our well-being.
If either I could accomplish something with my life but not know it, or believe 
that I had but not really have, I should prefer the first. That would be, for me, 
the more valuable life.
(Griffin, 1986: 19)
Griffin (1986) does not just consider this to be the more valuable life, but the more 
prudentially valuable life. Griffin even extends the recognition that the enhancement 
of well-being does not necessitate awareness to include posthumous 
accomplishments, the ultimate example of something enhancing well-being without 
impacting upon experience. Griffin contends that something can enhance your well­
being after your life has ended. ‘But what we have done may not have fully worked 
itself or fully have emerged into the light of day until after our deaths’ (Griffin,
2000: 284) This particularly difficult conclusion appears to have been fuelled by 
previous, less radical examples, arguing against the necessity of experience for well­
being.
It is worth, however, making a short qualification here. These claims are not, 
perhaps, as strong as at first glance. Griffin, of course, does not stipulate a threshold 
level of well-being, neither does he consider well-being a substantive value that is 
achieved or not achieved. He refers only to more or less well-being. The claim is not 
that a flourishing life or a life of well-being does not require awareness of our 
accomplishments, or indeed of any other prudential value. Griffin is making a 
weaker claim that experience is not necessary for the enhancement of well-being.
This claim is compatible with an argument that experience of a prudential value 
would further enhance well-being. Indeed the better life for the person would clearly 
be that in which the values are experienced and enjoyed.
Having criticised Griffin in previous instances for diminishing the critical power of 
his list, by the employment of an endorsement constraint, for example, I cannot level 
this criticism here. On the issue of experience Griffin stands staunchly by his list,
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insisting that those items are of such value that they can improve our lives without 
impacting upon experience. He differs with Sumner (2000), on the issue of 
experience. Sumner acknowledges that improvement of a life from a perfectionist 
perspective may not necessitate experience, but rejects the idea that from a 
prudential perspective this can make us better off. This has lead Griffin to consider 
the possibility that the two philosophers are actually getting at different concepts, in 
developing their theories of well-being and welfare respectively.
Perhaps my list account and Sumner’s own happiness account are not clear-cut 
competitors, but accounts of somewhat different things. Perhaps we are not 
clear precisely what either is meant to be an account of. The terms ‘well- 
being’, the ‘prudential value of a life’, ‘the quality of life’, and so on do not 
pick out a known subject about which we then turn out to agree or disagree. 
What we say about ‘well-being’ (and the rest) will partly fix the subject we 
think important to elucidate as well as offer an elucidation of it.
(Griffin, 2000: 284-5).
For Griffin experience is not necessary for well-being to be increased. He does, 
however, accept Sumner’s (2000) contention that one cannot be ‘made better off 
after death. For Griffin the latter expression points to an experience that well-being 
does not. Others may seek to adjust the boundaries, suggesting ‘the good life’ is a 
term that would not necessitate experience, with well-being incorporating an 
experience requirement.51 Of course, those accounts which reject the experience 
requirement are left with a very broad account of well-being, and as we have seen 
above (as in the case of the brother cured of a disease without my awareness) there 
are difficulties in trying to limit these boundaries.
Griffin seems to be saying that Sumner’s concept of welfare might be an attempt to 
conceptualise something different to his well-being, something more tightly related 
to the subject’s perspective. This is an excellent point. Brower (1998) questions 
Sumner’s presumption that well-being must be from the subject’s perspective, 
arguing this begs the question against objective theories. ‘It seems an “open 
question” whether an individual’s life could be going well even though he or she
511 thank Steve Edwards for this observation.
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does not have the “perspectival” view that it is going well.’ (Brower, 1998: 311). I 
too have indicated dissatisfaction with both Sumner’s tightly subjective definition, 
and with the subsequent sharp separation between perfectionist and prudential value. 
Griffin (1986) employs an endorsement constraint, allowing an undeserved authority 
to flawed desires and mistaken judgements, damaging the critical power of his list of 
prudential values. Well-being, as I understand the concept, need not be anchored in 
the subject’s perspective. It is quite feasible that well-being might be enhanced 
without endorsement of an attained value, or indeed awareness of its achievement. 
Griffin’s appreciation that achieving certain values would improve our lives even 
without our knowledge seems to at least restore some of the power to those values, 
after all considered to be the ends of life. I see nothing inconsistent, however, in 
acknowledging that the primacy of the values in this context must be balanced with a 
recognition that it is more desirable to both accomplish for example, and be aware of 
the significance of the accomplishment, deriving pleasure and satisfaction from it.
Sumner’s stark separation of prudential and perfectionist value, and his anchoring of 
the concept welfare within the subject’s perspective is evident in the development of 
his own account. Sumner employs a ‘justification requirement’ (Sumner, 2000: 17) 
to an account of happiness, as happiness may reflect a flawed perception of the 
world. Sumner is anxious, however, that this requirement is not so strong as to 
distance his concept from the perspective of the individual. He makes the familiar 
move of utilising ‘informed’ as a criteria for an individual’s judgement. The standard 
of informed, however, remains subjective. It is the extent to which further 
information would ‘make a difference to a subject’s affective response to her life, 
given her priorities’ (Sumner, 2000: 18). Nozick’s experience machine provides an 
example:
A subject who recognises the illusion, in retrospect, may respond by regretting 
having passed that period of her life floating in a tank or, alternatively, may 
embrace the experiences that were artificially induced for her (‘Too bad it 
wasn’t real, but it was a gas’). The extent to which the illusoriness of the 
experiences matters for an individual’s well-being therefore depends on the 
extent to which she decides (or would decide) to make it matter.
(Sumner, 2000: 18fiil0).
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This account is unable to question those decisions that are counter to the very 
essence of our being human. Nozick (1974) indicates how ‘plugging in’ leaves the 
person an ‘indeterminate blob’ (1974: 43) indeed not really a person at all. I would 
argue that it is nonsensical to talk of the individual’s well-being in this respect, and 
question Sumner’s suggestion that the extent to which we discount such experiences 
should be anchored in the subject’s own perspective. Plugging in is contrary to the 
core of our being human, someone floating in a tank, plugged into a machine is no 
longer living a life we would associate with a human being, and thus it makes no 
sense to talk of their well-being, regardless as to the subject’s endorsement of the 
machine. This conclusion, or course, rests upon an objective conception of well­
being, in which certain values are understood as constitutive of both a human 
existence, and of our well-being. It is a conclusion unavailable within Sumner’s 
approach that takes for granted the subjectivity of well-being. The example does, 
however, serve to illustrate the uncomfortable conclusions associated with this 
subjectivity.
4.9 Desires and well-being: which desires should count?
Griffin’s (1986) concept of well-being is utilitarian at root. Recall that Griffin begins 
with the utilitarian notion of well-being ‘what it is for a single life to go well’ 
(Griffin, 1986: 7). Griffin’s approach, however, is designed to overcome some 
common criticisms of utilitarian theories of well-being. Partially stemming from his 
rejection of mental state theories of well-being, Griffin does accept that other 
regarding desires form a part of our well-being. We do not just want ‘pure states’ 
(Griffin, 1986: 24) for ourselves, a lot of what we want, and indeed our happiness, 
concerns the success and happiness of others. Griffin moves on though, and accepts 
more unpalatable desires as part of our utility. These include a ‘hater’s 
schadenfreude’ (Griffin, 1986: 25), described as a ‘slight’ pleasure (ibid). Irrational 
desires are not subject to across the board restriction either. ‘A misogynist might be 
put off his food by a woman’s sitting next to him in the Senior Common Room’ 
(Griffin, 1986: 25). Such desires, states Griffin should count. One may object to this
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on moral grounds, Griffin though does not want to include all moral restrictions 
within his concept of utility.
So since irrational desires cannot be excluded wholesale, why not let them in, 
and if their fulfilment is sometimes morally intolerable, look to other moral 
matters besides utility to block it.
(Griffin, 1986: 25).
Irrational or morally flawed desires that may be accepted as contrary to the 
development of the individual from a perfectionist perspective, can still impact 
positively on well-being. One would think that Griffin’s (1986) understanding of 
well-being in terms of the satisfaction of informed desires might provide a means of 
excluding irrational desires. Griffin, however, holds that such desires do count 
because ‘there is a utilitarian value at stake.’ (Griffin, 1986: 25). The utilitarian value 
referred to is the upset stemming from frustration of such desires. Griffin’s allowing 
a utilitarian value to the upset of the misogynist at having to eat in the presence of 
women, can be extended to other cases. The frustration of many irrational desires 
might entail upset. The acceptance of irrational desires here, if not threatening to the 
notion of informed desire, certainly leaves an account of reduced force.
There are further examples of Griffin accepting less informed desires. 
Acknowledging that normally someone with sadistic desires would be best served, in 
prudential terms, pursuing something better, he concedes, however, that ‘Perhaps 
there is someone for whom sadistic kicks are all he has, who is incapable of better.’ 
(Griffin, 1986: 26). For something to enhance well-being it need not meet Griffin’s 
most stringent standards of informed, ‘minimally informed’ desires may suffice.
Thus for a satisfied desire to have some positive impact upon well-being, one must:
know enough about what one is getting to rule out one’s ending up no better 
off or even worse off. But it does not have to be a fully informed desire, that is, 
one such that if one knew more one would not want anything different. Desires 
that are minimally informed will at least register on the positive scale.
(Griffin, 1986: 348 nl9)
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It is understandable that Griffin is keen to accept enhancements to well-being are 
possible without meeting the strongest of his requirements. After all it is unlikely 
that any of us understand fully what ‘makes life go well’ (Griffin, 1986: 13), and 
thus our desires are unlikely to be fully informed in Griffin’ sense. The final 
sentence indicates that desires that are more informed will be further up the positive 
scale than those that are minimally informed. We may get minor utilitarian value 
from less informed desires, but a better life for the person would be one in which the 
focus was upon those values on the list, for significant relationships with others, for 
accomplishment. This may allay the fears expressed above that the accepting less 
informed desires reduces the critical powers of the theory. Informed desires remain 
central to the theory; well-being will always be better served through the pursuit of 
the prudential values, rather than by the satisfaction of irrational or morally dubious 
desires.
But are we happy with these pleasures and upsets registering on the positive scale at 
all? Those from an alternative standpoint could convincingly argue that Griffin’s 
account must tighten its boundaries; that those irrational and immoral desires are to 
the detriment of the individual’s well-being. Is the pleasure or upset of the 
misogynist contributive to well-being? Philosophers proposing Aristotelian 
conceptions of pleasure refuse to consider it in isolation, as an end in itself, but 
propose that it supervenes upon the activity with which it is associated (Maclntrye, 
1971). Considering pleasure in these terms moves us to consider the activity itself, 
and perhaps question the value of the activity and thus of any associated pleasure. 
Annas illuminates the Aristotelian position, a more objective conception of pleasure:
For Aristotle, one cannot pursue pleasure regardless of the moral worth of the 
actions that are one’s means to getting it. Rather it is the other way round: it is 
one’s conception of the good life that determines what counts for one as being 
pleasant.
(Annas, 1980: 288).
This statement clearly rejects the hedonic position in which pleasure is considered an 
end apart from any conception of the good (Annas, 1980). Griffin does however, in 
line with the utilitarian roots of the theory, consider pleasure is isolation. For Griffin
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the enjoyment of irrational or immoral activities is accepted, but not, it seems, as 
serving well-being to the extent of satisfied informed desires. Griffin is aware that 
we may have other reasons for criticising such desires, but feels that we need not 
incorporate such concerns within a concept of well-being.
Griffin, in his attempts to understand well-being, continually strives for a balance 
between the subjective and objective (although he would dislike the categorisation). 
This is reflected in his incorporation of pleasure, frustration or upset within utility, 
whatever their source. Enjoyment itself is incorporated on the list of prudential 
values without restriction. Certain such pleasures, however, may threaten other 
values on the list, accepting their ability to enhance well-being appears to limit the 
critical power of the account altogether. Pleasure in someone else’s misfortune, a 
friend’s perhaps, fuelled by jealousy, would threaten one’s ability to achieve deep 
personal relationships. Do we want to accept such pleasures as even minimally 
impacting on the positive side of the scale? Loumidis and Wells (2001) speak of 
those undertaking exercise with seriously flawed perceptions their body. If the 
pleasure of the activity is attributable to the supposed impact upon the body, this 
does not seem to have any positive value for well-being at all. This criticism of 
course goes to the core of utilitarianism and the understanding of pleasure as an end 
in itself.
4.10 Conclusion
Griffin’s rigorous examination of the concept of well-being proposes ways of 
overcoming problems inherent in radically subjective accounts. That we can be 
mistaken as to what is in our best interests and that we desire more than just 
pleasurable experiences. The list account offers an improvement upon these 
subjective accounts but Griffin appears concerned with the problems of moving 
toward an unqualified objective account. Any defensible theory of well-being must 
be sensitive to individual differences, to the entanglement of desire and reason, and 
to the plethora of ways in which we as human beings pursue the good life. This 
sensitivity, however, must be balanced with an account that does as it intends, and
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remains capable of criticising those behaviours that threaten values at the core of 
well-being. Griffin offers an account that challenges certain dualisms. He remains 
adamant that his account does not leave his prudential values dependent upon one 
person’s desires. The subtle explanation of the role of desire in explaining prudential 
value is compatible with this stance. His employment of an endorsement constraint 
in Well-Being, however, as well the flexibility of the theory to account for instances 
in which a value may not enhance the life of an individual, threaten the critical 
powers of his list. Within Griffin’s theory such values are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for well-being (Moore, 2000).
Griffin’s theory grounds the prudential values in our reflective human nature, but 
fails to adequately address how our embodiment, our being animal human beings, 
also impacts upon a conception of well-being. Griffin has proposed a list of 
prudential values but not paid enough attention to how we as embodied human 
beings pursue and realise such values. We are not just vessels for prudential values, 
we can only accomplish, be autonomous, enjoy things, engage in relationships in a 
human way. Our animal nature also shapes these prudential values and how we 
realise them.
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Chapter Five
N u s s b a u m ’s  c a p a b il it ie s  a p p r o a c h
5.1 Introduction
Theories of well-being (and indeed health) from a number of disciplines have been 
the subject of philosophical critique. The subjective theories of well-being and 
quality of life prominent within the psychological research were criticised and 
argued to be inadequate on a number of grounds, not least their inability to account 
for the possibility that we can be mistaken in our judgements of well-being.
Griffin contends that an informed desire theory of well-being, one that attempts to 
account for those mistaken judgements fatal to actual desire theories, must 
eventually progress to a list theory. His original proposal, however, employs an 
endorsement constraint and thus (Griffin, 1986) can still be criticised for affording 
too much respect to potentially flawed subjective judgements. Griffin has since 
distanced himself from a desire theory of well-being, with the endorsement 
constraint notably absent. Thus more recent versions of the account appear closer to 
the list theory that Griffin himself labels it, and that I favour. Griffin’s account, 
including more recent versions, however, offer a conception of human nature in 
which the rational is elevated over the animal. This grounding of the prudential 
values in our reflective nature is no doubt connected to understanding health as a 
mere means to well-being.
I have argued throughout, with the use of examples from the sports and exercise 
arena, that well-being can be enhanced in the absence of desire and other favourable 
attitudes. We may not endorse the enhanced capability with which exercise might be 
associated. Indeed, we may take our improved capacity to move around for granted. 
Yet we can still understand such a benefit of exercise to have improved our well­
being. This approach, however, is not dismissive of the importance of enjoying our
52 See Griffin (2000) ‘Replies.’
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life, having a positive attitude toward our achievements and experiencing pleasure. It 
is compatible with the contention that endorsing the achievement of those values 
central to our well-being, enjoying them, further enhances well-being. It seems likely 
that an otherwise objective theory must stipulate a certain level of subjective 
satisfaction. A life that includes objective values, but without enjoyment, pleasure, or 
the individual endorsing these goods would not reach a threshold level that we would 
generally associate with well-being. It would, however, be better than a life without 
such goods, or a life in which one merely was deluded into thinking that certain 
goods had been achieved.
Martha Nussbaum, in defending her own list of central capabilities, also proposes a 
list account. Those capabilities and functionings on the list are used to criticise 
preferences that reflect adaptation to deprived circumstances. Nussbaum argues that 
a list is essential in this process, that such criticism is only possible through reference 
to a substantive theory that offers insight on those aspects central to a human life 
(Nussbaum, 2000a).
I certainly concur with this progression toward a list theory of well-being that takes a 
clear stance on those matters central to human life. There is, however, a great deal of 
philosophical terrain to be covered in assessing the defensibility of such theories.
The previous chapter described Griffin’s theory; illustrated its advantages over 
previous theories discussed, and was subject to some initial criticism. I will follow a 
similar pattern here, deferring more substantial and methodical criticism until the 
following chapter that entails a critical comparison of the two theories.
This critique of theories of well-being, however, should not be understood as 
progressing to a definitive or objective account in the sense that we would have 
reached our final destination. Prudential knowledge may be as such that we will 
never reach a final answer (indeed this statement seems applicable to all knowledge). 
Both Griffin and Nussbaum seek to provide initial conceptions, prompting further 
reflection and deliberation. My own conclusions could be understood as the 
beginnings of a process that strives for the sort of objectivity Putnam discusses the
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warranted assertibility feasible after extensive criticism. The conclusions of this 
thesis are best understood as part of the reflection and criticism that Nussbaum and 
Griffin seek to initiate, rather than claiming objectivity that would require reflection 
and criticism beyond that offered here.
An indication of the content of these conclusions may enable a clearer understanding 
of the following chapters. Ultimately, after the comparison and criticism of both 
Griffin and Nussbaum’s accounts it is argued that the latter offers a theory 
sufficiently attentive to both the reflective and animal aspects of our human nature. 
Griffin is not oblivious to the implications of our being human for those prudential 
values on his list, but Nussbaum is more attentive to how our embodiment shapes the 
kind of life we as human beings can lead.
5.2 Nussbaum’s capabilities approach: a description
The capabilities approach, a method of conceptualising quality of life and ultimately 
assessing human development, represents a confluence of economic and political 
thought (Jayawardena, 1995). Capabilities refer to what people are able to ‘do or be 
in leading a life’ (Sen, 1993: 31), as opposed to their levels of satisfaction, or the 
resources they have at their disposal. Subjective ratings of satisfaction, as we have 
seen, are a flawed indicator as to how well a life is going.
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have been at the forefront in the development 
and application of the capabilities approach. Nussbaum differs from Sen in 
stipulating a list of those capabilities deemed to represent ‘what all citizens are 
entitled to by virtue of being human’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 33). The reference to 
‘entitlements’ demonstrates Nussbaum’s primary concern with justice, not with the 
defence of a comprehensive theory of human flourishing. As we shall see, however, 
in deciding upon these entitlements Nussbaum probes questions relevant to our 
prime concern with well-being. Nussbaum spends considerable time justifying her 
list o f ‘Central Human Functional Capabilities’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 78), capabilities 
‘of central importance in any human life’. (Nussbaum, 2000a: 74). The list is not
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dissimilar to other list theories of well-being, indeed the similarities with Griffin’s 
list are noted in the following chapter.
An important distinction, made by both Sen and Nussbaum, is that between 
capability and functioning. Sen describes this distinction in more formal terms:
Perhaps the most primitive notion in this approach concerns ‘functionings’. 
Functionings represent parts of the state of a person -  in particular the various 
things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. The capability of a 
person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings the person can 
achieve, and from which he or she can choose one collection.
(Sen, 1993:31).
Functioning represents what we actually do, whereas capability refers to our 
opportunities to function. Nussbaum exemplifies the difference referring to health:
When we think of health, for example, we should distinguish between the 
capability or opportunity to be healthy and actual healthy functioning: a 
society might make the first available and also give individuals the freedom 
not to choose the relevant functioning.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 14) 
This distinction is important not least because the capabilities approach is intended
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for political application. One way of overcoming accusations of paternalism 
levelled at such a theory is to argue that governments provide opportunities to 
function without insisting upon the actual functioning. The political goal in the most 
is capability not functioning.54Nussbaum, in fact, offers a primary and supporting 
reason for this strategy. The main reason for promoting capability rather than
53 Nussbaum (2000a, pp. 51-5) defends her theory against the argument from paternalism.
54 Although Nussbaum acknowledges that in certain instances a government may be justified in 
insisting upon the functioning itself. See Nussbaum (2006a) pp. 172 ‘Only in the area of self-respect 
and dignity do I think that actual functioning is the appropriate aim of public policy. ‘Political 
principles should treat all with respect, argues Nussbaum, not offer individuals the opportunity to be 
treated without such respect, in exchange for say, financial gain. (Nussbaum, 2006a). Nussbaum 
continues in saying that for children, functioning may be aimed at in more instances. ‘Thus I have 
defended compulsory education, compulsory health care, and other aspects of compulsory 
functioning’ (Nussbaum, 2006a: 172). This promotion of functioning is justified on the basis of ‘the 
child’s cognitive immaturity and by the importance of such functioning in enabling adult capabilities’ 
(ibid.) Nussbaum also recognises how this may, in some instances, justify the promotion of 
functioning for those with severe mental impairments.
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function is a ‘respect we have for people and their choices’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 88). 
The supporting reason recognises that choice is an important constituent of certain 
functions, ‘Play is not play if it is enforced, love is not love if it is commanded.’ 
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 88).
The capabilities approach provides an alternative to crude measures of human 
development such as GDP that fail to account for how such wealth may be 
distributed, and fail to adequately establish the quality of life of those individuals for 
whom development initiatives are most crucial. Nussbaum is keen to retain an 
emphasis upon the individual. The ‘principle o f each person as an end\ (Nussbaum 
2000a: 56) maintains:
the food on A’s plate does not magically nourish the stomach of B; that the 
pleasure felt in C’s body does not make the pain experienced by D less painful; 
that the income generated by E’s economic activity does not help to feed and 
shelter F; in general, that one person’s exceeding happiness and liberty does 
not magically make another person happy or free.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 56)
Contrary to the aggregation strategies employed in utilitarian thinking, Nussbaum 
situates her stance ‘squarely within the liberal tradition’ (Nussbaum, 2006a: 216).
The conception of the person Nussbaum employs draws extensively on Aristotle, 
although it remains Nussbaum’s intention that the list of central capabilities offers an 
opportunity for political consensus, as a freestanding moral idea, not one that relies 
on a particular metaphysical or teleological view’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 73). This 
Aristotelian conception of the person, along with claims that the approach stands 
alone from any metaphysical stance will be subject to scrutiny in the following.
5.3 Nussbaum’s ‘Central Human Functional Capabilities’ (Nussbaum, 
2000a: 78-80).
The list below represents those capabilities Nussbaum considers central to our 
quality of life. Further explanation of the capabilities has been added where 
necessary.
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1) Life ‘not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not 
worth living’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 78).
2) Bodily Health
3) Bodily Integrity -  ‘Being able to move freely from place to place; having 
one’s bodily boundaries treated as sovereign.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 78)
4) Senses, Imagination and Thought ‘to imagine, think and reason -  and to do 
these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an 
adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic 
mathematical and scientific training.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 78-9).
5) Emotions -  here particular reference is made to attachments and their 
importance to the development of emotions (Nussbaum, 2000a).
6) Practical Reason ‘Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage 
in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 79).
7) Affiliation including ‘the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation’ 
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 79), illustrating Nussbaum’s concern with the ‘external 
conditions for the exercise of the function’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 85). This 
reflects the practical and political emphasis of Women and Human 
Development. Governments cannot point to an innate or internal capability to 
affiliate as an indicator of quality of life, if a state does not facilitate such 
affiliation by ensuring policies that protect against discrimination, for 
example.
8) Other Species; concerns our relationship with nature.
9) Play
10) Control over one’s environment -  both 1) Political and 2) Material -  ‘Being 
able to hold property’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 80).
The absence of a central capability may be so severe that a life cannot be described 
as human at all. Here Nussbaum refers to ‘severe forms of mental disability or senile 
dementia’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 73). Nussbaum’s primary concern, however, is with a 
higher threshold, ‘the level at which a person’s capability becomes what Marx called 
“truly human,” that is, worthy of a human being.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 73). The
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capabilities listed above, are, for Nussbaum, essential to the living of a fully, or truly 
human life (Nussbaum seems to use these terms interchangeably). Within this 
framework two capabilities in particular are thought to be especially important, they 
are said to ‘organize and suffuse all the others making their pursuit truly human.’ 
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 82).
In Marx’s example, a starving person doesn’t use food in a fully human way -  
by which I think he means a way infused by practical reasoning and 
sociability. He or she just grabs at the food in order to survive, and the many 
social and rational ingredients of human feeding can’t make their appearance.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 72)
The example above refers to both practical reason and affiliation. It is perhaps, 
however, easier to understand the organising role for practical reason. For Nussbaum 
being capable of practical reason is ‘Being able to form a conception of the good and 
to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life.’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 
79). Planning one’s life itself seems very close to the organisation of the other goods 
within one’s life. Affiliation might be easier understood in terms of its suffusing, 
rather than organising the other goods, suggesting, for example that the fully human 
use of the senses or emotions, two of Nussbaum’s capabilities, will be in some way 
social.
The principle o f each person as an end effectively serves as a critique of crude social 
measures of quality of life such as GDP. The approach also offers a strong critique 
of utilitarian thinking, questioning the focus on satisfaction as a basis for quality of 
life or well-being assessment. Nussbaum acknowledges that we might be interested 
in levels of satisfaction but questions theories within which it is dominant. First, 
Nussbaum observes, we may be satisfied having adapted our preferences to meet our 
circumstances. ‘Women and other deprived people frequently exhibit such “adaptive 
preferences,” formed under unjust background conditions.’ (Nussbaum, 2006a: 73). 
Nussbaum also considers the utilitarian focus on satisfaction as demonstrating a 
‘deficient regard for agency.’ (Nussbaum, 2006a: 73). Nussbaum refers to Nozick’s
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experience machine in arguing for the importance of ‘active striving’ (ibid.) not just 
levels of satisfaction.
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is concerned with what people can be or do, rather 
than their utility or resources. She proposes a list of central capabilities and intends 
these capabilities to be universally applied. Policies should aim for citizens to have a 
threshold level of capability without exception. Without being capable in these 
central areas a life cannot be deemed fully human. In this sense Nussbaum likens her 
approach to that focusing upon human rights.55
The focus of this chapter, in keeping with the ultimate objective of addressing the 
contribution of exercise to well-being, will be upon Nussbaum’s approach to the 
related ideas of dignity, flourishing and the ‘truly human’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 73). It 
should be recognised, however, that in putting forward a conception intended for 
political application, the shape of the capabilities approach reflects that purpose to a 
significant extent. It is intended as a ‘partial, not a comprehensive, conception of the 
good life, a moral conception selected for political purposes only.’ (Nussbaum, 
2000a: 77). It will be shown however, that this mainly political focus, and partial 
conception, still offers real insight into human well-being.
This will be the objective of my first section, after which I will move to address 
Nussbaum’s list and the familiar problem objective theories face, how such a list is 
justified. Nussbaum’s justifies those items on her list as having a ‘political 
objectivity.’ She accepts that there are a range of conceptions of flourishing but 
attempts to provide a conception that can be endorsed by those holding different 
views on the constituents of a fully human life. Agreement on the constituents of a 
fully human life is not required, just agreement that those capabilities on the list be 
endorsed as important opportunities to be guaranteed to all, even if some do not 
actually value the associated functioning. This particular type of objectivity and the 
implications of its use for the theory will be addressed. Finally I move on to consider 
the role of human nature in Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. I aim to critique
55 See Nussbaum (2006a) pp. 78.
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Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, addressing both its limitations and where it offers 
opportunities for progress in the debate as to what best reflects our well-being. The 
two chapters describing and criticising the theories of both Nussbaum and Griffin are 
essential to chapter six, the comparison of the two theories. This comparison is 
intended to enable progression toward a defensible theory of well-being within 
which the value of exercise can be assessed. It is only after proper extensive debate 
upon well-being and its constituents that we can begin to consider the role of 
physical activity.
5.4 Dignity, the good and justice: Nussbaum’s approach and its relevance to 
well-being
Nussbaum does not intend to provide a comprehensive theory of human flourishing. 
Indeed Nussbaum refers extensively to concepts of dignity, justice and the social 
minimum. This section investigates the possibility of disregarding the approach as 
having limited relevance to my enterprise of exploring well-being and the role of 
exercise within our lives. Let us consider those aspects of Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach that seem distant from concerns with how well a life is going. This 
distance, it will be demonstrated, is somewhat illusory.
First, I consider Nussbaum’s explicit refusal to conceptualise the whole of the 
prudential domain. Nussbaum does not stipulate one conception of flourishing for 
which we should all aim.
Insofar as a highly general idea of human flourishing and its possibilities does 
figure in the approach, it is not a single idea of flourishing, as in Aristotle’s 
own normative theory, but rather an idea of a space for diverse possibilities of 
flourishing. The claim that is made by the use of this single list, then, is not 
that there is a single type of flourishing for the human being, but, rather, that 
these capabilities can be agreed by reasonable citizens to be important 
perquisites of reasonable conceptions of human flourishing
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 182).
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Nussbaum, in aspiring to a universally applicable approach, recognises that we can 
flourish in many ways. A focus upon certain central capabilities, opportunities to 
function in valuable ways, is one way in which plural specifications of the good life 
might be realised. There will be many valuable functionings that correspond to a 
capability. The capability play for example, allows for a wide range of ways of 
playing. The capabilities provide a space for functionings, and it is indeed 
functionings that Nussbaum considers to get closer to what makes a life fully human:
It is perfectly true that functionings, not simply capabilities, are what render a 
life fully human, in the sense that if there were no functioning of any kind in a 
life, we could hardly applaud it, no matter what opportunities it contained. 
Nonetheless, for political purposes it is appropriate that we shoot for 
capabilities, and those alone.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 87)
Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, encourages provision for the space to flourish, it 
does not stipulate the specific ingredients of a flourishing life. Any objective theory 
would need to recognise how we can pursue values in many ways. Nussbaum’s 
approach has a greater distance from flourishing, or the domain of prudential value, 
because its list only insists on our being free to pursue those functionings that make a 
life fully human. It retains clear relevance to our concern with flourishing or well­
being, however, because it is pretty straightforward to discern functionings related to 
those capabilities on the list. There is also the further question as to whether the 
opportunity to function, capability, has a role in well-being itself. It is to this 
question I now turn.
5.5 Why Capabilities over functionings: human flourishing or facilitating 
political agreement?
Nussbaum indicates that her approach suggests prerequisites for flourishing 
(Nussbaum, 2006a) rather than attempting to stipulate flourishing itself. Nussbaum 
(2000a) has also referred to her approach as offering the nature and contents of a 
partial theory of justice, concerned as it is with those capabilities governments are 
obligated to ensure its citizens can achieve. A focus upon capability rather than
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functioning eases political implementation, but the relevance of capability to well­
being has not gone unnoticed by philosophers such as Sen, Putnam, and indeed 
Nussbaum.
The reasons offered by Nussbaum for the primacy of capability have been described 
above. To recap, the main reason is ‘the respect we have for people and their 
choices’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 88). A supporting argument being that certain 
functionings would not retain their central characteristics if this element of choice 
were removed. Prior to providing these two reasons, Nussbaum suggests the 
promotion of capability is best understood when we consider the centrality of 
practical reason ‘as a good that both suffuses all the other functions, making them 
human rather than animal.’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 87).
There seems to be room here for the justification of the promotion of capability for 
reasons related to human well-being. We must promote capability to promote the use 
of practical reason. Putnam (2003) in defending a more comprehensive conception 
of the capabilities approach works along these lines:
However, to say that functionings connected with the capacities on 
Nussbaum’s list are each and everyone important and valuable for vast 
numbers of people is not to deny that each person must have the right to 
choose which ones to exercise or not to exercise. This too I would defend not 
by arguing that we need a ‘political conception’ on which we can get an 
‘overlapping consensus’ of the voters, but by saying that, in the democratic 
conception of human flourishing, autonomy is a central -  in many respects, the 
central -  value (Putnam, 1989: 46-9). At least from the time of Kant, liberal 
conceptions -  comprehensive liberal conceptions -  have defended the right of 
individuals to make choices, including choices that are mistaken from the point 
of view of those conceptions themselves, not as a grudging concession to 
political realities, but as something essential to our collective life conceived of 
as a venture in learning.
(Putnam, 2003: 404).
Of course, as an aside, these issues o f ‘freedom’, ‘choice’ and ‘autonomy’ are 
conceptually complex themselves. On freedom, Nussbaum differs with Sen.
Freedom for Nussbaum (2006b) is not a good in itself, and we must utilise a list of
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capabilities in order to understand which freedoms warrant protection and promotion 
and which do not. Nussbaum argues that Sen’s account understands freedom as a 
more general good, and that this may result in a distortion of an approach intended to 
help the least well-off. Protecting the freedom of the disadvantaged may require 
limiting other freedoms ‘the freedom of big business to make large campaign 
contributions: the freedoms of industry to pollute the environment.’ (Nussbaum, 
2003: 417), ultimately saying that ‘those freedoms are not good’ (Nussbaum, 2003: 
417).
Despite their agreement on the ‘evaluative space’ (Sen, 1993) of capabilities and 
functionings, I favour Nussbaum’s employment of a list of capabilities deemed 
central to a fully human life over Sen’s reluctance to articulate such a list. I concur 
with Nussbaum’s stance on freedom and the corresponding conclusion that we 
require a list of capabilities central to the fully human life in order to successfully 
criticise adaptive preferences and behaviours that threaten aspects central to our 
humanity.
Nussbaum certainly defends the promotion of capability over functioning in terms of 
practical reason. Nevertheless one must be careful in elevating freedom and choice 
in isolation over the other values. Nussbaum instead advocates a normative notion of 
practical reason.
To some extent, the list avoids those problems of paternalism by insisting that 
the political goal is capability, not actual functioning, and by dwelling on the 
central importance of choice as a good. But the notion of choice and practical 
reason used in the list is a normative notion, emphasizing the critical activity of 
reason in a way that does not reflect the actual use of reason in many lives.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 112).
Nussbaum (2000a) devotes a whole chapter to the critique of adaptive preferences, 
where those in the most deprived of circumstances put up with what they have got 
while thinking that they are living a good life. This suggests Nussbaum, is not a 
choice that should go unnoticed, but should be subject to criticism. Nussbaum’s 
practical reason is informed by those other capabilities on the list.
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The defence of capability-promotion (in Putnam’s terms), in terms of autonomy, 
seems initially plausible when we consider Nussbaum’s justification, and draws 
directly on what enables flourishing. It is of particular relevance to our concern with 
exercise and its contribution to well-being. This way we can see capability- 
promotion not as a concession to politics, ensuring some from of consensus between 
those who do not want to function in this way themselves, but as better serving our 
well-being. Understanding Nussbaum’s theory in this way would reaffirm what I 
have already suggested. The theory demonstrates ample concern with issues of 
human flourishing and well-being, and this is not diminished through its political 
aims. We must note, however, that this is Putnam’s defence of a more 
comprehensive capabilities approach, not Nussbaum’s defence of her partial 
conception. For Nussbaum the issue is confused by her use of a normative notion of 
practical reason, through which certain choices can be criticised, if they threaten the 
capabilities. Nussbaum would be uncomfortable with any elevation of choice or 
freedom over those capabilities on her list.
Nussbaum’s disinterest in the prudential implications of a failure to play despite 
having the capability to do so reflects the political leanings of the theory, rather than 
a stance on the importance of capability to well-being.
A person may prefer to work with an intense dedication that precludes 
recreation and play. Am I declaring, by my very use of the list, that such lives 
are not worthy of the dignity of the human being? And am I instructing 
government to nudge or push people into functioning of the requisite sort, no 
matter what they prefer?
It is important that the answer to this question is no. Where adult citizens are 
concerned, capability, not functioning, is the appropriate political goal.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 87).
It is quite difficult to fully evaluate this quotation. To which question is Nussbaum 
answering with a resounding ‘No’? Whether we should push people into functioning, 
or whether a life neglecting play (by choice) is that of a dignified human being?
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Keen to retain the political relevance of her conception, Nussbaum seems to verge 
between rejecting that the absence of the function ‘play’ diminishes a life and 
avoiding the issue altogether, sticking to the for political purposes line. Nussbaum’s 
decision not to enter into this debate cannot be founded solely in respect for choice 
and practical reason, and its importance to flourishing. The concept of practical 
reason Nussbaum uses is one tied to the goods on the list. Other choices have been 
criticised as neglecting certain central capabilities, why not the choice not to function 
in a certain way?
The answer, it seems, concerns the political application of the list. Putnam succinctly 
describes Rawls’s influence on Nussbaum, particularly relevant here:
I have heard Martha Nussbaum explain this point using the Rawlsian notion of 
a ‘political conception’, that is, a conception on which the ethical theorist 
hopes to get an ‘overlapping consensus’ from holders of very different 
standpoints -  not a consensus on the value of all these capabilities, indeed, but 
a consensus on the desirability of a democratic society’s providing the means 
and prerequisites for the exercise of the corresponding functionings to all its 
members, even though some individuals and some groups of individuals 
(including some religious groups) will not wish to exercise them themselves 
and will not even value them in principle.
(Putnam, 2003: 403)
It seem more likely that the sort of consensus Nussbaum is after will be achieved 
through an emphasis on capability, governments should focus on opportunities to 
function, rather than the functioning itself. On Putnam’s reading, the focus on 
capability reflects the political leanings of Nussbaum’s approach. Putnam himself 
defends capability-promotion in more comprehensive terms. Nussbaum, in the 
above, offers reasons of a more political nature. In the following, however,
Nussbaum does recognise that being capable is itself central to a fully human life. In 
demonstrating this I will trace Nussbaum’s argument in defending her list of 
capabilities and their relevance to those who do not endorse corresponding functions.
First let us consider an example of the sort of disagreements relevant to this topic:
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Do we ask the Amish citizen to state that human flourishing and a life 
compatible with human dignity are not possible without the right to vote? This 
she may well not believe. Do we ask the ultraorthodox citizen to affirm that 
human flourishing and a life compatible with human dignity are not possible 
without free press?
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 183).
The distinction between capability and functioning is again central. The capabilities, 
Nussbaum contends are important to everyone, even those who do not endorse the 
corresponding function. ‘These people’ states Nussbaum, ‘have chosen to live in a 
pluralistic democracy and to show respect for its values’ (Nussbaum, 2006a: 184). 
Those who do not endorse the functionings, Nussbaum states, do not just put up with 
the corresponding capability:
The citizens in question may also believe that choice is good for them: to be a 
nonvoter in a nation that has no elections expresses nothing much about human 
values; to pursue nonreligion in a state that persecutes religion expresses 
nothing much about the values of the nonreligious person. If we place the 
accent firmly on capability rather than functioning, it is a not impossible 
reconstruction of their thinking to ascribe to them the thought that a dignified 
life for a human being requires these capabilities -  which include, of course, 
the right not to use them.
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 185).
The universality of such options ensures an equality of capability, dismissing this 
equality in favour of, as Nussbaum puts it, ‘plural lists for plural conceptions’ 
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 185) would diminish the ‘social bases of self-respect’
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 185). If it was decided that I do not warrant the same 
opportunities as others because I do not endorse the same functionings, any equality, 
(and the respect for persons this entails) would be threatened. In this sense capability 
itself is important to ensuring a fully human life, a life with dignity. She writes:
There are, then, good reasons why the capabilities list is single, even though 
the conceptions of flourishing are plural. Nor does it seem that the appeal to a 
notion of the human causes difficulty for the type of pluralism that the 
approach is committed to respecting. We can accept without profound 
metaphysics the idea that human life has a characteristic shape and form, and 
that certain abilities, meaning certain spaces for choice, are generally agreed to
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be very important to its success -  even if for personal or religious reasons one 
will in some cases renounce the actual functioning in question.
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 186).
Nussbaum’s capabilities are not only indicators of the functionings that make a life 
fully human, or are central to our well-being, but capability itself is important. A 
fully human life, Nussbaum seems to be saying, requires certain opportunities, even 
if those holding a different conception of the good do not endorse the corresponding 
functions. It is not just that the capabilities make space for the function, even if we 
do not function in this way, it is important to our lives that we have those same 
opportunities as others.56 Being free to function in a valuable way, being capable, 
may be of direct relevance to well-being, not just indirectly through enabling central 
functions. In this way we can see those capabilities on Nussbaum’s list as important 
to concepts such as well-being. Indeed Sen indicates that ‘Acting freely and being 
able to choose may be directly conducive to well-being, not just because more 
freedom may make better alternatives available’. (Sen, 1993: 39). Nussbaum has 
indicated that for certain functionings, for example love and play, choice is 
constitutive. Neither functioning can be forced and retain its form, they must be 
voluntarily entered into. Well-being would also be better served, Sen (1993) has 
argued, if one remains free to choose, rather than just being guaranteed the 
functioning by ‘the actions of others’ (Sen, 1993: 44). These interpretations of the 
relationship between capability and well-being further reinforce conclusions that 
Nussbaum’s account, and its emphasis on capability, remains directly relevant to my 
ultimate concern with well-being.
I have already noted Nussbaum’s criticism of Sen for failing to stipulate those 
freedoms, or capabilities that are of value and those that are not. Nussbaum’s 
contention that only certain freedoms warrant political protection also has relevance 
to well-being. Just being free to choose from a range of options will not necessarily
56 Nussbaum is also keen to point out that it is not just equality that is important here ‘for I think it is 
fair to say that they value not just any old sameness, but this sameness. That is, these citizens would 
not consider themselves as well off in a benevolent dictatorship that denied all people the right to 
vote. They have chosen to affirm the public culture as more than a convenient modus vivendi: so it is 
not after all so implausible to say that they hold that these capabilities are prerequisites of a decent 
human life in a political community.’ (Nussbaum, 2006a: 186).
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enhance well-being. Within that range of choices there may be a number of 
insignificant options of no value. I argue that it is the freedom to achieve valuable 
functionings that is important to our well-being. We understand which functionings 
are valuable not through consulting subjective preferences, because of the potential 
flaws in this process, but by consulting an objective list such as that proposed by 
Nussbaum.
The above suggests that capability is important to our well-being in a number of 
ways. First, capability is constitutive of certain functionings. Play and love, the 
examples offered by Nussbaum, both by definition require freedom of choice, we 
cannot be forced into either. Second, to deny someone, or entire sections of the 
community, capability, on the grounds that they do not endorse the functioning fails 
to treat everyone with equal respect. Better to afford everyone the respect that allows 
them to pursue their own conception of flourishing having been guaranteed the same 
opportunities as others. Even this argument, for how universal capabilities ensure a 
respect central to a fully human life does not quite exhaust why capability itself 
might be important to someone who does not endorse the corresponding function. 
Nussbaum suggests that such individuals do not ignore the importance of such a 
capability to their own life, but that the person affirms a culture within which such 
capabilities are deemed prerequisites of a good human life. Thus the individual 
recognises that in order to flourish within the society in which we live, we must be 
afforded such capabilities, even if we do not use them. They value the choice to live 
a certain way, and would not value to the same extent a community that was equal in 
the sense that it offered no choice at all. Finally, and more generally, our being free 
to choose from a range of valuable options makes a contribution to our well-being 
independent of the resulting valuable functioning.
5.6 The capabilities approach and basic needs approaches to quality of life 
and well-being: a comparison
Nussbaum’s focus on capability, however, is not the only facet of the approach that 
requires further analysis to illuminate the continued relevance to well-being. How do
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we reconcile this continued relevance with Nussbaum’s commitment to establishing 
a ‘social minimum?’
I shall argue that the best approach to this idea of a basic social minimum is 
provided by an approach that focuses on human capabilities, that is, what 
people are actually able to do and be -  in a way informed by an intuitive idea 
of a life that is worthy of the dignity of the human being. I shall identify a list 
of central human capabilities, setting them in the context of a type of political 
liberalism that makes them specifically political goals and presents them in a 
manner free of any specific metaphysical grounding. In this way, I argue, the 
capabilities can be the object of an overlapping consensus among people who 
otherwise have very different comprehensive conceptions of the good.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 5).
Nussbaum here refers to the capabilities approach as the best way to understand a 
social minimum, the similarity of the approach to basic needs accounts has been 
recognised by Ian Gough (2003). The idea of a social minimum seems some way 
from human flourishing, yet Nussbaum seems to refer to both. Gough considers her 
overall concern to be with the former:
Thus, on the one hand, Nussbaum continually speaks of ‘a fully human life’, of 
‘a life truly worthy of a human being’. On the other hand, she identifies a 
lower threshold level of capability, a basic social minimum which should be 
secured for all citizens (WHD 73, 75). Much of the detailed argument focuses 
upon this minimum rather than on a comprehensive list of human flourishing.
(Gough, 2003: 17).
It is easy to emphasise Nussbaum’s intention to provide a threshold for a certain 
minimum level of life. Some of those items on the list may be taken for granted by 
many of us in a more fortunate, secure position, as necessary for any sort of life, 
rather than relating to ideas of flourishing or well-being. Nussbaum’s list, is 
however, intended to be universal, and it would be an oversight to ignore capabilities 
that for example refer to education, freedom of expression, and bodily integrity, 
because they seem to relate to a minimum that some are fortunate enough to have 
exceeded.
57 Gough is, as the abbreviation indicates referring to Nussbaum’s Women and Human Development.
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The contention that Nussbaum’s concerns are with a minimum that has little 
relevance to the well-being of those in more developed economies is an oversight. 
Nussbaum (2006a) has pointed out that a satisfactory level of capability has not been 
achieved for all citizens in any nation. An examination of the items on Nussbaum’s 
list also demonstrates a convergence with other theories such of well-being.58 
Nussbaum has items on her list such as play, affiliation, self-expression and 
pleasurable experiences (the latter two under Senses, Imagination and thought). A 
life with opportunities of this sort certainly seems relevant to our living flourishing 
lives.
Finally, I move on to discuss the possibility that Nussbaum’s capabilities are better 
considered a reflection of human dignity rather than the human good. The quick 
response is that it is impossible to disentangle these concepts. Dignity is indeed 
central to Nussbaum’s capabilities approach:
The capabilities are not understood as instrumental to a life with human 
dignity: they are understood, instead, as ways of realizing a life with human 
dignity, in the different areas of life with which human beings typically 
engage. The guiding idea behind the list is to move through these different 
areas (life, health and so on) and to ask, in each of these areas in which we live 
and act, what would be a way of being able to live and act that is minimally 
compatible with human dignity. Dignity is not defined prior to and 
independently of the capabilities, but in a way intertwined with them and their 
definition.
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 161-2).
A life with dignity for Nussbaum represents a life worthy of the human being.59 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is intended to capture just that, what it is for a life 
to be fully human. In her writing, Nussbaum moves very easily between the terms 
‘dignity’ and the ‘fully’ or ‘truly human.’ There is no significant conceptual loss in 
this; a good or dignified life is a good or dignified life of the human kind, a life 
worthy of the human being. Defensible concepts of well-being must also draw upon
58 See the following chapter and comparison of Griffin and Nussbaum’s lists.
59 ‘The basic intuitive idea of my version of the capabilities approach is that we begin with a 
conception of the dignity of the human being, and of a life that is worthy of that dignity -  a life that 
has available in it “truly human functioning,” in the sense described by Marx in his 1844 Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts.' (Nussbaum, 2006a: 74).
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ideas of the fully human; well-being concerns our potential as human beings. After 
all, as Nussbaum indicates we have no choice but to attempt to flourish as human 
beings.60
Nussbaum, we must acknowledge, is concerned with a minimum below which a life 
cannot be conceived as having the dignity worthy of a human being, or below which 
a life cannot be deemed fully human. This however, need not be interpreted as a 
limitation of Nussbaum’s account. First, Nussbaum does not aim to include within 
her conception all that is of value in a life. Nevertheless, those capabilities necessary 
for a life with dignity, or for a life to be fully human will also be necessary for a 
threshold level of well-being; we cannot achieve this without dignity, or with 
anything less than the fully human use of our capabilities. Nussbaum may well be 
more concerned with ensuring a threshold level of capability for all, a minimum 
level of which dropping below it is construed as a tragedy. It could be suggested 
however, that those values and capabilities central to such a minimum encompass 
more of the prudential domain that Nussbaum herself recognises. The similarity with 
Griffin’s list noted in the following chapter would certainly indicate this. Indeed 
when we consider a list such as Nussbaum’s it is difficult to stipulate other 
capabilities and values that we would need in our lives to push well-being beyond 
the ‘fully human’ threshold. Having exceeded a threshold level of well-being, it may 
help if we spend more time with friends and family, or have greater opportunities to 
express ourselves in work. I am unsure, however, that a direct concern with well­
being rather than a more minimal threshold would result in a different conception 
altogether.
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is not really designed to assess individual lives, as 
Wolf (1995) has observed. The approach is intended to conceptualise the 
entitlements of human beings, suggesting that a life worthy of a human requires a 
certain level of those central capabilities stipulated. I have indicated, however, 
convergence with more comprehensive theories of well-being, and described how
60 Nussbaum makes this point in arguing against the employment of a separate list of capabilities for 
those with severe mental impairments. (See Nussbaum, 2006a pp. 186-95).
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Nussbaum’s focus on capability can be understood as more than just a concession to 
political considerations, when we consider how being capable itself may impact 
upon well-being. Nussbaum herself has recognised how capability may be important 
in this respect; as has another major proponent of the capabilities approach, Amartya 
Sen. In light of this I contend that Nussbaum’s approach, rather than being confined 
to issues concerning a social minimum offers important insights into the well-being 
of human beings.
5.7 Nussbaum’s Political Objectivity
Nussbaum, in aspiring to universalism, is conscious of the grounds upon which her 
conception is defended. Defence of the theory is based upon political objectivity, 
rather than relying upon potentially divisive metaphysical ideas.61 Nussbaum’s 
approach, however, is still founded in intuitions regarding the fully human and has 
some way to go to achieving the political objectivity she speaks of. The distance 
from political objectivity need not trouble us in our main enterprise of ascertaining 
the contribution of physical activity to well-being. A convincing picture of human 
well-being may be discerned from Nussbaum’s approach, a picture ‘objective’ in a 
different sense altogether.62
Nussbaum’s account, intended for political application, seeks to recognise the 
conflict and disagreement surrounding metaphysical matters today, and is thus 
anxious that politics is not based upon a potentially divisive metaphysical standpoint.
61 Rawls’ (1985) ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’ addresses in depth how a 
justification of political principles might seek to avoid potentially divisive metaphysical foundations.
62 Nussbaum offers an explanation of these different senses of objectivity in ‘Political Objectivity’ 
(Nussbaum 2001). She actually favours Putnam’s internalist approach to objectivity, (see pp. 886) 
stating that ‘we do have available to us a quite robust conception of objectivity both in science and in 
ethics’ (Nussbaum 2001: 886), but does not seek to justify her capabilities approach in this fashion, 
aiming for a more political objectivity, as we shall see. As I begin to contemplate the capabilities 
approach as a framework within which to understand the value of physical activity I suggest that a 
defence of the capabilities approach as objective in Putnam’s terms is available to us, and indeed not 
ruled out by Nussbaum. This seems more in line with my ultimate concern with the role of physical 
activity in well-being.
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we ought not to build our fundamental political principles around a particular 
contested conception of objectivity, for example Allen Wood’s conception, or 
the conception of self-evident truth used in the U.S Declaration of 
Independence. On the other hand, we are not entirely at a loss: for we can 
articulate and defend a specifically political conception of objectivity that can 
itself be the object of an overlapping consensus among comprehensive 
doctrines.
(Nussbaum, 2001: 887).
This Rawlsian notion of political objectivity is that advocated by Nussbaum. O’Neil 
(1996) describes how Rawls responded to claims that his conception of the person, 
and hence his theory of justice relied upon metaphysical assumptions by 
emphasising that the basis of such principles are founded in liberal democratic 
society, they are justified politically, not in metaphysical terms. Nussbaum’s 
‘freestanding moral idea, not one that relies on a particular metaphysical or 
teleological view’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 83), endorses this political justification, 
although it strives for application beyond the bounds of liberal societies. This 
viewpoint does not claim that there is no objective truth to be got at on such matters, 
there is no affirmation of relativity here. Indeed, as Nussbaum points out, asserting 
relativity would certainly alienate many who believe they have arrived at an 
objective truth, in denying that one exists. Instead, this liberal stance accepts 
disagreement and attempts to produce a conception that would be endorsed by those 
of conflicting views on the basis that ‘it protects spaces in which they, like everyone 
else, can live by what they hold deepest and most important.’ (Nussbaum, 2001:
892). The distinction between capability and functioning is again at the forefront 
here. Nussbaum (2006a) considers those central capabilities to be endorsed, not just 
put up with by those who would not endorse the corresponding functioning 
(Nussbaum, 2006a). Nussbaum’s capabilities are intended as political principles, 
justifiable without reliance on contested theories of value or indeed human nature.
Of course, Nussbaum still needs to justify those political principles she puts forward. 
The principles need to be respected as ‘principles reasonable for all’ (Nussbaum,
2001: 894) and not just the ‘putting forward of our own opinion’ (Nussbaum, 2001:
63 This extension is questioned by Kamtekar (2002), a point discussed in the following.
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894). Rawls (1993) in Political Liberalism defends criteria for a form of political 
objectivity, comprising of five main ‘requirements’ (Nussbaum, 2001: 895).
These five elements -  a public framework of judgement, an account of 
correctness in judgment, a ranking of ordering of reasons, a distinction 
between the merely local or personal and the politically objective, and finally, 
an account of reasoning toward agreement -  are necessary and sufficient,
Rawls believes, for a conception of political objectivity. These five elements in 
place we are able to distinguish mistaken from correct political claims; to 
distinguish sincere but misguided recommendations from genuinely reasonable 
recommendations, and so forth.
(Nussbaum, 2001: 895-96).
In her paper ‘Political Objectivity’ (Nussbaum, 2001) Nussbaum refers to Women 
and Human Development and its attempts to ‘follow Rawls’ (Nussbaum, 2001: 901) 
in detaching itself from metaphysical views. The list of central capabilities is 
described thus:
The list represents the result of years of cross-cultural discussion, and 
comparisons between earlier and later versions will show that the input of 
other voices has shaped its content in many ways. Thus it already represents 
what it proposes: a type of overlapping consensus on the part of people with 
otherwise very different views of human life.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 76)
This notion of consensus again draws on Rawls’s Political Liberalism, as Nussbaum 
recognises. There have, however, been questions raised about the extent to which the 
work represents a genuine consensus.
More importantly, Nussbaum has not in practice utilised the method she 
advocates. She has made some revisions to her earlier approach in response to 
discussions in India, the work of Martha Chen (1986) and other writers. 
However, this does not amount to systematically confronting her conception of 
the good with the values and experiences of the poor, as Clark (2003), for 
example, attempts to do in his study of South Africa.
(Gough, 2003: 16)
Kamtekar (2002) provides a more detailed critique of Nussbaum’s apparent 
consensus, suggesting she has over stretched the notion.
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Rawls himself is very restrictive about the content and scope of the 
overlapping consensus: with respect to content, the consensus is about political 
justice, and is derived from a consensus on the political conception of persons 
as free and equal, reasonable and rational; with respect to scope, the consensus 
is among (representatives of) the many conflicting but reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that exist in a modem western industrialized 
democratic society. For these societies already have a well-established liberal 
political culture (not itself the result of moral argument alone) in which 
persons are conceived, for political purposes, as free, equal, reasonable and 
rational.
(Kamtekar, 2002: 264)
Nussbaum, as Kamtekar points out, extends the content of the consensus to that of 
the capabilities, and its scope to something truly universal, rather than that confined 
to western democratic society. Kamtekar also shows that ‘consensus on the value of 
a capability is not necessary for it to be on the list’ (2002: 265), referring to the 
disagreement Nussbaum acknowledges on the importance of the ‘Other Species’ 
capability. Kamtekar’s overall argument seems to be that an overlapping consensus 
of the sort Nussbaum puts forward is unlikely; disagreement is likely to prevail on 
these issues of the good, and even in this age of globalisation any agreement is likely 
to be upon more minimal criteria (Kamtekar, 2002).
Nussbaum draws on Rawls’ Political Liberalism in justifying her conception in 
terms of political objectivity and aiming for a consensus. This aims to distinguish her 
theory from other notable theories of flourishing, well-being or quality of life that 
may have more contested foundations and offer a list based on particular 
metaphysical view. Of course Nussbaum’s theory is a proposal for further 
discussion,64 any consensus, if achievable at all, would be some way off. Important 
questions have, however, been raised about whether Nussbaum is aiming a bit too 
high, in hoping for a more expansive consensus than Rawls (Kamtekar, 2002). I will 
not address these questions further, as this would entail a detailed critique of the
64 ‘Since the intuitive conception of human functioning and capability demands continued reflection 
and testing against our intuitions, we should view any given version of the list as a proposal put 
forward in a Socratic fashion, to be tested against the most secure of our intuitions as we attempt to 
arrive at a type of reflective equilibrium for political purposes.’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 77).
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concept of political objectivity itself beyond the bounds of this thesis. My concern 
here is whether Nussbaum can advance our knowledge of well-being further.
5.8 Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and intuitions of the fully human life
Nussbaum’s conception is better understood in terms of initiating discussion across 
cultural boundaries, rather than the result of such discussion. The cross cultural 
discussion that has taken place has provided Nussbaum with further insights into the 
good life but the optimism behind the capabilities approach as an apparent 
framework for consensus seems to be based on intuitions as to what constitutes a 
fully human life. Indeed, Nussbaum herself acknowledges the major justification of 
her conception:
I shall argue that this fact about the how the list has evolved helps to justify it 
in an ancillary way, although the primary weight of justification remains with 
the intuitive conception of truly human functioning and what that entails.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 76).
The basis of the inquiry is formed by intuitions regarding what makes us human, and 
what defines a fully human life. Ideas on these matters are put forward for further 
reflection and hopefully some form of consensus.
Nonetheless, I do hold out some hope that a much more modest and realistic 
goal can be achieved by appeal to the concept of the human being: namely, 
that of setting forth a very basic level of ethical judgement about ourselves that 
is likely to lie deeper and to command a broader consensus than do many of 
the troublesome questions we are actually discussing. In other words, to put 
matters in Rawlsian language, we are trying to get clear about some of the 
“provisional fixed points” in our judgements, before testing the theories we 
examine against them.
(Nussbaum, 2000b: 120).
The optimism regarding the potential for cross cultural consensus is likely to be 
influenced by Nussbaum’s view that there is ‘a deep and broad consensus on the 
concept of the person as Aristotle articulates it.’ (Nussbaum, 2000b: 121).
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Nussbaum’s ideas about what it is to be fully human play a substantial role in the 
development of the conception. Nussbaum, it seems, considers these intuitions 
regarding the person to be widely shared, and therefore not potentially alienating, but 
providing a sound basis for potential consensus. Kamtekar (2002) disagrees, 
questioning this level of optimism. The extent to which these basic intuitions may 
inhibit the political objectivity of the conception depends largely upon the content of 
the intuitions and any potential controversies surrounding them. Any difficulties with 
the idea of the human that underpins the proposal would also go to the heart of the 
suitability of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach for our purposes. The political 
objectivity of the conception is secondary; my ultimate concern is with exercise and 
its contribution to well-being. If, however, the idea of the human proposed by 
Nussbaum is not convincing, the picture of the fully human life proposed will not 
only be unsuitable for political purposes but for any analysis of the contribution of 
exercise to a life. We will begin the analysis of Nussbaum’s concept of the human 
and its implications here. This discussion will be extended in the subsequent 
comparison with Griffin, more directly concerned with the strength of the respective 
theories and their application to my ultimate question.
5.9 Human nature and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach
In further investigating the foundations of the theory and justification of the list of 
central capabilities, the role of human nature in Nussbaum’s theory will be 
discussed. The Aristotelian leanings of the theory will be clear as we progress 
through the description of the theory and the critical analysis that follows.
Nussbaum’s acknowledges that the development of her conception has been fuelled 
by intuitions regarding what constitutes a truly human existence.
The intuitive idea behind the approach is twofold: first, that certain functions 
are particularly central in human life, in the sense that their presence or 
absence is typically understood to be a mark of the presence or absence of 
human life; and second -  this is what Marx found in Aristotle -  that there is
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something that it is to do these functions in a truly human way, not a merely 
animal way.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 71-2).
Nussbaum’s main interest is in ‘the level at which a person’s capability becomes 
what Marx called “‘truly human,” that is, worthy of a human being.’ (Nussbaum, 
2000a: 73). Thus the concern is not just with the level of capability required for an 
existence to be defined as human, but this higher level of truly or fully human. A 
fully human life is defined by reaching this higher threshold level of the central 
capabilities and their corresponding functionings.
If we are to describe the foundation of the theory in terms of human nature, as we 
have hinted at earlier, does this mean that these intuitions stem from considerations 
of human biology? The answer to such questions is a very definite no. Nussbaum 
asserts in Women and Human Development that the account is ‘not one that is 
deduced from natural teleology or any non-moral source’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 76). 
Nussbaum also considers herself to be following Aristotle in this sense.
And it was my controversial contention that Aristotle already saw this point; he 
was not dong what many, including Williams and MacIntyre, have thought 
him to be doing -  that is, deriving ethical norms from metaphysical biology -  
but rather deriving ethical norms from some more basic and more generally 
shared ethical judgements. If he had been doing the other thing, I argued, we 
would be right to reject his conception, as Williams did; but what he is really 
doing, deriving ethical value from ethical value, makes sense and should hold 
our interest.
(Nussbaum, 2000b: 118)
Examples of how Nussbaum derives these capabilities from an evaluative procedure, 
deciding upon the central aspects of human existence by asking whether we would 
continue to be human in their absence is provided in the chapter the above quotation 
refers to.65 More recently Nussbaum has referred to a species norm; the capabilities 
list being informed by ‘A notion of the species and of the characteristic activities of a
65 See Nussbaum, M.C. (1995a) ‘Aristotle on human nature and the foundations of ethics’ in World, 
mind and ethics: Essays on the ethical philosophy o f Bernard Williams, J.E. J. Altham and R. Harrison 
(eds), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp 86-131.
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species’. (Nussbaum, 2006a: 180). Again, however, looking at the species norm in 
this way is an ethical process at root:
The capabilities approach does not urge uncritical nature-worship: instead, it 
urges evaluation of the basic powers of a creature, asking which ones are of 
central importance for its good.
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 94)
This sort of deliberation has resulted in Nussbaum’s concluding that the key aspects 
of our human nature (Nussbaum, 1995a) are sociability and practical reason, both of 
which are considered central aspects to a human existence. These two concepts play 
a prominent role in the list of central capabilities, considered to ‘organize and 
suffuse’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 82) the other capabilities.
The importance of practical reason and sociability to a fully human life is 
emphasised throughout Women and Human Development. Nussbaum’s intuitions 
regarding the centrality of practical reason (Nussbaum 1995a) provide firm 
indications as to the way politics should progress.
The focus on practical reason as an essential necessary condition of 
humanness, and, therefore, a basis for political assessment, provides political 
thought with a direction strikingly different from that provided by a focus on 
wealth and commodities as primary objects of the legislator’s concern. For it 
tells the legislator that these commodities have their place in a human life as 
means to the activities of practical reason. No good is done by giving people 
food, money and medical care, unless government also promotes the truly 
human use of these objects, in a life governed by personal choice of the good.
(Nussbaum, 1995a: 119).
Nussbaum, although aiming for a political objectivity, utilises intuitions of what 
constitutes a fully human existence as a basis for her conception. These intuitions are 
ethical in nature, i.e. they are not rooted in human biology. The capabilities practical 
reason and sociability (‘affiliation’ in WHD) are afforded special status within the 
approach. The following chapter includes an examination of the lists of both Griffin 
and Nussbaum; therefore I will not offer further explanation of the role of practical 
reason within the approach here. That reason and sociability are central to well-being
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appears a widely shared intuition, it is a contention made in numerous list theories of 
well-being, although terminology may differ.
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach may appear overly reliant upon her (shared) 
intuitions. These intuitions do not amount to justification of the approach itself, 
relying upon intuitions indicates the absence of adequate justification. Nussbaum is, 
however, quick to respond that her theory is no more guided by intuitions than other 
theories of justice.
The appearance of a difference in the role of intuitions stems, I believe, from 
the more general difference between procedural and outcome-oriented 
approaches, which I discussed in Chapter 1. Devotees of procedural 
approaches typically feel squeamish about the naked appeal to the idea of 
human dignity in the capabilities approach, in a way that they do not feel 
squeamish about the similar role of an idea of human inviolability and a related 
intuitive idea of the respect for persons in Rawls’ theory -  simply because 
there are so many moving parts in between that intuitive idea and the output 
that one can fail to notice how much work these intuitive ideas are doing.
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 174).
Nussbaum is, of course, defending her approach as a partial theory of justice here, 
rather than as a theory of flourishing or well-being. The approach may not be any 
more based on intuition than these alternatives, but this does not really allay our 
fears that Nussbaum has not yet found an adequate justification for the central 
capabilities. The capabilities are, essentially, the result of an Aristotelian influenced 
reflection upon human nature, combined with further (but by no means 
comprehensive) testing of the approach. This justification may not be satisfactory, 
but reflects a widespread difficulty of objective lists. Reference to the human or 
human nature seems to defer the issue of justification rather then solve it, human 
nature may be just as contested as well-being itself. Nussbaum, however, has to start 
somewhere, and is willing to continually test and modify the conception. There are 
also, as we shall see below, some advantages of this distinctly Aristotelian picture of 
the human, and the fully human life.
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Practical reason and sociability do not exhaust the manner in which the conception 
of the human being impacts upon Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Neither should 
this focus on practical reason be interpreted in Kantian fashion as contrasting with 
our animal nature. Nussbaum asserts that ‘The capabilities approach, by contrast, 
sees rationality and animality as thoroughly unified.’ (2006a: 159). Nussbaum 
explains further.
And bodily need, including the need for care, is a feature of our rationality and 
our sociability; it is one aspect of our dignity, then, rather than something to be 
contrasted with it.
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 160). 
This perspective is embedded in an Aristotelian conception of the human being.
The Aristotelian conception sees the human being as a “political animal”, that 
is, not just a moral and political being, but one who has an animal body, and 
whose human dignity, rather than being opposed to this animal nature, inheres 
in it, and its temporal trajectory. Humans begin as needy babies, grow up 
slowly, and require lots of care as they grow. In the prime of life they have the 
“normal” needs that the social contract model typically incorporates, but they 
also have other needs, stemming from accidents or illnesses that put them in a 
position of asymmetrical dependency for a shorter or longer time.
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 88)
Nussbaum’s approach to the fully human life encompasses our whole nature as both 
rational and animal. Understanding our well-being requires us to understand how we 
live as humans, within human bodies, our needs, and how they vary with age and 
illness. Nussbaum’s reliance upon the Aristotelian conception of the person has been 
advantageous here, providing a conception sensitive to the human condition.
Wolf (1995) has commended Nussbaum for achieving such an understanding, and 
rightly so. Referring to an earlier version of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, Wolf 
endorses its recognition of the physical aspects of our humanity:
Human flourishing is, then, more naturally suggestive of a complex, organic 
ideal, in which the ability to exercise physical powers and realize physical
149
capabilities is not artificially separated from or denigrated in comparison with 
intellectual and spiritual ideals.
(Wolf, 1995: 106).
This recognition stems from, Wolf suggests, Nussbaum’s focus upon the human 
being, and the biological element this focus incorporates. Wolf reviews an earlier 
version of Nussbaum’s work that produces two lists. An examination of these and 
subsequent lists exemplifies Nussbaum’s continuing concern with all aspects of 
being human. ‘Level One o f the Conception o f the Human Being: The Shape o f the 
Human Form o f Life' (Nussbaum, 1995b: 76) includes a section on the human body 
its ‘possibilities and vulnerabilities’ (Nussbaum, 1995b: 76). In earlier work 
Nussbaum indicates that this concern with the human body includes ‘the need for 
food and drink, a need for shelter, sexual need and desire, the ability to move and 
delight in being mobile, the capacity for pleasure and the aversion to pain’ 
(Nussbaum, 1993b: S55-S56). This list concerns the human life, and addresses how 
the human body shapes our understanding of what a human life is. Nussbaum’s 
second threshold concerns a good human life (Nussbaum, 1995b). It draws upon the 
first conception, as one would expect, particularly when the onus on the 
development of a human function into a good human function remains with the 
individual as opposed to government support (for capabilities such as practical 
reason and affiliation (Nussbaum, 1995b)).
Of course, Nussbaum’s account is ‘neither a biological account nor a metaphysical 
account’ (Nussbaum, 1995b: 74). We have noted how her account of the human 
being is ethical at its core. Therefore a value-free consideration of biology and 
physiology as a justification of physical activity is unavailable within Nussbaum’s 
framework. The capabilities on Nussbaum’s list cannot be explained by a value-free 
consideration of our physiology or biology. Nussbaum’s conception of the good life 
has at route an ethical basis, whilst remaining interested in our embodiment and what 
this entails. This attention to the human body paves the way for inquiry into the 
value of exercise. Earlier versions of Nussbaum’s account, for example, speak of 
delight in mobility, stemming from considerations of the human body.
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Women and Human Development does not employ two lists, a level one conception 
of the human, and level two of a good human life, but provides one list of ‘Central 
Human Functional Capabilities’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 78), similar to level two of 
previous lists. The first three capabilities in WHD relate to the human body, Life, 
Bodily Health, and Bodily Integrity. The latter refers to ‘Being able to move freely 
from place to place’ (Nussbaum, 2000a 78), but omits the previous reference to ‘the 
ability to move and delight in being mobile.’ (Nussbaum, 1993b: S56). The mobility 
referred to in the capability bodily integrity appears to be of a more political nature. 
The approach, however, still retains its recognition of our embodiment, and the 
limits and potential this brings. There is reference to the threat of premature death, 
and to health.
5.10 Conclusion
Nussbaum’s conception of the human being in which our animal nature is not 
separated or denigrated, enables a conception of the fully human life sensitive to the 
potential and indeed frailty of human existence. Any defensible concept of well­
being must incorporate such sensitivity. We can only function as human beings, and 
our embodiment will inevitably impact upon such functions, through, for example 
aging or illness.
Nussbaum embraces both the animal and rational aspects of our human nature. Our 
bodies are not understood as mere means to the pursuit of those values on the list, 
this is reflected in Nussbaum’s contention that human dignity inheres in our animal 
nature. We cannot understand those values constitutive of well-being independent of 
our embodiment. Our embodiment not only determines certain of the listed 
constituents of well-being, Nussbaum acknowledges capabilities such as health and 
life, but also the way in which we can pursue and achieve values. We must 
understand the constituents of well-being as the constituents of human well-being, 
and recognise how our embodiment shapes such constituents. Nussbaum in 
recognising the trajectory of our powers, how health concerns leave us dependent 
unexpectedly, is clearly attentive to the whole of our human nature. Griffin’s
151
conception of well-being, by contrast, appears to connect those ‘ends of life’ with 
our reflective nature, with less attention paid to our animal nature. Any defensible 
list theory of well-being, however, must address how we actually pursue such values, 
the role they play in our lives. We can only pursue such values as embodied human 
beings, and Griffin has failed to pay adequate attention to this in developing his 
theory.
The main focus of this chapter has been Women and Human Development 
(Nussbaum 2000a) although in order to fully describe and examine Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach it has been necessary to refer to other articles and texts both 
before and after its publication. The basic aspects of the capabilities approach have 
been presented, and some critical themes discussed. The first section demonstrated 
how Nussbaum intends her conception to be applied in the development arena, but 
argued that the theory is ultimately still relevant to our concern with well-being. The 
distance of the theory from the political objectivity it strives for may inhibit political 
application to an extent, but reinforces our conclusions in the first section. Indeed 
Nussbaum herself acknowledges its roots in her intuitions of the fully human, 
intuitions evaluated in the final section.
This chapter has made limited reference to my overall aim of understanding the 
contribution of exercise to well-being. It has been intended more as an examination 
of Nussbaum’s approach in its own terms, addressing the theory’s strengths and 
weaknesses. This process should itself offer insights as to the role of exercise, is its 
omission from Nussbaum’s list both glaring and indefensible, or is it better 
understood in terms of supporting or being enabled by those items on the list? The 
following comparison of Nussbaum’s and Griffin’s approaches offers further 
discussion on the theories, eventually arguing that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
offers a more defensible account within which to contemplate the value of exercise.
152
Chapter Six
G r i f f i n ’s  W e l l -B e in g  a n d  N u s s b a u m ’s c a p a b il it ie s  a p p r o a c h . A
COMPARISON
6.1 Introduction
The celebrated philosophical works of both Martha Nussbaum and James Griffin 
were examined in some depth in the previous chapters. The aim of this chapter is to 
offer a comparison of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Griffin’s theory of 
well-being. This comparison will further illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of 
the respective theories and provide a platform from which to assess the relationship 
between physical activity and well-being. Despite their differences, there is 
extensive overlap between the two approaches. Their convergence is desirable states 
Nussbaum:
as we should expect, there is and should be a good deal of convergence 
between an intelligently normative proceduralism and a substantive good 
theory of a non-Platonist kind, sensitive to people’s actual beliefs and values.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 158).
There are indeed clear similarities in the lists proposed by Griffin and Nussbaum. It 
is my contention here, however, that the theories also differ in important ways. 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach clearly recognises how our being embodied, 
animal human beings, must have implications for any concept of the fully human life 
or well-being proposed. Griffin is less attentive to our animal nature, and how our 
being embodied impacts upon a conception of well-being. This approach, focusing 
upon the reflective but not the animal aspects of the human being also neglects to 
include health within the list of prudential values. Health, of course, refers to how 
our being embodied might impact upon our lives, thus it is unsurprising, but 
damaging to Griffin’s theory, that he omits it from his list.
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The theories of both Nussbaum and Griffin are list theories. They propose prudential 
values or capabilities considered central to well-being or the fully human life. 
Griffin’s theory develops from an informed desire account of well-being to a list 
account (Griffin, 2000). Actual desires are dismissed as unreliable indicators of well­
being, and informed desire is ultimately given its content by the prudential values 
Griffin stipulates.66 Nussbaum also devotes considerable time to the criticism of 
certain preferences, those that damage or threaten the central capabilities.
Despite the critique of adaptive preferences and actual desires conducted within the 
work of Nussbaum and Griffin respectively, the importance of an individual 
choosing the life that is best for her is central to both approaches. Griffin considers 
autonomy to be one of his prudential values, indeed the core of our humanity. 
Nussbaum’s theory has a particularly central place for the capability practical reason. 
For Nussbaum this role does not entail that choosing in and of itself is a constituent 
of the fully human life. A normative concept of practical reason is employed, what is 
a good choice is shaped by the list of central capabilities. Neither does Griffin 
accept, without qualification, that autonomous choice enhances well-being. 
Suggesting this would threaten his critique of certain decisions and desires that upon 
satisfaction leave us no better or worse off. The success with which the respective 
theories achieve the balance between retaining the critical power of the substantive 
list within a framework attentive to the autonomy of the individual will be analysed 
here.
Griffin considers health valuable only to the extent that it provides a means to the 
prudential values on his list. This seems to suggest that we can isolate health; and 
consider its contribution to a life. I reject this, pointing to the entanglement of fact 
and value within concepts such as health, and argue, following Nordenfelt, that
66 Griffin writes: ‘My account seems to shift the real explanatory weight from the mere occurrence of 
a desire and of its satisfaction onto the features or qualities of the objects of desire. Then I give 
prominence to only a certain range of features or qualities (for example accomplishment, enjoyment, 
certain kinds understanding, and so on -  the list of prudential values that I later compiled)’ (Griffin, 
2000: 282).
67 ‘Choosing one’s own course through life, making something out of it according to one’s own lights, 
is at the heart of what it is to lead a human existence. And we value what makes life human, over and 
above what makes it happy.’ (Griffin, 1986: 67).
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health reflects our ability to achieve that which is central to our lives. I differ, 
however, with Nordenfelt’s subjective understanding of that which is vital or central 
to us.
Nussbaum is more forceful with respect to the importance of health to a fully human 
life, holding that health has intrinsic worth. A detailed analysis of how health is 
understood within the two approaches will be conducted. The lowly status of health 
within Griffin’s account, it is argued, represents inadequate attention to our 
embodiment and this impoverishes the conception of well-being advanced. A more 
general assessment of how each theory accounts for the inevitable interaction 
between goods and capabilities will follow, examining their potential to support each 
other, and how in certain instances utility values accepted by Griffin as part of well­
being may in fact undermine other central values.
The second section of this chapter (6.3) also considers, albeit briefly, the nature of 
desire and how its role in each theory might contribute to an understanding of those 
values and capabilities on the respective lists. The discussions on how each 
philosopher justifies their list will not be extended further within this chapter, or 
indeed within this thesis as a whole. I note, however, that neither Griffin nor 
Nussbaum offer satisfactory justifications of their lists. Griffin’s reliance on human 
nature is inadequate; a different view of human nature could be used to justify a
/ 'O
quite different list of prudential values. I have also questioned how Griffin moves 
so easily from one’s being reflective to those prudential values present on his list. 
There are a number of important steps missing here. Moreover, his employment of a 
rationalistic conception of human nature, elevating and separating the reflective from 
the animal, is inadequate. Despite their protestations to the contrary both 
philosophers seem to have relied on the manner of justifying these goods employed 
by Finnis (1980); that they are values which are simply self-evident. Nussbaum has
68 Indeed Griffin recognises how lists will vary according to ‘one’s metaphysical views’ (Griffin, 
1996: 150nl9). ‘My own list is very much out of a particular tradition: modem Western, and atheist. 
But take someone with a radically different list: instead of enjoyment, the mortification of the flesh; 
instead of deep personal relations, cloistered solitude; instead of autonomy, submission to the will of 
God.’ (Griffin, 1996: 150nl9).
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certainly not achieved any consensus as yet, her starting point grounded in intuitions 
as to what constitutes a fully human life. Griffin conducts a detailed foray into 
metaethics, but his conclusions would certainly not be self-evident to those with 
competing views of human nature.
It should be recognised that such manoeuvres are typical within the literature. It is 
beyond the bounds of this thesis to offer a comprehensive justification for a theory of 
well-being. Nevertheless, Putnam’s objectivity, best understood as warranted 
assertibility offers scope for a framework within which to consider theories of well­
being and how they might be justified. Within such a framework a theory of well­
being would certainly not be considered justifiable in terms of its convergence upon 
some predefined correct picture of the world. Instead the theory could be justified in 
terms of the criticism that it has undergone in order to for its conclusions to be 
warranted. For a theory to achieve this, however, would surely require extension 
beyond that offered by Nussbaum and Griffin so far (although we must note that 
neither philosopher appears to aspire to this form of objectivity). Understanding our 
judgements to be objective or warranted in this way opens the way for justification 
of an objective theory on these grounds. It is not that we cannot justify an objective 
theory of well-being. We must however, not equate justification, or claims of 
objectivity, with a final, once and for all, conclusion, but with a recognition that 
these conclusions are the best available, and the result of the sort of extensive 
criticism Dewey recommends.
First, it is necessary to discuss the aims of Nussbaum and Griffin in proposing their 
theories. Nussbaum, as we have seen, does not speak of well-being, preferring the 
‘fully human life’, and describes her theory as both a partial conception of the good 
life and a partial theory of justice. The theory is shaped, from the very beginning, by 
political and moral concerns. Griffin’s Well-Being is clearly concerned with the 
relationship between prudence and morality, and how certain of our central interests 
may justify certain moral conclusions. The development of an account of well-being 
however, is conducted prior to addressing such matters.
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6.2 What are the aims of Nussbaum and Griffin in proposing their respective 
conceptions?
I propose that Griffin and Nussbaum are best understood as being concerned with 
different ‘scales’ in developing their respective conceptions. Griffin states that 
principles ‘especially plausible on the large social scale’ (1986: 51) may not be of 
relevance at an individual level:
Perhaps much of what is appropriate on the social level is not essential to a 
principle’s being a moral principle and so will not appear on the small 
interpersonal scale. We are trying to establish moral principles, principles that 
are relevant -  perhaps in different forms -  on any scale. Certainly what matters 
on the social scale (chance factors such as degree of knowledge and 
agreement) is often irrelevant on the small scale. So we have to try to get 
behind these differences of scale as well.
(Griffin, 1986: 51).
By contrast, Nussbaum is primarily concerned with the social scale and the 
development of a framework suitable for political application. Women and Human 
Development, for example, proposes a ‘partial’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 96) conception of 
the good. Nussbaum’s contrasts her own approach with more comprehensive 
accounts that consider individuals ‘as leading substandard lives insofar as they 
neglect one of the items on the Aristotelian list, or devote themselves to something 
that is not on the list.’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 95). The capabilities approach proposed in 
WHD does not stipulate the whole of the good life. The capabilities are intended to 
facilitate the pursuit of a good life, but not to represent all that is valuable.69 
Nussbaum acknowledges that her capabilities have similarities to:
69 ‘In my own approach, by contrast, the use of the list is facilitative rather than tyrannical: if 
individuals neglect an item on the list, this is just fine from the point of view of the political purposes 
of the list, so long as they don’t impede others who wish to pursue i t  And if they pursue an item not 
on the list, that is to be expected, and exactly what the list is meant to make possible. It is in this sense 
that the list is, emphatically, a partial and not a comprehensive conception of the good.’ (Nussbaum, 
2000a: 96).
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primary goods in Rawls’s recent (political liberal) theory: they have a special 
importance in making any choice of a way of life possible, and so they have a 
special claim to be supported for political purposes in a pluralistic society.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 75).
Along with this emphasis on this facilitative role of the capabilities, Nussbaum, at 
various points acknowledges their own value. ‘The central capabilities are not just 
instrumental to further pursuits: they are held to have value in themselves, in making 
the life that includes them fully human.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 74). This ‘Argument 
from Intrinsic Worth’ (2000a: 144) is utilised as a critique of considering capabilities 
solely in terms of their impact upon utility. It is important to be free to form 
relationships, express oneself, be healthy, not merely because of these capabilities’ 
relationship with some higher good, or because they impact upon utility conceived 
subjectively, but because they have value in themselves. That capabilities are of 
intrinsic worth, suggests Nussbaum, need not require a Platonic approach, but can be 
aligned with an approach that ‘would make at least a qualified reference to choice 
and desire.’ (2000a: 144). The Argument from Intrinsic Worth and how desire helps 
ground the conception, avoiding the Platonic justification of these capabilities will 
be further discussed in the section 6.3, ‘Desire and justification’ below.
The aims of Nussbaum’s and Griffin’s theories clearly differ. Nussbaum’s aim is that 
governments ensure a threshold level of capability for their citizens, providing a 
foundation from which an individual can pursue their own idea of the good life. The 
theory is aimed at this level of social development, not for the judging of individual 
lives. In line with this Nussbaum sees little of relevance politically if someone 
‘neglects an item on the list’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 96), and does not focus on the 
prudential implications of this. Griffin’s concern with the prudential is more direct, 
contending that his theory is suitable for the judging of individual lives. The values 
on the list being the ends of life, not just a means to well-being, allow us to judge 
(although only roughly as Griffin acknowledges) a life, and how it might be better.
Nussbaum is concerned with political principles; her capabilities approach is 
intended to shape political activity, and ensure a threshold level of quality of life. A
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70partial conception of the good is also proposed as a partial conception of justice. 
Does this concern with justice leave Nussbaum’s concept at a greater distance from 
concerns over human well-being? Are we clear on the centrality of the capabilities 
for political life, but less so on the role of the capabilities in a flourishing life? 
Nussbaum’s account may be limited in its reluctance to address prudential matters, 
to specify how a life would be better or worse in instances of capability neglect, or 
indeed failing to function in a certain way. This reluctance is founded in an attempt 
to provide a conception that avoids alienating those with diverse ideas of human 
flourishing.
The claim that Nussbaum’s capabilities are less suited to the assessment of an 
individual life than Griffin’s prudential values (and therefore of less significance for 
our enterprise of assessing the contribution of exercise to well-being) warrants 
further consideration. That Nussbaum’s account is less suited than Griffin’s to the 
judging of an individual life does not mean that it lacks relevance to issues of human 
flourishing. In chapter five I argued that Nussbaum’s account as a whole retains 
relevance to these matters. Here I consider the appropriateness of Nussbaum’s 
approach for addressing the questions of this thesis.
6.2.1 Is Nussbaum’s theory relevant to our concern with the contribution of 
exercise to well-being?
Griffin’s more comprehensive account has been contrasted with Nussbaum’s partial 
conception. Indeed Nussbaum is often indifferent as to whether the individual 
actually chooses to function in a certain manner, despite recognising the importance 
of functioning to a fully human life. Recall her example of play, in which she does 
not address the implications for well-being of over working and neglecting the 
functioning play, despite having the capability.
70 ‘The primary task of my argument will be to move beyond the merely comparative use of 
capabilities to the construction of a normative political proposal that is a partial theory of justice.’ 
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 6).
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Capabilities are best understood as opportunities to function. Referring to health, 
Nussbaum indicates how a society might provide opportunities to be healthy, 
providing sports or exercise facilities for example, without insisting on the ‘actual 
healthy functioning’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 14) of individuals in the form of sports 
participation or increased physical activity, in this instance. The political application 
of the theory dictates that capabilities are the main focus of the theory, distancing the 
conception from the pure interests of the individual or paternalistic concerns.
It would seem to follow from this that Griffin’s conception has more relevance to 
our project of assessing the contribution of exercise to individual well-being. This 
question has so far been taken to ask, how does being exercise, or failing to exercise 
impact upon my well-being? Such questions seem to require the sort of judgements 
Griffin seems willing to make, suggesting that the prudential values help us judge a 
life. Nussbaum, in some instances, does not remark on whether a life would be better 
or worse, preferring to focus on the political obligation to ensure capability in central 
areas, rather than an individual’s use of this capability and its impact upon an 
individual life.
At first glance Nussbaum’s account seems better suited for assessing government 
obligation to provide opportunities to exercise, and less relevant to questions 
concerning the importance of physical activity to well-being. It has, however, been 
argued in the chapter above that Nussbaum successfully bridges its focus on politics 
with a concern for issues of human flourishing. Indeed Nussbaum’s reliance upon 
intuitions of what constitutes the fully human life perhaps situates her account more 
closely to a particular view of human flourishing than she would like. There would 
of course be difficulties in utilising certain aspects of the theory to analyse the 
relationship between exercise and well-being. Certain physical activities for example 
can be conceived of as play, but Nussbaum does not really address whether failing to 
play diminishes a life, preferring to emphasise the importance of having the 
capability. Recall Nussbaum’s reluctance to debate whether someone who chooses to 
work, deciding not to play even though (s)he has the opportunity to do so, can still 
have a fully human life. The ambiguity here, no doubt present because of
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Nussbaum’s political ambitions for her approach, leaves us on rather uncertain 
ground if we are to contemplate the value of being physically active to well-being 
via the capability of play. Nussbaum does not at any point say must actually play in 
order to live a fully human life.
Nussbaum, however, is not indifferent about certain capabilities, and their 
corresponding function. Health retains a special importance within Nussbaum’s 
conception.
My own view is that health and bodily integrity are so important in relation to 
all the other capabilities that they are legitimate areas of interference with 
choice up to a point, although there will rightly be disagreement about where 
that point is in each area.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 95)
Let us first address the interference with choice. Nussbaum does not insist upon the 
individuals functioning in a healthy way without qualification. In Frontiers o f 
Justice, she disagrees with Ameson’s contention that ‘it is appropriate for political 
planning to promote actual health as a social goal rather than merely to promote the 
capability to choose a healthy life’ (Nussbaum, 2006a: 171).
I myself take a more libertarian line here: that is, I do not favor policies that 
would make unhealthy activities such as boxing, unsafe sex, football and 
smoking illegal, although education about risk seems to be highly appropriate.
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 171).
Nussbaum elsewhere, (2000b) refers to modem nations regulating ‘food, medicine 
and the environment’ justifiably because of ‘the difficulty of making informed 
choices in the areas and because of the burden of inquiry such choices would impose 
on citizens.’ (Nussbaum, 2000b: 130). There may be some tension within 
Nussbaum’s justification of interference in certain areas, and opposing it in others. 
We could ask what makes the domain of food, medicine and the environment 
different to boxing, sex and smoking; that justifies interference in one but not the 
other? Reference to the burden of inquiry offers an incomplete argument, for in
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certain contexts it may be difficult to make an informed choice in those areas that 
Nussbaum opposes interference.
Nussbaum’s suggestion that health impacts upon the other capabilities, might 
provide us with some insight into how exercise impacts upon well-being. For health 
to be important to the other capabilities we must be talking of actual health, rather 
than just the corresponding capability. There is, however, a difficulty in speaking so 
easily of health’s importance in supporting the other capabilities. Health, it has been 
argued, cannot be understood in isolation from those values and indeed capabilities 
central to our lives. Health’s relation to the other capabilities may be best understood 
in reverse. We cannot discuss how our being healthy supports our being capable.
This seems to suggest a somewhat naturalistic account of health, in which we 
understand it in isolation from those values central to our lives. I argued in chapter 
three that health itself is better understood in a more holistic fashion, following 
Nordenfelt.71 Applying this stance to the capabilities approach, health itself would be 
understood with reference to the capabilities. Indeed, having rejected Nordenfelt’s 
vital goals as an appropriate conception of happiness, I will ultimately argue that to 
be healthy is to be in the bodily and mental state that ensures the capability to 
function in valuable ways. The capabilities are the primary concept. Within this 
holistic framework health cannot be understood as a foundation that is distinct from 
the capabilities themselves, but as the extent to which we are capable. This is a 
normative approach in which the capabilities constitutive of well-being determine 
those bodily and mental states defined as healthy. This discussion will be advanced 
further in the final chapter of thesis, as I move to consider the best account within 
which to understand the contribution of exercise to well-being.
Nussbaum’s theory is not really designed to judge individual lives but she is clear on 
the centrality of capabilities, indeed functionings such as health, bodily integrity, 
practical reason and affiliation to a fully human life. Indeed it is important to 
recognise that many capabilities and values situated within an objective list theory 
are likely to interact and support each other, a point that Nussbaum is acutely aware
71 But not accepting his overly subjective conception of happiness.
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of. I have resisted the temptation to argue for the contribution of exercise to well­
being through its impact upon health, conceived of as a foundation for other 
capabilities. We must take exercise, to achieve a level of health necessary for a 
threshold level of the other capabilities, the argument would suggest. Nussbaum’s 
approach to health, however, in particular her apparently understanding health to 
support the other capabilities, may be at odds with the normative perspective on 
health advocated earlier. From this perspective health is not understood as 
supporting the capabilities, but as reflective of our ability to achieve certain central 
ends. I have already criticised Nordenfelt’s basically subjective vital goals.
Our ultimate concern is with the contribution of exercise to well-being. Nussbaum’s 
approach seems at greater distance from the purely prudential. Consider for example 
her emphasis on the capability ‘play’, and not its function. Nussbaum does not 
address questions as to whether the absence of a function would diminish a life. 
Nevertheless there is the potential to depart from Nussbaum to a degree, and suggest 
certain functionings and indeed capabilities as constitutive of well-being. The 
extensive similarity between the two lists the philosophers indicates the feasibility of 
such a transition. Nussbaum herself recognises that her partial conception remains 
based upon intuitions as to what constitutes a fully human life. These origins offer an 
explanation as to how the theory retains its relevance to issues of human well-being 
despite its explicitly political motivations.
6.3 Desire and justification
Both Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Griffin’s theory of well-being can be 
categorised as list theories, although there remain important differences between the 
approaches. In proposing such a theory care must be taken to ensure the theory 
remains grounded, and sensitive to the different ways in which the values may figure 
in our lives. Griffin retains an emphasis throughout Well-Being and in later work on 
providing a theory sensitive to such individual differences. Desire plays a significant 
role in the explanation of prudential value and in earlier work an endorsement 
constraint is employed. Well-being cannot be enhanced by the achievement of a
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prudential value if the individual does not endorse such an achievement. I have 
questioned these more subjective leanings of Griffin’s approach, and in particular the 
employment of an endorsement constraint. An individual can be flawed in failing to 
endorse or desire a value, but this need not prevent the achievement of such a value 
making a positive contribution to well-being.
Nussbaum also retains a place for desire in her account. She attempts to balance the 
importance of the items on the list with a respect for people’s desires. The 
Aristotelian conception of desire provides a route toward this balance. We can 
briefly trace the development of this argument.
Nussbaum devotes considerable space to adaptive preferences, illustrating how 
unreliable desire can be as an indicator of quality of life.
But there was a time when Vasanti did not think this way -  especially before 
her husband’s vasectomy, when she thought she might still have children. Like 
many women, she seems to have thought that abuse was painful and bad, but 
still part a of women’s lot in life, just something women have to put up with as 
part of being women dependent on men, and entailed by having left her own 
family to move into a husband’s home. The idea that it was a violation of 
rights, of law, of justice, and that she herself has rights that are being violated 
by her husband’s conduct -  these ideas she didn’t have at that time, and many 
women all over the world don’t have them now.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 112-3).
Nussbaum is thus moved to put great emphasis on the value of those items on her 
list, regardless as to whether they are desired. This is reflected in The Argument from 
Intrinsic Worth that Nussbaum seems persuaded by:
even if we could engineer things so that people were reliably adapted to a very 
low living standard -  and, as Mill says, the “masters of women” have in many 
areas done exactly that -  this would not be the end of the issue of what is good 
or right. These failures themselves have importance, and just the bare fact that 
human beings are undergoing them should be enough for us.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 144)
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Nussbaum though, is keen that her conception remains grounded, the values in the 
list need not be conceived of in a Platonic fashion. Nussbaum is after all concerned 
with the political justification of goods and thus cannot be indifferent to choice and 
desire. Nussbaum (2000a) asserts that the principle of respect dictates that we take
79note of desire in proposing such a conception. Nussbaum also criticises a sharp 
distinction between desire and reason. This distinction can be contrasted with 
Nussbaum’s own approach in which desire is understood:
as reaching out for “the apparent good”, and thus as involving, even at the 
level of appetite, a high degree of selective intentionality and responsiveness, 
one will have in that very picture of desire some strong reasons not to bypass 
it, for it seems to be a part of our humanity worthy of respect and voice.
(Nussbaum 2000a: 147).
Indeed Nussbaum considers desires for ‘food, for mobility, for security, for health, 
and for the use of reason’ as ‘permanent features of our makeup as humans, which 
culture can blunt but cannot altogether remove.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 155). Desire is 
deemed to be part of what explains the goodness of the capabilities for political 
purposes. Nussbaum’s capabilities are justified on political grounds, thus she need 
not enter the debate as to whether the value of the capabilities to a life is also partly 
constituted by their being desired. There are indications however, that her 
acknowledgement of the importance of desire does not entail subjectivity. 
Nussbaum’s argues for the intrinsic worth of the capabilities, and insists that the 
norms proposed are not understood independently of history, human choice and 
desire. Nussbaum does not state that they are partly constituted by actual desire:
The platonist will indeed say that these eternal intrinsic values have the value 
they do altogether independent of human history, human choice and human 
desire. But one might adopt a different account of justification, one that would 
make at least a qualified reference to choice and desire. Rawls’s Socratic 
account of justification proceeding toward “reflective equilibrium” may be one
72 Disagreeing with Scanlon’s (1993) rejection of desire within his approach to quality of life. 
Nussbaum states ‘Scanlon fails to consider a very strong reason we have for giving desire at least 
some role in our process of justification: the reason of respect I have already endorsed. The fact that 
human beings desire something does count; it counts because we think that politics, rightly 
understood, comes from people and what matters to them, not from heavenly norms.’ (Nussbaum, 
2000a: 146).
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such account; Aristotle’s use of the person of practical wisdom as normative 
criterion is another; Dewey’s pragmatism offers another
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 144-5).
Nussbaum also remarks that certain norm-laden proceduralist approaches offer a 
qualified incorporation of desire. I have argued for an objective approach to well­
being, in which desire is neither necessary nor sufficient for the enhancement of 
well-being. Yet I consider this compatible with an approach in which the formulation 
of the list itself is not indifferent from the human perspective. After all, from what 
other perspective can we understand our well-being? Those items on an objective list 
can only be justified after the sort of inquiry into their value both Dewey and Putnam 
recommend. Such inquiry would of course attend to human history and desire. It 
would certainly be strange if such goods on an objective list were never the objects 
of desire, such a finding would certainly prompt further investigation. Do the goods 
belong on the list? Have we lost track of what is valuable in a life? My concern, in 
advocating an objective conception of well-being is not that we remain independent 
of the human perspective, but that the value of those capabilities and functionings 
that might be contained on a carefully considered objective list is not entirely 
negated by an individual’s poorly reasoned failure to endorse or desire them.
Nussbaum herself acknowledges that because of the potential for the distortion of 
desire, we rely primarily on the list of substantive goods. That coupled with her 
suggestion that the capabilities are of intrinsic worth clearly indicates an approach 
more in line with the objectivity I have advocated. Both Griffin and Nussbaum agree 
that there must be some role for desire, but I understand Nussbaum as standing more 
firmly by her list of substantive goods. This I think safest in light of the flawed 
reasons for which we may fail to endorse a good. Those items on both lists, I argue, 
are so important to human lives, that they should not be reduced to subjective 
perception. Well-being should not be entirely reduced to subjective perspective, our 
lives can be improved through our being capable, or achieving a value, in the 
absence of favourable attitudes or endorsement.
166
6.4 The ‘lists’ o f Nussbaum  and Griffin: A comparison
6.4.1 Dangers of over-specifying well-being or the fully human life
Nussbaum and Griffin both stipulate a range of values or capabilities that constitute a 
flourishing life, but must remain aware of the dangers of over specifying. List 
theories, in order to achieve their aims must resonate universally, although there are 
some qualifications to this I will arrive at shortly. Achieving this appeal requires the 
philosopher to recognise the variety of ways in which people pursue the good life, 
without losing the critical capabilities of the theory. Griffin certainly aims to provide 
a list theory of prudential values in most instances important to all of us. I have 
argued, however, that in aspiring to account for individual difference and provide a 
theory both that is both objective and subjective the list is deprived of some of its 
critical powers.
Nussbaum in proposing a conception for universal application, across a range of 
cultures must retain an acute awareness of the different ways in which people live 
their lives.
Indeed, part of the idea of the list is its multiple realizability: its members can 
be more concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and 
circumstances. It is thus designed to leave room for a reasonable pluralism in 
specification.
(Nussbaum 2000a: 77).
Neither theory insists that life must take a particular form to enable the individual to 
flourish. General values or capabilities are proposed; the manner in which they 
feature in the lives of an individual is a matter for them. It remains important, 
however, that they do feature (although Nussbaum, 2000a in the majority of cases 
does not insist on the actual functioning). Having examined the lists in more detail, 
particular attention will be paid to health and its role within each conception. I will 
also address instances in which certain goods may not be realised and the
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implications of this. It is perhaps unsurprising that Griffin is more willing to accept 
that there are exceptional circumstance in which well-being will not be diminished in 
the absence of say, accomplishment. Nussbaum, on the other hand, understandably 
insists on the importance of all her capabilities, the list is after all intended as 
providing obligations for governments; any concessions may well weaken the power 
of the theory in this respect.
Figure 2. A comparison of Griffin and Nussbaum’s lists
Nussbaum’s *Central Human Functional Griffin’s (ends of life’ (Griffin 1986:
Capabilities’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 78). 64; for list of these see page 67).
■ Life ■ Accomplishment
■ Bodily Health ■ The components of human
■ Bodily Integrity existence; autonomy,
■ Senses, Imagination and ‘minimum material goods
Thought to keep body and soul
■ Emotions together’ (Griffin 1986:
■ Practical Reason 67), liberty.
■ Affiliation ■ Understanding
■ Other Species. ■ Enjoyment
■ Play
■ Control over one’s environment
■ Deep personal relations
6.4.2 Similarities -  deep personal relations
The categories of deep personal relations (Griffin) and affiliation (Nussbaum) are 
extremely similar. Griffin focuses upon the positive value of ‘reciprocal relations of 
friendship and love’ (1986: 67). Nussbaum recognises this positive side of 
relationships in both the categories of emotions (‘to love those who love and care for 
us’ (2000a: 79)), and affiliation, where, in keeping with the political dimension to 
the theory, great emphasis is also placed upon the ‘social bases of self-respect and 
non-humiliation’ (ibid.) and ensuring ‘protections against discrimination.’ (ibid).
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Both philosophers recognise that the value of such relationships extends beyond the 
mental states with which they may be associated. Griffin distances himself from 
classical utilitarianism, emphasising the value of these relationships ‘apart from the 
pleasure and benefit they give’ (Griffin, 1986: 68). Nussbaum would of course 
agree; her reason for conceptualising the fully human life in terms of capabilities is 
to avoid such reduction to experienced states. Griffin suggests that deep personal 
relationships:
fit Aristotle’s model of the human ergon better than even his own candidate, 
rationality; they in themselves go along way towards filling and completing 
life.
(Griffin, 1986: 68)
Nussbaum offers a more formal description of affiliation and indeed practical 
reason’s elevated status within her capabilities approach:
Among the capabilities, two, practical reason and affiliation, stand out as of 
special importance, since they both organize and suffuse all the others, making 
their pursuit truly human.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 82).
Practical reason is more clearly an organiser, it is perhaps less clear how affiliation 
would organise the other capabilities on the list so we will move straight to address 
how affiliation suffuses the other goods. Nussbaum is saying, it seems, that the truly 
human functioning of the goods on her list will be alongside others, perhaps in some 
cooperative task. This follows on from Aristotle’s account of our social nature. We 
may at times value solitude, but a flourishing life requires participation in certain 
central values with others. When we consider Nussbaum’s list this seems fair; play, 
the use of our senses, imagination and thought, the contemplation of nature, all these 
seem more complete if they incorporate some social element. Perhaps we will not 
require the presence of others at all times, but certain ‘practices’ suggests MacIntyre 
(1985), such as bird watching, science and sport, even if pursued alone, seem to 
require others in some sense.
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To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with its 
contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us in the 
practice, particularly those whose achievements extended the reach of the 
practice to its present point.
(MacIntyre, 1985: 194)
This may be extending far beyond Nussbaum, but the point remains an interesting 
one. For such activities to significantly improve lives, making them fully human, do 
we need to recognise and embrace this inherent social component? This indeed 
seems to be part of the beauty of sport. This requires further analysis, the main point 
here though, is that the fully human life requires affiliation of some kind, and the 
fully human pursuit of capabilities entails some form of affiliation. This is not say 
that we do not value solitude in some situations, but that in central areas of our lives, 
the presence of others enhances life.
Affiliation suffuses the other capabilities central to a fully human life. Nussbaum’s 
explicitly stating this relationship provides more detail as to what a fully human life 
is, what the activities or practices that comprise it involve. Griffin, however, seems 
aware of the importance of deep personal relationships to the other prudential values. 
In Value Judgement he states that his prudential values imply a certain relationship 
with others, recognition of the value of others. In demonstrating the closeness of 
prudence and morality Griffin says of accomplishment:
Perhaps there are accomplishments whose weighty value does not come from 
benefiting others. Solving some puzzle in pure mathematics might be an 
example. Still, the more one doubted that the situation met any substantial 
human interest; the more one would suspect that it failed to give any life much 
point or weight. In any case, one would have no grasp of the very largest class 
of accomplishments that human life affords if one did not introduce the value 
represented by other persons. Most accomplishments, and the sorts of 
accomplishments accessible to most of us, involve benefit to others.
(Griffin 1996: 70)73
73 Further examples of how the moral may penetrate the prudential are provided in Griffin (1996, pp. 
70-1) referring to both deep personal relations and understanding. For Griffin deep personal 
relationships will be ones of ‘love and friendship (1996: 70), recognising, of course, the value of 
others. Griffin’s ‘understanding’ entails not just ‘passive contemplation’ (1996: 71) of values, but an 
appropriate response to them. Among these will be ‘certain moral values.’ (Griffin 1996: 71).
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Accomplishment appears largely dependant on the presence of others, and 
recognition of their value. Griffin does not formally state that the value ‘deep 
personal relationships’ penetrates the others, but is aware that his values are 
ultimately dependent on recognising the moral worth of others. ‘The more one tries 
to explain these prudential values, the more one finds a huge whole in them that has 
to be filled by the value represented by other persons.’ (Griffin, 1996: 69). This does 
not seem far away from Nussbaum’s recognition that the capability affiliation is 
central to other capabilities. Deep personal relations, for Griffin, entails recognising 
the worth of others.74 In turn the recognition of the value of others is central to the 
other prudential values.
A useful way of further examining this issue is to take skill as an example. That a 
skill is difficult is not enough for its execution to constitute an achievement, suggests 
Tasioulas:
some other value must appropriately characterize a difficult activity before it 
can be an achievement. Activity that amounts to an achievement is always a 
difficulty-overcoming mode of participation by an agent in some value, such as 
deep personal relations, knowledge, justice, beauty, and so on, one that rightly 
commands our admiration.
(Tasioulas, 2006: 255).
This other value that helps decide what constitutes an achievement is referred to as 
the ‘framing value’ (ibid.). Griffin agrees that the execution of a difficult skill is not 
in itself sufficient to deem it an accomplishment (differing in terminology with 
Tasioulas) he states that ‘walking on one’s hands from Oxford to London is a 
remarkable deed, of the Guinness Book of Records sort, but itself lacks the worth 
that is part of an accomplishment’ (Griffin, 1986: 65). Our extension of Griffin’s 
position here, following Nussbaum, (and in part Tasioulas75, although he does not
74 see Griffin (1996) pp. 70
75 Tasioulas in more directly concerned with the intrinsic goods of game playing, although this of 
course has implications for well-being. Tasioulas’ summarises his argument thus: ‘the primary 
intrinsic good internal to game-playing -  a good worth pursuing for its own sake and so capable of 
making one’s life go better in so far as one participates in it -  is that of play itself.’ (2006: 237). This
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directly address well-being), is to suggest deep personal relationships, or affiliation, 
must always be present as a framing value for the achievement of a genuine 
accomplishment, or indeed for other values on the lists, such as play, to fully realise 
their contribution to a life. Griffin’s insistence of the centrality of recognising the 
worth of others to his prudential values gets close to this conclusion, without 
formally stating it.
Nussbaum and Griffin both accept that centrality of meaningful relationships to a 
flourishing life. Nussbaum offers a formal recognition of how the capability 
affiliation suffuses other capabilities. Griffin, in addressing the relationship between 
prudence and morality, clearly states how prudential values are intertwined with 
adequate recognition of the worth of others.
6.4.3 Enjoyment
Griffin’s prudential value ‘enjoyment’ is not neglected within Nussbaum’s account. 
‘Senses, Imagination and Thought’ contains ‘Being able to have pleasurable 
experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain.’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 79). Nussbaum 
also includes ‘Play’ in her list, ‘Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational 
activities.’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 80). A persuasive argument for this inclusion is 
provided:
We may suppose that children naturally play and express themselves 
imaginatively in play. This, however, is not precisely true. In many cultures, 
little girls never get encouragement to play, and in consequence they really 
don’t know how to play.
(Nussbaum 2000a: 90).
Griffin does not consider ‘play’ to warrant a category in its own right preferring to 
include it within the broader category of enjoyment. The idea that enjoyment entails 
play in this fashion warrants further examination. Earlier chapters have sought to 
illustrate how physical activity can be of value apart from the satisfaction or
argument is a response to Hurka’s (2006) account of the good of games, following Suits, in which 
achievement of a difficult skill is the primary intrinsic good.
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enjoyment with which it is often associated. A similar analysis could be conducted 
with respect to play. Its contribution to well-being is not reducible entirely to the 
enjoyment with which it is associated. Playing games (for example, football or 
chess) may not always be enjoyable but may be of broader value to our lives. Having 
earlier rejected the contention that difficulty or skill may provide sufficient criteria 
upon which to define accomplishment, I cannot conclude that the technical aspects 
of play enhance well-being.
Tasioulas rejects this role for complexity in explaining the value of games arguing 
that play is more characteristic of games than the overcoming of difficulty. He goes 
on to elaborate upon certain aspects of Huizinga’s study of play:
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free activity 
standing quite consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not serious”, but at 
the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity 
connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained from it. It 
proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to 
fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of social 
groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their 
difference from the common world by disguise or other means.
(Huizinga, 1950: 13).
In elaborating upon Huizinga’s assessment of the play mood as ‘one of rapture and 
enthusiasm, and is sacred or festive according to the occasion’ (Huizinga, 1950:
132), Tasioulas (2006) is keen to point out that certain types of play, especially 
sports have at their core a tension, and require exertion both physically and mentally. 
In certain instances this might mean that enjoying them during participation is 
particularly difficult.
Many types of play are enjoyed, and that enjoyment, for games without a 
challenging component, would be the main reason for participation. In certain 
instances, however, and sports provide a good example, certain other characteristics 
may take precedence. Time and space prevent my elaborating further on the value of 
play to a good life, but Huizinga’s characterisation offers a starting point from which 
to examine the features of play, and how they might be of value to a life, even when
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the activity is not enjoyed. Griffin’s account of well-being, I argue, is deficient in not 
including play within his account. The reduction of play to enjoyment does it a 
disservice and overlooks these important characteristics.
A further reason for Nussbaum’s inclusion of play as a central capability and 
Griffin’s preference for the more general value ‘enjoyment’ relates to the intentions 
of each theory. If enjoyment was proposed as a central capability within Nussbaum’s 
approach the government obligation would be somewhat unclear. The capacity to 
enjoy is universal, those in power might respond, but we all enjoy different things. 
What policies can such a capability initiate? The capability play may offer potential 
for greater stipulation, encouraging the provision of facilities for physical activities 
as well as for other games for those of a range of ages. Play seems to suggest a 
certain range of activities, it certainly does not encompass all that we enjoy, but 
stipulates a type of activity central to a fully human life, in Nussbaum’s eyes. The 
capability refers to our laughing, playing and enjoying recreational activities 
(Nussbaum 2000a). Although certainly not specific as to what we enjoy or laugh at, 
the capability play, as opposed to enjoyment, gives us some idea of those activities 
that form a part of the fully human life, and assert the importance of a government 
providing scope for these activities. Griffin’s theory need not concern itself with 
such practicalities, how the value ‘enjoyment’ might be interpreted by those in 
power, is not the primary concern as his theory of well-being is developed.
As I have stated, despite my opposing Griffin’s reduction of play to enjoyment, I am 
happy for an otherwise objective list to require a certain level of enjoyment, pleasure 
and satisfaction. In advocating an objective conception of well-being I claim that 
well-being can be enhanced in the absence of these subjective goods. I do not assert 
that a life without any form of subjective satisfaction or enjoyment could reasonably 
be associated with well-being. Both Griffin and Nussbaum make reference to these 
subjective goods, and I contend that a certain level of these subjective goods must be 
required for a life to achieve a satisfactory level of well-being.
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Of Griffin’s list of five, three have fairly direct counterparts in Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach, deep personal relations, enjoyment, and the components of 
human existence (to be examined later in section 6.4.6, Autonomy, liberty and 
practical reason). This provides strong evidence that Nussbaum has successfully 
found a balance between an account sufficiently basic so as to ensure potential for 
application (particularly in developing countries), but with a strong sense of what is 
central to our well-being. The prudential values that have not yet been addressed 
directly are Griffin’s accomplishment and understanding.
6.4.4 Understanding
‘Understanding’ for Griffin requires ‘Simply knowing about oneself and one’s 
world’ and ‘being in touch with reality, being free from muddle, ignorance, and 
mistake.’ (Griffin, 1986: 67). Griffin does not include practical rationality within his 
account, claiming that it is better understood as the capacity to organise those 
constituents of well-being. First, I will address parallels in the Nussbaum account 
with Griffin’s understanding, and secondly, I will discuss ‘practical rationality’ and 
its absence in Griffin’s list.
Although ‘Understanding’ is not considered to include practical rationality (Griffin, 
1986) there does seem to be a resemblance to Nussbaum’s ‘Practical Reason’. The 
latter is elaborated upon as ‘to engage in critical reflection about the planning of 
one’s life’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 79) closely resembling Griffin’s reference to living a 
life without muddle. When we consider that Nussbaum also refers to ‘Being able to 
search for the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way’(Nussbaum 2000a: 79), 
related, one would think to knowing about one’s world, there is a reasonable 
argument to suggest that Griffin’s prudential value ‘understanding’ is sufficiently 
accounted for in Nussbaum’s list. Of course, it is not necessary that the two lists 
converge entirely; they may just reflect different ideas of what the good life is. This 
convergence, however, does support my earlier conclusion that Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach is of relevance to my concern with well-being, not just with the 
establishment of political principles to ensure a social minimum.
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6.4.5 Griffin ’s account of practical rationality
Practical rationality, for Griffin is ‘the practical weighing and balancing of the 
elements of a good life’ (Griffin, 1986: 58). The overall view seems to be of 
practical reason as an organiser, but not as part of the content of the good life. There 
is evidence, however, of deviation from this line. Griffin also remarks that practical 
reason may form part of the good life,76 but does not give us a good enough idea of 
its whole. Despite this ambiguity Griffin is certainly more dismissive of practical 
reason as a constituent of the good life than Nussbaum. Within Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach practical reason is said not only to organise but also to suffuse 
the other goods: ‘To use one’s senses in a way not infused by the characteristically 
human use of thought and planning is to use them in an incompletely human 
manner.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 82).
Nussbaum’s conception of practical reason is not as a mere organiser; rather it is 
central to what make us truly human. Practical reason encompasses choice and 
‘critical reflection’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 79), this seems to incorporate a great deal of 
the characteristics involved in Griffin’s components of human existence, ‘choosing 
one’s own course through life’ (Griffin, 1986: 67). Indeed Griffin considers these to 
be ‘what makes life human’ (Griffin 1986: 67). He appears unsure as to whether 
practical rationality is a constituent of well-being, but accepts the centrality of the 
components of human existence, components that have a great deal of overlap with 
Nussbaum’s practical reason. Nussbaum, however, goes further in describing how 
her practical reason suffuses the other goods on her list, and as we shall see how her 
notion of practical reason is in part shaped by her substantive list.
76 ‘Practical rationality -  for example knowledge, autonomous choice -  is part of its content, but only 
along with, for instance, enjoyment, accomplishment, and deep personal relations.’(Griffin, 1986: 58).
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6.4.6 Autonomy, liberty, and practical reason
Nussbaum clearly states that although practical reason forms a central part of her 
conception of a fully human life, this does not mean that any choice is a good choice. 
Nussbaum employs a normative notion of practical reason. She writes:
To some extent, the list avoids those problems of paternalism by insisting that 
the political goal is capability, not actual functioning, and by dwelling on the 
central importance of choice as a good. But the notion of choice and practical 
reason used in the list is a normative notion, emphasizing the critical activity of 
reason in a way that does not reflect the actual use of reason in many lives.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 112).
Many people make choices that damage those capabilities on Nussbaum’s list.
These, in the main, warrant criticism. Nussbaum’s account of practical reason is tied 
to her list of substantive goods. Practical reason suffuses and infuses those 
capabilities on the list; a life would not be fully human if the capabilities did not 
involve practical reason in this way. For Nussbaum practical reason and affiliation 
are afforded a special status within the approach, however, this does not seem to 
amount to a formal hierarchy, so much as a recognition of how these capabilities 
interact with others on the list. Indeed, the fully human use of practical reason, 
within Nussbaum’s conception, is also informed by those capabilities on 
Nussbaum’s list. Being free to make any choice is not central to Nussbaum’s 
conception of the fully human life, in the way that practical reason is. In certain 
instances it is accepted that choice can be justifiably limited, i.e. a government can 
seek to promote the function health and not just its capability, within the limits set by
T1liberty. For Nussbaum, it is the space for valuable choices protected by her 
substantive list that is so important to a fully human life, not choice or freedom per 
se.
77 Nussbaum (2000a: 91) talks of how health may be of value ‘independent of choice, and that it is not 
unreasonable for government to take a stand on its importance in a way that to some extent (though 
not totally) bypasses choice.’ Although, again, we should acknowledge Nussbaum’s (2006a) noted 
earlier. Nussbaum certainly does not advocate the promotion of the function health in general.
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A look at some of Nussbaum’s earlier work enables further understanding the role of 
choice in the good life. In contrast to Women and Human Development, earlier 
examples of Nussbaum’s work offered a more comprehensive theory of the human 
good. Rather than aligning herself with Rawls, as she does in Women and Human 
Development, Nussbaum has in the past contrasted her stance with that of Rawls, 
stipulating both the ends and shape of the good life (Nussbaum, 1993b: S54). Within 
this earlier work Nussbaum was more willing to discuss the role of autonomy within 
a conception of the good life, or flourishing.
Finally, the Aristotelian insists that choice is not pure spontaneity flourishing 
independently of material and social conditions. If one cares about autonomy, 
then one must care about the rest of the form of life that supports it and the 
material conditions that enable that form of life. Thus the Aristotelian claims 
that her own comprehensive concern with flourishing across all areas of life is 
a better way of promoting choice than is the liberal’s narrower concern with 
spontaneity alone, which sometimes tolerates situations in which individuals 
are in other ways cut off from the fully human use of their faculties.
(Nussbaum, 1993b: S61).
Earlier I referred to Annas (1980) and her description of an Aristotelian position on 
pleasure, in which it is not conceived in isolation but in terms of the ends of a good 
life. This concern with all areas of a life is also evident in the understanding of 
autonomy. Women and Human Development has moved away from the 
comprehensive conception advanced within Nussbaum’s earlier work. Nevertheless, 
Nussbaum’s assertion that choice and autonomy must be considered alongside those 
other constituents of a fully human life seems relevant to Women and Human 
Development, when we consider how the list proposed there helps us understand 
which choices can be deemed reasonable.
Griffin’s inclusion of autonomy within his ‘components o f human existence’ 
indicates how his concept extends beyond a crude subjective sense of happiness or 
well-being.
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Now, on the face of it, the values that back rights -  for example, the three 
values that I have singled out, autonomy, liberty, and equal respect -  seem 
clearly to fall outside the ambit of well-being. However, sometimes that is 
because the notion of well-being in use is too narrow quite apart from the 
issue.
(Griffin, 1986: 236).
Griffin argues there may come a point in certain instances that a reduction in 
autonomy might be justified as better serving well-being, such a point may be 
reached in the case of a psychiatric patient, he suggests. In general though, he argues 
that autonomy is central to our well-being. ‘We value what makes life human over 
and above what makes life happy (Griffin, 1986: 67), and Griffin considers both 
liberty and autonomy central to our humanity. Griffin’s account of well-being has 
been criticised for its subjectivism, but the account also offers a clear improvement 
upon those that tie well-being to subjective experiences.
Griffin certainly does not elevate either autonomy or liberty over those other 
prudential values on his list. This can be seen in his situating liberty within a broader 
conception of well-being. ‘So, in the real world, power at the centre of one’s life 
matters immensely. But its value derives from the value of the whole way of life at 
stake.’78 (Griffin, 1986: 237). A successful objective list theory must be committed 
to all those values it stipulates as constitutive of well-being. Both of these 
approaches recognise that certain choices and desires may at times threaten those 
values on a list, and rather than elevating values such as liberty, autonomy or even 
practical reason, recognise for a life to flourish, our choices must be informed by all 
of those values or capabilities on the list.
6.4.7 Accomplishment
It has already been established that Women and Human Development provides a 
partial conception of the good, and despite including a great deal of Griffin’s ends, it
78 For the distinction between autonomy and liberty see Griffin (1986) pp. 374-5n9. ‘the early stage of 
choosing one’s path through life (autonomy) and the latter stage of not then being stopped by others 
from going down it (liberty).’
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is not intended as a comprehensive theory of all that is valuable. Thus 
accomplishment, that sort of genuine achievement that gives life ‘point and 
substance’ (Griffin, 1986: 64), does not have an explicit counterpart in Nussbaum’s 
list. The central capabilities presented in Women and Human Development are 
intended to provide the foundations within which such projects could be conducted 
without interference. It could perhaps be argued that a range of the goods on 
Nussbaum’s list would provide this point of life, our relationships for example 
(affiliation) or the self-expressive works we produce (Senses, Imagination and 
Thought). The absence of accomplishment is not enough for us to conclude that 
Nussbaum’s theory is only of interest in the political sense of what governments are 
obligated to ensure their people have. The theory provides genuine insights into the 
human good, demonstrated by its convergence with informed desire, a convergence 
that Nussbaum anticipates and welcomes.
6.4.8 Health
The role of health within the respective theories offers an area of substantial 
difference. Nussbaum includes ‘bodily health’ as a central element of her 
conception, Griffin, on the other hand, does not consider health an appropriate 
candidate for his prudential values.
Health on its own is not valuable; it is necessary for a life, out of which each of 
us in his own case can make something valuable. But then what moral status 
has a necessary condition of the good life, in a case where achieving it will not 
allow one, and may prevent one, from having a good life?
(Griffin 1986: 46-47)
This stance on health should be placed within the broader context of his critique of 
basic needs accounts. Griffin accepts that governments will generally seek to 
promote needs such as health, paying less attention to desires, even going so far as to 
say that ‘needs generally trump desires’ (Griffin, 1986: 47). He is reluctant, 
however, to conclude that needs must have greater moral importance, suggesting that 
the trumping that seems to occur in a political context indicates only the elevated
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political importance of needs. Indeed Griffin considers the elevation of needs over 
desires in a moral sense a mistake.
Not all basic needs are morally important; some mere desires are. What we 
need are deeper categories. We have to get behind talk about needs and desires 
to their deeper significance in our lives. This, then, becomes a serious threat to 
need accounts, for if prudential value turns out to be that deeper category we 
shall be back with the informed-desire account.
(ibid.).
Basic needs discussed by Griffin include education, ‘interesting work’, (Griffin,
1986: 43) and health. Griffin recognises that needs are required to at least some level 
or threshold. ‘They all involve a norm falling below which brings malfunction, harm 
or ailment.’ (Griffin, 1986: 42). In terms of health, certain isolated behaviours, 
having a takeaway meal with high fat levels, for example, do not seem to constitute 
harm to well-being, or indeed a significant harm to health. Griffin makes the 
observation that it is very difficult to ascertain just where the line falls that indicates 
a significant harm to a basic need such as health. He continues on to say that even if 
we can make the notion more determinate, it does not overcome the problem that 
some harms are trivial, and advocating the inclusion of health within an account such 
as Griffin’s may elevate such trivial harms over other significant values:
Some harms are trivial. This is not just again the point that the notion of ‘harm’ 
is indeterminate. Even if we take the notion at its tightest and least disputable -  
for instance, we are certainly harmed if our health is damaged, particularly if 
the span of our lives is reduced -  some harms are still minor, some reductions 
in span still insignificant, compared to other things, not harms according to 
need accounts, that can blight a life.
(Griffin, 1986: 46).
Having made this observation Griffin amends the basic needs account: ‘well-being is 
the level to which basic needs are met so long as they retain importance’ (Griffin, 
1986: 52). Griffin’s ultimate argument is that this notion of importance relies upon 
that of prudential value. Minor stresses; or indulgences in rich or ‘fast food’ may be 
construed as harmful to health (within a certain definition of health). To understand 
whether such harms are important, however, we rely upon some conception of the
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ends of life. Is this harming my ability to pursue those values that allow me to lead a 
full and rewarding life? Many of us decide that isolated instances do not threaten 
these central ends. More regular indulgences, leading to illness or disease, may 
however force us to reconsider the importance of the harm. Again this would be in 
terms of the prudential values. As an aside, for the analysis of these health harms, 
Nussbaum’s capability ‘Life’ -  is relevant here. Certain harms, smoking, drugs, 
excessive alcohol indulgence, (or a combination of the three) for example, may not 
threaten our capability to pursue central values in the short term, but reduce the time 
span within which we could pursue them, a ‘live fast, die young’ mentality.
Griffin concludes that the possibility of minor harms to health indicate that there are 
deeper categories that relate to our well-being. The prudential values are considered 
to be this deeper level of analysis. This observation, in particular the contention that 
there can be minor harms to health, point to an implicit commitment to a certain 
theory of health. The notion of minor harm relies upon the idea of something that has 
limited if any implication for our overall well-being. These harms would not 
frustrate those ends central to life. Yet if health is understood as I have suggested in 
a normative sense, with reference to valuable ends, the whole notion of minor harm 
to health would be in doubt.
Nussbaum includes Bodily Health on her list of central capabilities. At first sight this 
seems to contradict Griffin, who seems less convinced of its importance. Griffin, for 
example, cites scholars who ‘with full understanding, prefer an extension to their 
library to exercise equipment for their health.’ (Griffin, 1986: 45). These scholars, 
however, (presumably) have reached a certain threshold in terms of their health. We 
may presume that the scholars are ‘adequately nourished’ (Nussbaum 2000a: 78) and 
have ‘adequate shelter’ (ibid.), part of the bodily health Nussbaum speaks of. If not, 
then perhaps we could question their desire for a library at this stage. The point is 
that health promotion for these individuals may not be of the same urgency as those 
who are malnourished and without shelter. Those whom the capabilities approach is 
intended to ultimately help, through the establishment of government obligations.
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Griffin’s example of the scholars, whose life is apparently no worse for the decision 
not to utilise the equipment on offer hides too many assumptions. A certain level of 
physical activity is presupposed just by being able to fulfil one’s academic duties, 
getting up the stairs, moving around, and sitting with comfort. Even this level of 
physical activity might be threatened by continued failure to exercise for an extended 
duration, or a complete neglect of one’s body. One might for example develop a bad 
back through poor posture while being regularly slouched at a desk. The only way to 
alleviate such an ailment may be through exercise of some sort. We do not know 
enough of Griffin’s scholars to really advance the case against health as a constituent 
of well-being. Indeed the whole argument offers no real insight as to the value of 
health. The scholars may value health, but just not as much as the intellectual aspects 
of life. They may value their health to the extent that it allows them to pursue the 
academic life. Despite this, Griffin, as we have seen, does not consider health an 
appropriate candidate for his list.
Nussbaum’s assertion of the importance of health and bodily integrity to the other 
capabilities can be interpreted as alluding to the idea that health cannot be pursued in 
isolation. The idea of being healthy is entangled with other values central to well­
being. Practical reason would be one of those values entangled with our ideas of 
what it is to be healthy. Nussbaum recognises how practical reason helps set the 
political threshold she is concerned with.
We are not saying, for example, that health is a mere means to freedom of 
choice. But we are saying that a government that makes available only a 
reduced and animal-like mode of an important item such as healthy living, or 
sensing has not done enough. All the items on the list should be available in a 
form that involves reason and affiliation. This sets constraints on where we set 
the threshold, for each of the separate capabilities, and also constraints on 
which specifications of it we will accept.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 82-3).
The emphasis on nutrition and shelter in Nussbaum’s bodily health, infer a fairly 
minimal conception of health. Recognising the concept’s being suffused by practical 
reason allows for a more expansive interpretation. I support this more expansive
183
stance. I have argued in favour of Nordenfelt’s definition of health, but questioned 
the concept of happiness that informs it. Nussbaum’s capabilities approach offers an 
alternative to the vital goals. Health can be understood not just as the absence of 
disease, but in terms of our capability. Nussbaum’s account though, should not be 
immune to criticism. Within Nussbaum’s capabilities approach health may be 
understood as a support, or even (although Nussbaum does not say so explicitly) a 
foundation for the other capabilities. In speaking of health in this way, we must be 
careful not to resort to a conception of health disentangled from the capabilities 
themselves, a disentanglement that has been argued impossible in previous chapters.
This manner of incorporating health within the account resonates with Griffin’s 
section on rights. Here he discusses autonomy and its reliance upon a ‘some 
minimum health and leisure’ (Griffin, 1986: 226).
Autonomy has a value on its own. But autonomy, on its own, is not enough. It 
is not enough being able to choose one’s path through life if one cannot move. 
One needs limbs and senses that work, or something to take their place. But 
that is not enough either; it is no good being able to choose and having the 
capacity to act, if one is so racked by pain or by the need to keep body and soul 
together that one cannot spare a thought for anything else. We surely also need 
some minimum of health and leisure.
(Griffin, 1986: 226).
Earlier Griffin had concluded health as having only instrumental value, the above is 
not quite so clear. Griffin’s reference to ‘limbs and senses that work’ ‘pain and 
anxiety’ ‘material goods to keep body and soul together’ within his list of prudential 
values, under (b) the components of human existence (Griffin 1986: 67), confuses 
matters further. Does Griffin consider health to be only of instrumental value or 
constitutive of those prudential values incorporated under the components of human 
existence?
A resolution could be provided if we take Griffin’s response to Mackie (1978 in 
Griffin, 1986), on the value of liberty. Mackie considers liberty the basic value, 
Griffin ‘the valuable life, on some conception or other.’ (Griffin, 1986: 238).
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But it is that we have goals, that we have the chance of making our life 
valuable, which gives value to the right of liberty.
(Griffin, 1986: 238).
Griffin earlier had indicated that control over our life is valuable because of ‘the 
value of what can be controlled’ (Griffin, 1986: 237), and that ‘liberty’s being 
“central” in this sense is compatible with its being derivative.’(1986: 237). Griffin’s 
overall view on liberty is unclear, here it seems to derive its value entirely from the 
valuable ways of life we are at liberty to pursue. Below he seems more wiling to 
acknowledge its intrinsic value, but anxious not to elevate it above the other values 
within his conception of well-being.
We value our status as persons and want to live recognizably human lives, and 
liberty is a central component of that. But then liberty, like autonomy, can be 
fitted into the scheme of preferences, and its value explained by its place there. 
So there is more than one kind of link with well-being. It is a mistake to move 
from liberty’s being valuable in itself to the conclusion that well-being does 
not encompass it.
(Griffin, 1986: 238).
It is important to note Griffin’s final remark here. Griffin’s concept of well-being 
does not represent an ‘over-arching value’ (Griffin 1986:31), to which the prudential 
values are reduced. Nevertheless, his earlier remarks indicate that liberty can remain 
central to well-being, without necessarily being of intrinsic value. We could extend 
Griffin’s account to include health in this fashion, if this is not what he means 
already by hinting at it in his components of agency. On this reading we have a 
strong association between health and well-being.
This representation of Griffin, however, may not be accurate. Despite his inclusion 
of certain minimal requirements, I contend that Griffin does not adequately address 
the related roles of both health and our embodiment within his conception of well­
being. Having the minimal physical requirements that enable one to choose one’s 
course through life is of course an essential aspect of our autonomy. Yet, as we shall 
see in the following section Griffin does not consider in any depth the relationship 
(what I describe as entanglement) between our embodiment and the prudential
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values that he considers to arise from our reflective nature. The significance of our 
embodiment for our well-being does not end once we have the necessary physical 
attributes to pursue a life plan. We can only pursue well-being as embodied human 
beings. This embodiment has further implications, not least in terms of our health, 
and how this enables or limits not just the pursuit of prudential values, but exactly 
how we can achieve such values and in what form they figure in our lives.
Griffin’s reference to minor impairments to our health further illustrates his 
separation of the prudential values thought to arise from our rational nature from our 
embodied animal nature. Those aspects that relate to our embodiment are only 
considered to the extent that they allow us to pursue the prudential values. Given that 
minor harms to health do not impinge upon these values, argues Griffin, it follows 
that the values must somehow be a deeper level of significance. Again, I question 
this separation of health from the values that constitute well-being. Indeed the real 
philosophical issue at stake here, it seems to me, is the way in which health is 
understood within each approach. Griffin, in placing health in opposition to his 
prudential values, fails to recognise the entangled nature of health. Health reflects 
our ability to make valuable choices. It is also tied to our bodily and mental faculties. 
In this sense the inclusion of health on a list, conceived of in this normative fashion, 
is a timely reminder that those values or capabilities central to a flourishing life are 
human values. These values are pursued within the confines of our being embodied, 
mortal human beings, with the all vulnerabilities that this entails.
Even if we conceive of health as constitutive of the fully human life this does not 
require that it be conceived of in a purely biological function. Rather it may be 
viewed as a capability infused with practical reason, as Nussbaum has suggested. We 
can elaborate this further; a fully human specification of health involves our ability 
to plan and reflect upon issues of the good life, and to be able to make valuable 
choices.79
79 This latter point reflects Nussbaum’s normative use of practical reason, not just to form any 
conception, but a valuable conception, shaped by Nussbaum’s substantive list.
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For Nussbaum certain abilities exert a ‘moral claim’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 83) to be 
developed. Instances in which the development of these abilities does not take place 
are described as tragic. These ethical conclusions are derived from an argument 
ethical at base, evaluating the ability itself as one of moral importance. Health, or the 
absence of, does not imply raw physiological capability. A better explanation is that 
a bodily or mental function exerting a moral claim to be developed fully, central to 
living a fully human life; is compromised. We can see how capability in Nussbaum’s 
sense relates to potential; our potential to live a fully human life; how our human 
capabilities are meant to develop. Genuine harms to these capabilities and 
functionings threaten both our potential to live a fully human life and our present 
actual functioning.
Griffin eschews this entanglement perceiving health as a mere means to well-being. 
This underestimates the extent to which our concept of health has at its core some of 
those values central to Griffin’s conception. Health is not just a means to those 
values central to our well-being, but a reflection of the extent to which our bodily 
and mental faculties facilitate the pursuit of such values.
6.5 Embodiment and well-being
These differing stances on health indicate a further difference between the theories; 
the importance the theories place upon our being physical, embodied human beings. 
Griffin, despite his reluctance to include health within his ends of life, acknowledges 
that any explanation of a value such as autonomy must recognise our human nature 
and existence. This can be seen within his approach to rights, grounding them in 
personhood, and a concern with what aspects of being human entail special 
protection (see Griffin, 2001).
Autonomy should be explained, therefore, as we find it in the phenomenal 
world, and we find it there deeply embedded in the causal network. So the kind 
of autonomy we are interested in will reflect the peculiarly human way of 
experiencing and conceptualizing the world; it will be shaped by characteristic 
human concerns and sense of importance. We do not know what it is like to be
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a Great Ape or a deity. Our aim must be the more modest one of 
understanding, not the autonomy of a spare, abstract self, but the autonomy of 
homo sapiens. So by the word ‘human’ in the phrase ‘human rights’ we should 
mean, roughly, a functioning human agent. And human rights cannot therefore 
be ahistorical or asocial.
(Griffin, 2001:312).
Here Griffin recognises that our being human has clear implications for any concept 
of human rights and indeed the good life. Griffin continues, explaining that his 
concept of human nature is essentially normative80 -  like Nussbaum’s. It is within 
the conception of human nature that gives rise to these interests (the prudential 
values on Griffin’s list) that Griffin places less emphasis on our embodiment and its 
importance to a theory of well-being. Griffin considers the prudential values to arise 
from our reflective human nature,81 but interestingly offers a somewhat dualist 
picture of human nature:
Suppose, then, that I am right in thinking that non-biological interests, such as 
accomplishment and deep personal relations, are as firmly embedded in human 
nature as biological ones are. To put it roughly, biological ones are embedded 
in our animal nature, and non-biological ones in our rational nature.
(Griffin, 1996: 55).
Now Griffin intends this as a rough account, so it would be wrong to hang too much 
upon this. Nevertheless, for Griffin the prudential values derive from our capacity to 
reflect. When he talks about grounding his account of rights in being human, he 
means the rational aspect of human nature; our animal nature seems to be of limited 
importance here.
80 ‘the conception of the “human” that I am proposing is not natural. I single out functioning human 
agents via notions such as their autonomy and liberty, and I choose these features precisely because 
they are especially important human interests.’ (Griffin, 2001: 313).
81 ‘These large-scale, course of life desires emerge with the move from a merely biological being to a 
reflective intentional one. Human nature is both biological and intentional; all these interests are part 
of human nature.’ (Griffin 1996: 54)
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This of course, leaves Griffin open to a similar criticism as in the previous section. 
The good life is in part dictated by our embodiment; health for example, represents 
how biology is entangled with value judgements about what we need to live a good 
life. There are certain physical limits we accept as part of being human, and there are 
certain frustrations or problems (Nordenfelt, 2007a) that we consider as illness or 
disease. Values go all the way down -  we are not starting with biology here, but 
recognising that certain of Griffin’s values, autonomy was the subject of our last 
discussion, may be embedded in our ideas of how the human body functions and to 
what ends. Griffin himself recognises certain biological aims:
Particularly deeply embedded in us are certain biological aims -  for food, 
health, protection of our capabilities -  and certain psycho-biological aims -  for 
company, affection, reproduction.
(Griffin, 1996: 54).
It is the contention here that these biological aims, entangled as they are with values 
such as autonomy and our need to form deep personal relationships, are impossible 
to separate from our rational nature. Ideas of health, illness and disease have 
developed through the exercise of reason, by reflecting upon certain central human 
interests, and their frustration. Those second order desires that Griffin argues have 
given rise to prudential values are the same sort of desires that help us to decide 
when we are healthy, when we are fulfilling our potential as human beings. This tidy 
separation between rational and biological is not tenable. Our reflections upon the 
good life are grounded in our being human, not just rational human beings, but 
embodied animal human beings.
Nussbaum, as we have seen in chapter five, is anxious that our animal nature is not 
set apart from an elevated conception of rationality.82 Nussbaum’s approach:
sees the rational as simply one aspect of the animal, and, at that, not the only 
one that is pertinent to a notion of truly human functioning. More generally,
82 See also Mary Midgley’s Beast and Man, illustrating the continuity between other animals and 
humans for discussions relevant to this topic.
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the capabilities approach sees the world as containing many different types of 
animal dignity, all of which deserve respect and even awe. The specifically 
human kind is indeed characterized, usually, by a kind of rationality, but 
rationality is not idealized and set in opposition to animality; it is just garden 
variety practical reasoning, which is one way animals have of functioning. 
Sociability, moreover, is equally fundamental and equally pervasive. And 
bodily need, including the need for care, is a feature of our rationality and our 
sociability; it is one aspect of our dignity, then, rather than something to be 
contrasted with it.
(Nussbaum, 2006a: 159).
Truly human functioning is not for Nussbaum entirely dictated by the rational, the 
approach as a whole encompasses a greater recognition of our animal nature and 
how this impacts upon a notion of the fully human life. This can be contrasted with 
Griffin who situates his profile of prudential values within the related conception of 
a reflective nature.
At first glance it seems that Nussbaum’s (2000a) list provides a mixture of values 
constitutive of the fully human life, and those items that should be included for 
political reasons, specifying that upon which governments must aim to improve, but 
are really reducible to the sort of prudential values Griffin indicates. Rejecting this 
contention, I have argued that Nussbaum better recognises how our being embodied 
shapes what our conception of the good life can feasibly be. To reduce health or 
bodily integrity to the category of means to prudential values is to view the human 
body as merely a vessel, subservient to our reflective nature, and those values this 
reflection deems important. But our embodied nature is more important in shaping 
our conception of the good life than this allows. Autonomy and the related ideas of 
freedom, practical reason and liberty, are shaped by our embodiment as human 
beings. Included in a richer account would be such items as bodily health and 
integrity. This is not including capabilities which are not just mere means to well­
being or the fully human life, but illustrative of those capabilities that are truly 
valuable for human beings. Including health on the list, for example, acknowledges 
how our capabilities are shaped by our embodiment, and the varying impact of our 
embodiment on our conception of well-being, evident in periods of illness.
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6.6 Trade-offs
Nussbaum and Griffin have quite different stances on the possibility of trade-offs 
between those goods stipulated in the lists. Nussbaum aims to conceptualise a 
threshold level of capability, ‘required by human dignity itself (Nussbaum, 2000c: 
1023), a level intended to prompt political action. Griffin, on the other hand, only 
refers to well-being in terms of more or less, and does not stipulate a level or 
threshold, his account is not intended to facilitate political action in the way that 
Nussbaum’s is.
Although Nussbaum does not stipulate the threshold, leaving this open for the 
threshold to be set at a more local level, she states that a certain level of all of the 
capabilities is required for a life to be described as fully or truly human. If a central 
capability drops below this threshold, this tragedy cannot be avoided by the increase 
of another (ibid). Nussbaum also indicates how the capabilities help support each 
other, if women can be employed outside of the home, this provides greater options 
to leave, if for example bodily integrity is threatened within an abusive home 
environment. (Nussbaum, 2000a).
Nussbaum, in proposing a threshold level of capability required by human dignity, 
combined with recognition of the interdependence of the capabilities, leaves little 
room for trade-offs that night result in capabilities dropping below the threshold 
level. Griffin, as we know, considers well-being in degrees, not as a substantive 
value itself. In speaking of more or less well-being, and not making reference to a 
threshold level, Griffin is more flexible with regard to the absence of a value in 
someone’s life. He accepts, for example, that in special circumstances 
accomplishment may entail too much anxiety for an individual to make it valuable 
for them (Griffin, 1986). His contention is that in most cases these prudential values 
will enhance well-being, but that there are exceptions. The exception above seems 
reasonable; accomplishment in this instance is not valuable for the anxious 
individual. Perhaps elaboration is required. Life would be improved further, not by
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avoiding instances of challenge that may entail anxiety, but by addressing the 
anxiety itself. Nussbaum must be more forthright in her insistence upon all of her 
capabilities being achieved, designed, as they are to represent a social minimum.
Nussbaum’s recognition of the relationship between her capabilities, however, offers 
a dimension to her account less explored within Griffin’s Well-being and Value 
Judgement. Griffin’s account offers flexibility not reflected in Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach, but at times this flexibility opens up difficulties. We can be 
less firm as to the universal importance of the prudential values, as there are certain 
exceptions. This admission of exceptions along with the employment of an 
endorsement constraint and the role of desire in explaining prudential value leaves 
the account proposed in Well-Being in particular, heavily influenced by possibly 
flawed subjective judgements. Despite the account’s progress from an actual desire 
to an informed desire account, Griffin still offers reasons for why irrational desires 
should weigh in the calculation of utility. Within his section ‘ Why we should resist 
restricting it more’ (Griffin, 1986: 24) Griffin accepts as contributing to well-being 
in some way, (often to a minimal extent), a ‘hater’s schadenfredude' (Griffin, 1986: 
25), sadistic desires, and the misogynists desire not to sit by a woman.
In attempting to overcome the rigidity of the informed desire account, Griffin may 
have let in too much. The theory remains consistent. Griffin’s discussion of morality 
and prudence, illustrating how many of the prudential values require recognition of 
the worth of others does not represent a requirement for well-being to be enhanced, 
but an ideal, requiring extensive moral education (Griffin, 1996). But do these 
desires really improve a life, even in a minimal way? Nussbaum’s insistence upon 
the relationship between her capabilities offers us a route to concluding in the 
negative.
These minimal enjoyments seem to be masking damage to other prudential values, 
central to well-being. Does any pleasure or enjoyment enhance well-being, however 
dubious its origins? A compulsive hand washer is not free to choose his/her course 
through life because of this condition. It would be more informative to understand
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the hand washing as threatening autonomy, rather than enhancing utility in some 
small way. The hater’s schadenfreude (Griffin, 1986: 25), or the misogynist, may 
both, (although to different extents), fail to recognise the moral worth of other 
people. This is an important aspect of the prudential values, within the ideal case, 
Griffin acknowledges. The less ideal desires seem to be afforded too much credence. 
It does not seem impossible that these desires promote some form of utility, but 
further emphasis on how this small pleasure prevents the achievement of a level of 
well-being associated with a better understanding of the prudential values would 
surely improve the account.
Griffin rightly recognises that any theory of well-being must be sensitive to 
individual differences, the trade-off between accomplishment and anxiety in the 
special case providing an example of this. Nussbaum is in a position to make 
stronger conclusions on this issue, due to her employment of a threshold level of 
capability in order for a life to be fully human. Griffin does not a stipulate a 
threshold level at which well-being is achieved, although he does contend that in 
most instances informed desires will aim at those prudential values he stipulates, and 
that this will best serve well-being. Still the absence of a threshold level, combined 
with an acceptance of minimally informed desires, leaves the account overly 
accommodating of pleasures of dubious value to a life. Recognising the manner in 
which these desires, their pursuit and satisfaction, may damage the prudential values 
central to the conception would provide a more rounded picture. Nussbaum’s 
account reflects a greater understanding of and reflection upon how the values or 
capabilities constituent of a fully human life interact.
6.7 Conclusion
Griffin’s theory of well-being overcomes many of the problems associated with 
mental state theories and the crude subjectivism evident in the psychological concept 
of subjective well-being. Despite acknowledging that the theory is best described as 
a list theory of well-being, there remains an important role for desire, and in Well- 
Being an endorsement constraint is employed. Griffin considers the
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objective/subjective dualism to misrepresent the role of desire in well-being, and 
proposes an account that spans this dualism (Griffin, 1996), I argue, however, that 
his earlier account in particular allows too greater credence to the potentially flawed 
judgements of the individual.
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach also employs a list of those capabilities 
and functionings deemed central to the fully human life. I endorse Nussbaum’s 
argument that these are of intrinsic worth, and agree that this stance need not infer 
Platonism, but can be coupled with an understanding of the role of human history 
and desire in the formation of such a list. It is not unimportant that we desire such 
goods on an objective list. It is however, important that the value of such goods is 
not dependent upon the subjective judgements of an individual. I favour Nussbaum’s 
conception as more clearly recognising how certain capabilities and functionings are 
necessary for a life to be called fully human.
Griffin’s rejection of the fact/value dichotomy in expanding naturalism should be 
applauded, although his assertion that the prudential values follow from our 
reflective nature should be questioned. This perhaps represents one of Griffin’s 
greatest failings, his failure to recognise the importance of our physicality in his 
explanation of the prudential values. Nussbaum’s account places more emphasis on 
our being embodied, animal, human beings, exemplified by her inclusion of health 
and bodily integrity in her list of central capabilities. Indeed, we can only function as 
embodied human beings. This brings certain limitations to the manner in which we 
can pursue well-being. Our powers alter according to the stage of life we are at, and 
according to our health status. The manner in which we pursue any valuable 
functioning is dictated by our animal as well as our rational nature. Any successful 
conception of well-being, and human nature from which this is drawn, must have, at 
its core, both the rational and animal aspects.
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Chapter Seven
0 1
T h e  c o n t r ib u t io n  o f  e x e r c is e  t o  w e l l -b e in g
7.1 Introduction
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, it has been argued, offers insights into 
well-being sufficiently attentive to our being embodied. The capabilities approach is 
founded on a conception of human nature that embraces both the animal and rational 
aspects of our humanity. We can only be capable, and indeed function as embodied 
human beings, and this has significant implications for both the capabilities and 
functionings proposed as central to a fully human life or well-being. Our powers 
alter according to our age, and health may impact upon our capability at any time. 
Griffin is less attentive to the animal aspect of our human nature, as a result the 
values on his list appear somewhat disconnected from our concerns as animal as well 
as rational human beings.
The main reason provided in support of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as the 
best available framework within which to contemplate the value of exercise to well­
being is its attention to both animal and rational aspects of our human nature. I have 
also questioned, however, certain elements of Griffin’s approach that appear to place 
too great an emphasis on the possibly flawed judgements of the subject. This 
criticism has been directed in particular at Griffin’s (1986) employment of an 
endorsement constraint. Nussbaum, although not dismissing altogether the role of 
desire within her conception, relies more strongly on her list of substantive goods. 
The potential for distorted and adaptive desires is recognised and hence the list 
provides the prime means forjudging the success of those in power in ensuring a 
level of capability for its citizens.
831 have used the terms physical activity and exercise interchangeably until now. In this chapter I 
differentiate between physical activity and exercise. Physical activity refers to levels of activity that 
all of us apart from the bed-bound engage in as part of our daily routine. Exercise is intended to 
indicate a more strenuous level, most likely (although not necessarily) associated with those who 
make some special effort to ‘take exercise.’
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Nussbaum, of course, intends her theory to be applied in a political context and not 
for the assessment of individual lives; hence the political objectivity the theory 
aspires to, as well as the focus upon capability rather than functioning. Neither does 
Nussbaum consider her approach to incorporate all that is of value to a life. At this 
stage, however, the approach remains grounded in intuitions as to what constitutes a 
fully human life, and these intuitions clearly connect the theory with the prudential 
domain. In defending an objective conception of well-being I have rejected both the 
stark separation of prudential and perfectionist value, and the contention that well­
being is confined to the subject’s perspective. This approach conflates notions of the 
fully human life, those aspects that are central to our being human, and concepts of 
well-being. As an example of this I have criticised Sumner’s (2000) approach to the 
experience machine, in which plugging in is not necessarily seen as detrimental to 
well-being, if it is the individual’s preference. I reject this, following Nozick in 
arguing that that to plug in is to abandon the most central aspects of our humanity. 
Such a decision would directly threaten my objective conception of well-being, but 
the issue is less clear cut for Sumner’s conception tied, as it is, to the subject’s 
perspective.
Thus the terms well-being and the fully human life as I understand them, need not be 
sharply separated. Indeed there are similarities between Nussbaum’s and Griffin’s 
approach. I have chosen to use well-being as the final concept with which to 
examine the contribution of exercise to a life. The use of the concept helps indicate 
that Nussbaum’s account is not being used in exactly the fashion it is intended. I 
indicate a justification of Nussbaum’s conception in terms of Putnam’s approach to 
objectivity in the realm of ethics. My concern is with the contribution the capabilities 
and functionings stipulated make to a life, a marked difference from Nussbaum’s 
approach. My ultimate concern after all is with the role exercise has to play in well­
being, not a justification of its provision in political terms. There is no conceptual 
loss in exchanging fully human for well-being. I retain the central aspects of the 
conception, its recognition of our embodiment, and the potential for adaptive 
preferences.
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In using Nussbaum’s conception in this fashion certain of Nussbaum’s capabilities 
may appear out of place. Am I looking to judge contribution of exercise to well­
being in terms of our ability to vote, our political environment, or our ability to hold 
property? First, I should note that all such lists are provisional, intended to promote 
further discussion rather than represent the final objective constituents of our well­
being. Second, the capability ‘Control over One’s Environment’ would be the only 
capability, I argue, that appears unusual within a conception of well-being. Our 
political environment is of course of relevance to our well-being. Yet its inclusion in 
an objective list is somewhat unusual. It is possible that such control is subsumable 
under another of Nussbaum’s capabilities. Practical reason, the use of our Senses 
Imagination and Thought, Affiliation encompass a great deal of what is valuable 
within this capability: Our ability to govern our own life, speak freely, having equal 
property and employment rights. Indeed being afforded equal respect in these 
domains, directly relevant to our having the social basis of self respect, is central to 
Nussbaum’s conception of affiliation.
Nussbaum’s capabilities, it has been stated on numerous occasions, are not intended 
to encompass the entirety of what is of value to us. When we extend the capabilities 
to consider the actual functionings with which they might be associated, however, 
the account seems to encompass a great deal of the prudential domain. Indeed, the 
similarities with Griffin’s list provide support for this contention. Nussbaum’s 
threshold may be for some too low, intended to ensure an acceptable political level, 
but this need not overly concern my own use of the account. Griffin’s 
accomplishment offers one example of a value not included explicitly on 
Nussbaum’s list. I will make two observations here. Providing life with point and 
substance (accomplishment as Griffin understands it), might be achieved through a 
range of Nussbaum’s capabilities and functionings. Nussbaum refers to expressing 
oneself, planning and reflecting upon life, searching for the meaning of life. All such 
functionings certainly relate to Griffin’s accomplishment. Thus even this value has 
its counterparts. The capabilities and functionings form a defensible conception of 
well-being, and similarity with other lists suggests that it provides an adequate 
conception within which to judge the value of exercise.
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Nussbaum’s political justification of the central capabilities has provided a 
challenge, in terms of my ultimate concern, the relationship between exercise and 
well-being. This challenge, I have suggested, can be overcome. One way in which to 
achieve this would be to suggest that the political objectivity Nussbaum aspires to is 
unobtainable, perhaps even incoherent, and to seek to defend the conception on more 
perfectionist grounds. Putnam (2003) for example, suggests that the political 
justification of the theory contuses political principles with moral principles and 
moves to provide a justification of the capabilities in more comprehensive terms. 
Putnam may have a point, but I need not concern myself overly with such questions. 
Nussbaum herself states:
On the question of objectivity in science and ethics, my sympathies (and 
arguments in so far as I have them) lie basically with Putnam: we do have 
available to us a quite robust conception of objectivity both in the science and 
in ethics, and we do not need to rely, in articulating this notion, on any 
problematic notion of the given, or unmediated access to reality.
(Nussbaum, 2001: 886).
Nussbaum is not opposed to the notion of objectivity in ethics, it is just that her 
political motivations behind the capabilities approach discourage a consideration of 
the capabilities in these terms.
But ethics is one thing and normative political thought is, or may be, another. 
And what interests me in this essay is the particular form the search for 
objectivity takes, or should take, when a pluralistic democratic society seeks to 
justify its basic political principles.
(Nussbaum, 2001: 559).
Nussbaum leaves open the possibility that a version of the capabilities approach 
could be defended in more comprehensive terms, without recourse to political 
principles. Indeed, my question as to the relationship between exercise, health and 
well-being requires this stance, drawing upon Putnam’s conception of objectivity 
rather than Rawls’s political objectivity, for its foundation. Ultimately my concern is 
with the contribution of exercise to well-being. Whether exercise should be endorsed
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as a capability, or a constituent of a capability in Nussbaum’s political sense, with its 
resulting political significance, is not a primary concern.
This latter point requires further elaboration. My commitment to the objectivity of 
well-being does not entail a commitment to Nussbaum’s framework as an absolute 
truth, or even as a correct description of the world independent of perspective. I am 
committed to objectivity in the realm of values, and, although I have not developed 
this line of though in any depth, discussed Putnam’s picture of objectivity as an 
adequate stance on how values and concepts such as well-being and health might 
retain objective status in chapter three. Putnam, however, does not offer a final ‘once 
and for all’ answer. He does, however, suggest that reasoned discussion on topics 
such as well-being can bring us to some insightful, objective, but nevertheless 
fallible conclusions.
My commitment to objective theories of well-being extends to a claim that the 
capabilities approach represents the best available conception of our well-being, 
rather than it just representing a basis for political principles. I make this claim 
whilst of course accepting, as Nussbaum does, that the approach remains in its 
infancy, requiring continued discussion and revision. Claiming that a theory of well­
being can be objective in this sense, however, neither entails nor justifies 
paternalistic action. Supporting an objective theory of well-being is a separate matter 
from acting upon one to promote one’s own conception of the good for one’s self or 
others. It should also be noted that action of any kind based upon an objective theory 
of well-being would need to attend to the whole theory, in the cases of both 
Nussbaum and Griffin this would involve the centrality of autonomy (for Griffin) 
and practical reason (for Nussbaum) to living a life worthy of a human being.
What of the conclusions of this chapter and indeed the thesis as a whole? Having 
decided upon the most defensible theory of well-being, how do we understand the 
contribution of exercise to it? First, I posit that the nature of the relationship between 
exercise and well-being is merely instrumental. Exercise that makes you feel good 
does not necessarily improve well-being. Exercise that does not result in enhanced
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mood may still impact upon well-being. In short, exercise preserves those 
capabilities and indeed functionings constitutive of our well-being. It preserves those 
capabilities to function in a valuable way, those capabilities that, as Nussbaum 
indicates, are of intrinsic value. That exercise is of merely instrumental value to our 
well-being may disappoint some who would prefer a stronger argument as to its 
benefit. This conclusion, however, is not insignificant. Although instrumental, 
exercise is of special significance in that it represents one way in which a number of 
valuable functionings may be both instantiated within one activity, and preserved for 
later life. The manner in which we function is also, of course, limited and enabled by 
our embodiment. Exercise represents one of a restricted number of ways in which 
the physical precondition of our capability to function in certain valuable ways can 
be preserved.
This argument for the value of exercise to well-being will be developed in three 
sections. The first (7.2) will address how the normative conception of health 
advanced in chapter three can be incorporated within Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach. This represents a development of Nussbaum’s account that, 
understandably, does not address the capability health in great detail. The second 
(7.3) section will consider the importance of exercise to well-being. In line with the 
normative stance taken throughout the thesis, the value of exercise is contemplated 
in terms of the primary concept well-being, rather than health. The prior elaboration 
of health within Nussbaum’s account, however, helps us to understand one of the 
most significant ways in which exercise improves our lives, through its impact upon 
the bodily aspect of capability. The final, shorter section emphasises that certain 
‘thicker’ forms of exercise are more likely to impact directly upon the other 
capabilities.
7.2 Health within Nussbaum’s capabilities approach
Nussbaum has indicated that health (and bodily integrity), are important to the other 
capabilities. Nussbaum’s stance on the implications of this for public policy is not 
entirely clear. In Women and Human Development health’s importance and intrinsic
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value is used to justify governments, in certain instances, bypassing choice in order 
to preserve this central function. The stance in Frontiers o f Justice is more protective 
of choice. Regardless of this discrepancy, Nussbaum’s recognition of the importance 
of health to the other capabilities is a useful place to start assessing the value of 
exercise to well-being. If we were to follow the naturalistic argument a 
straightforward way in which to understand the value of exercise is available. The 
naturalistic argument suggests illness and diseases can be identified through value- 
free means. These in turn can be interpreted as having a negative impact upon a life. 
The physiological research on physical activity, that the WHO rationale (criticised in 
chapter three) is based upon, associates exercise predominantly with disease 
reduction. This scientifically verifiable ‘fact’ can in turn be evaluated as positive. 
Exercising promotes a bodily state free of disease, and (here evaluations enter), this 
state is positive in facilitating the pursuit of well-being.84
Chapter three, however, argued that health and indeed disease are not value-free but 
concepts that entangle fact and value. Underpinned by Putnam’s work on 
entanglement and initially fuelled by Nordenfelt’s normative theory of health, it was 
suggested that health is best understood in terms of a further concept such as well­
being or happiness. Nordenfelt’s philosophy of health, however, was not accepted 
without criticism. In particular it was noted that his subjective conception of 
happiness threatens the plausibility of the theory. An objective list theory of well­
being offers a more defensible framework within which to understand the concepts 
of health, disease and illness. This conception is less susceptible to the adaptive 
preferences and flawed reasons for failing to endorse a good that might distort 
subjective conceptions. Having worked through a number of alternative theories, I 
consider Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as the best available framework within 
which to understand both well-being, and therefore the concept of health.
84 A special issue of Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy (2007) 10, offers a more elaborate and 
refined discussion of naturalism and normativism; see especially Nordenfelt (2007a) ‘The concepts of 
health and illness revisited’.
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7.2.1 A Normative theory o f health and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach
Nussbaum does not clearly indicate the theory of health she embraces. It does, 
however, seem a rather minimal conception when we consider her definition of the 
capability.
Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; 
to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 78).
Nussbaum, however, does not reduce bodily health to the purely physical, endorsing 
the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 
definition of reproductive health, included within her bodily health capability. This 
echoes the WHO in stating ‘Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity in all 
matters relating to the reproductive system and its processes.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a:
78). This definition also includes reference to being free to decide on matters of 
reproduction.
Further evidence that Nussbaum does not consider the capability bodily health in 
value-free, physiological terms is provided by the description of how practical 
reason suffuses other capabilities:
All the items on the list should be available in a form that involves reason and 
affiliation. This sets constraints on where we set the threshold, for each of the 
separate capabilities, and also constraints on which specifications of it we will 
accept.
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 82).
Bodily health, to be the sort of health enjoyed within a fully human life, will involve 
these two capabilities. But what is it for health to be suffused by practical reason? 
Health constitutive of the fully human life must involve thought and planning in a 
manner that allows ‘concern and reciprocity with other human beings’ (Nussbaum, 
2000a: 82).
2 0 2
Being healthy necessarily entails being able to reason in such a way as ‘to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 79). That 
practical reason is closely connected with freedom of choice can be discerned from 
Nussbaum’s comments.85 Being able to critically reflect upon one’s life, forming a 
conception of the good, requires, it seems, freedom of choice (informed of course by 
the substantive list, not any choice is endorsed within this framework). There would 
be little to critically reflect upon if one was forced down a particular route. A fully 
human specification of health must be suffused by practical reason. Health, on this 
understanding is not just bodily function, but being able to reflect upon our life, and 
the options we have available to us. It will be my contention later that this is one way 
in which some diseases impact negatively upon a life. They reduce the options we 
have, we may be left just trying to get over the pain, get through each day, and find 
pleasure in whatever way we can. This surely represents a limitation to the way one 
can employ practical reason.
Nussbaum does not suggest that health as a concept can be reduced entirely to 
natural scientific description. The sort of bodily health Nussbaum considers central 
to a fully human life is suffused by practical reason. This role for practical reason 
takes us much closer to a normative stance. We are not just concerned with the 
biological indicators of health but with what we are able to do, the life we have 
available to us, that we can reflect upon and plan. This apparent normativity could be 
seen as at odds with the argument for promoting the function health.
My own view is that health and bodily integrity are so important in relation to 
all the other capabilities that they are legitimate areas of interference with 
choice up to a point, although there will rightly be disagreement about where 
that point is in each area.
(Nussbaum 2000a: 95).
85 ‘When we make practical reason and affiliation central in this way, we are not saying that these are 
the two ends to which all others can be reduced. We are not saying, for example, that health is a mere 
means to freedom of choice.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 82).
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Here Nussbaum advocates promotion of the function health because of its 
importance for all the other capabilities. Recall the distinction between functioning 
and capability; functioning represents the actual being or doing, if we are talking of 
play, actually playing. Capability refers to the opportunity to function. Nussbaum’s 
supporting the promotion of the function health seems to suggest (although 
Nussbaum does not go so far as to say) that health is a foundation for the other 
capabilities. If we are not healthy we will struggle to be capable. The arguments of 
chapter three favoured the direction of Nordenfelt’s argument, but not the conception 
of happiness employed. I argued that health should be understood in terms of well­
being (best understood in terms of functionings and capabilities) and not vice versa. 
Nussbaum’s approach offers a defensible, objective conception of well-being within 
which to understand health. Those functionings and capabilities central to 
Nussbaum’s fully human life should provide the primary concepts for the 
understanding of health, rather than health itself being understood as an independent 
foundation for the capabilities. To understand health as a foundation of that which 
defines it would reduce the argument to a damaging circularity.
7.2.2 Health and Capability: the relationship examined
Both Nussbaum and Nordenfelt refer to that which is vital or central to our lives, 
without intending to cover the whole of prudential value. Nordenfelt refers to goals, 
the achievement of which would improve our lives but would not be deemed as 
‘vital’. A pay rise, or good weather on holiday, for example. But, Nordenfelt 
continues:
Not all such things are prerequisites for our continuing to live a tolerable life,
for ensuring our minimum happiness.
(Nordenfelt, 1997: 70).
Nussbaum may well take exception to ‘tolerable life’, she is after all concerned with 
a ‘fully human life’ and ensuring that domestic abuse, poverty, poor education etc. 
are not tolerated. Nussbaum considers dropping below her threshold level of 
capability to be a tragedy, again indicating that the theory is concerned with that
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which is vital, not peripheral to an individual’s life. The capabilities approach she 
advocates understands those capabilities as central to a fully human life. She 
illustrates in numerous examples the ability of human beings to adapt and ‘tolerate’ 
the worst of circumstances. The capabilities and functionings are understood to be of 
intrinsic value, significantly limiting the force of subjective judgements such as 
adaptive preferences within the account. Nordenfelt’s reference to a ‘tolerable life’ 
thus will be rejected in favour of Nussbaum’s characterisation of how the 
capabilities and functionings are central to living a fully human life, and indeed I 
have argued, essential for any reasonable level of well-being to be achieved.
The capabilities are conceived as perquisites for well-being. Nussbaum’s use of a 
substantive list protects the concept of health itself from being distorted by ill- 
informed subjective goals. Nussbaum’s arguments for how freedom must be 
understood in terms of a substantive list seem to apply to health. Not all freedoms 
are valuable, and indeed not all goals considered vital by an individual warrant that 
status.
Conceptualising health in this manner, however, begs certain questions. Where do 
we draw the boundaries, that is to say, does this normative concept of health swell to 
incorporate too much of well-being. What is the difference between having those 
central capabilities and being healthy? Health may indeed be a less expansive 
concept, but it would surely extend health beyond its use in everyday language to 
suggest that it can be defined as a lower threshold of capability or well-being.
The accusation that the normative conception of health encompasses too much 
relates to Schramme’s (2007) concern that Nordenfelt’s concept of illness is also too 
expansive. Nordenfelt’s response suggests that he is quite happy with a broad 
concept of health, but he urges caution equating health reduction with illness, as this 
need not be the case. Schramme argues that an athlete, Lily, unable to fulfil her 
lifelong ambition of jumping higher than two metres, must not be considered ill or 
even in reduced health. Nordenfelt’s theory would be inadequate in classifying her as
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so. First Nordenfelt is quick to point out that he would not classify Lily as ill -  but in 
reduced health.
To me, and I think Schramme also agrees, although he does not focus on this 
matter here, health is a dimension ranging from a state of complete health to a 
state of maximal illness. So when Lily does not achieve what she has striven 
for so intensely, and this goal qualifies as a vital goal in my sense, the 
assessment is not automatically that Lily is ill. The result is only that Lily’s 
complete health is somewhat reduced.
(Nordenfelt, 2007b: 30).
Nordenfelt considers Lily’s health reduced because of what he calls ‘unrealistic or 
even dangerous goal setting’, cases of which he says are ‘more common in 
psychiatry than elsewhere’. (Nordenfelt, 2007b: 30).
In utilising a substantive list of central functionings and capabilities to define the 
concept health, subjective goals such as Lily’s can be given less credence.
Nussbaum, although anxious to criticise those adaptive goals that denigrate those 
capabilities on her list, is not entirely critical of adaptation. Adaptation in certain 
areas is a positive thing, states Nussbaum (2000a), who wanted to be a famous opera 
singer. She also takes as an example the striving for a sports career without having 
the necessary physical attributes. We adapt our preferences having recognised that 
these desires are unrealistic. These desires, states Nussbaum, should not be 
encouraged. Nussbaum utilises her list of central capabilities to distinguish goals 
such as Lily’s from those wants for what ‘people as people have a right to have.’ 
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 138). Lily would not be in reduced health according to 
Nussbaum’s objective conception. Neither is her well-being affected in a manner 
that has any political significance. The capabilities are not there to protect such 
desires.
My intention, however, is to extend Nussbaum’s account, not just to talk of political 
significance, but of an impact upon well-being. The capabilities approach, with its 
clear stance on those capabilities and functionings central to a fully human life 
certainly indicates that Lily’s frustration comes low down, even when we consider
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Lily’s well-being. Lily is unhappy that she cannot achieve a goal she deems central 
to her life, this surely has some impact upon well-being, and Nussbaum’s account 
can accept this. The capabilities are not intended all that is of value, and frustration 
in certain ends, however misconceived are likely to have some significance. We may 
also understand Lily’s goal setting as unreasonable, as the poor planning of one’s 
life. The fully human use of practical reason should be informed by those other 
capabilities on the list, striving for that which is not on the list, reducing time spent 
on the pursuit of more central values, is detrimental to well-being. The advantage of 
an account of the good such as Nussbaum’s, grounded as it is in ideas of the fully 
human, is that it encourages us to prioritise, to recognise those capabilities and 
values central to life and those that are not. Lily’s concern, although it may seem 
central to her, is not of the significance that she attributes it, when we consider those 
capabilities central to us as human beings. An objective conception encourages Lily 
to accept this and adapt her goals, not just because they do not relate to health, or 
they hold no political sway, but because there are more important things in her life.
If I had held on to my childhood ambition to be a footballer, and claimed to this day 
that my life is worse because I am not, those around me would encourage me to alter 
my desires, to adapt, and indeed to recognise what I do have and have achieved. An 
objective conception encourages us to contemplate those central values, and their 
pursuit and protection.
Nordenfelt, (2007b) of course, would also encourage Lily to modify her goals.
Where we differ is in the credence we allow such goals in the meantime. I am 
willing to accept that the frustration of a goal not on Nussbaum’s list may impact 
upon well-being to some extent. This impact however, being distinct from those 
aspects of life central to a human existence, is of limited significance. Most likely 
our pursuit of an unrealistic goal will reduce our chances to concentrate upon those 
functionings more central to a good life. I am not willing to accept that such goal 
frustration impacts upon health, Nussbaum’s list, tied as it is to those capabilities and 
functionings central for a fully human life provide a welcome restriction.
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This use of Nussbaum’s list to restrict those goals that might be said to impact upon 
health, does not fully answer Schramme’s argument. Nussbaum’s list includes many 
items that seem to extend beyond health as it is commonly conceived. Is health 
impinged if our political rights are inhibited? Political rights being subsumed under 
Nussbaum’s Control Over One’s Environment capability. A concern that this may 
amount to an unjustified inflation of the concept can be contrasted with Nordenfelt’s 
equally valid concern that concepts such as illness are not too restricted:
If medicine, or the enterprise of health enhancement in general - 1 do not want 
to let medicine have all the say here -  should be confined to dealing only with 
such illness as is clearly due to malfunction in a strict biological sense -  then 
we could miss a lot of suffering and disability that ought to be taken care of. 
What should we do about people who are burnt out or depressed and cannot 
perform their jobs or even take care of themselves. In many of these cases we 
cannot detect any biological malfunction in the Boorse/Schramme sense. 
Should we say that these people do not belong to medicine or psychiatry? 
Should we say that they belong to some other part of societal welfare, not yet 
invented?
(Nordenfelt, 2007b: 30).
Being burnt out, over worked, or depressed seems to have more identifiable 
counterparts in Nussbaum’s list of capabilities. Nussbaum refers to ‘being able to 
work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful 
relationships of mutual recognition with other workers’ (2006a: 78). Nussbaum also 
refers to play, emotional development and pleasurable experiences, all of which 
relate to Nordenfelt’s examples. Is this where our argument must end, with an 
acceptance that any reduction of the central capabilities below a certain threshold 
must necessitate impairment to our health? I am certainly willing to acknowledge 
that conditions such as bum out may be associated with both reduced health and 
illness, but I remain slightly anxious that accepting ‘capability’ as the primary 
concept does not stretch health too far beyond common usage of the concept.
If we return to Nordenfelt’s theory of health there are two main ways in which we 
might seek to differentiate between health and capability. Nordenfelt (2007c) 
proposal is that
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A is completely healthy if, and only i f  A is in a bodily and mental state which 
is such that A has the second-order ability to realize all his or her vital goals 
given a set o f standard or otherwise reasonable circumstances.
(Nordenfelt, 2007c: 54)
It is not essential to the argument to conduct a rigorous examination of Nordenfelt’s 
concept of health, but merely address that which might enable better understanding 
of the concepts of health and capability. First I will take Nordenfelt’s reference to 
standard or reasonable circumstances. Standard circumstances refer to one’s 
surroundings being as they would normally be. Nordenfelt (2007c) takes John’s 
ability to walk as an example, John is able to walk in the case that nothing unusual 
such as bad weather blocks the execution of this ability. The qualifier reasonable 
circumstances, seeks to overcome instances in which standard circumstances may 
still prevent the exercise of a capability. Someone is trained to be a teacher but is 
unable to function as a teacher because of the political climate, the closure of schools 
in Chechenya provides Nordenfelt’s example. These circumstances may be strictly 
defined as standard, but are considered unreasonable.
We would not, under this interpretation, consider someone unhealthy if they are 
unable to teach because of an unreasonable political environment. This offers one 
way in which to ensure that health does not inflate to encompass all of capability, for 
Nussbaum would certainly argue that the teacher does not have the capability to 
teach. Nussbaum is, after all, concerned with the political obligations her list 
generates. Nordenfelt’s reference to bodily and mental state also offers an 
interpretation of health that has clear differences from capability. One’s bodily and 
mental state facilitating the pursuit of certain values, such as friendships, political 
involvement, interaction with nature, is not entirely what Nussbaum means by 
capability. For one is not capable to pursue these valuable functionings just because 
the bodily and mental preconditions of capability are in place, Nussbaum is also 
concerned that external conditions facilitate the pursuit of the valuable functionings 
on the list.
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I suggest that anchoring health within bodily and mental states provides a way of 
preventing undesirable conceptual inflation. Capability becomes the wider concept 
requiring both the mental and physical state associated with good health, as well as 
the external conditions that facilitate the pursuit and achievement of those 
functionings on the list. This understanding of health retains the origins of the 
concept:
Health has always had to do with a person’s well-being and ability related to 
his or her internal somatic and mental conditions. If we change that 
supposition, then we are changing our basic language.
(Nordenfelt, 2007b: 31).
Health, as I have argued, is best understood with reference to the bodily and mental. 
This of course does not solve the argument as to the boundaries of health. There is a 
range of ways in which internal somatic and mental conditions may be affected and 
therefore this recognition may not restrict the concept to the extent some would like. 
Indeed, we must be careful not to anchor the definition so much within the internal 
conditions, that we lose sight of the primary concept for understanding health -  in 
my view capability. If we cannot find a clear internal cause of one’s capability loss 
this does not seem to prevent it per se from being a health matter. The internal causes 
of chronic fatigue syndrome may be unclear but yet we rightly accept it as pertaining 
to health, not just a matter for well-being. The holistic theory of health remains true 
to common usage through its reference to bodily and mental conditions. There may 
be instances, however, in which bodily and mental states are less clear but we accept 
that condition as one pertaining to health and illness. The primary concept of 
capabilities helps illustrate the debilitating nature of such illnesses, even in the 
absence of a clear internal cause.
I am willing to leave the issue of the boundaries of health somewhat unresolved. I 
am happy to suggest the capabilities as the primary concept with which to 
understand health, but also accept its association with our bodily and mental state. 
Indeed, Nordenfelt’s recognition of this indicates that taking a normative stance need 
not require reduced attention to how our being embodied affects our lives.
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Nussbaum’s capabilities approach itself is keen to recognise how our embodiment 
affects any conception of well-being or the fully human. My concern is with the 
relationship between exercise and well-being, and this normative stance together 
with recognition of health’s continued association with our bodily and mental state 
provides ripe ground for discussion. Exercising is one of the few ways in which the 
physical aspect of capability may be impacted upon. Many of the capabilities require 
a certain minimal level of physical activity and use of our bodies, and exercise 
represents one of a restricted number of ways in which this physical aspect of 
capability might be impacted upon. This, however, is to move ahead of the 
argument. First I must continue in my analysis of the role of health within 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.
7.2.3 Capable yet unhealthy -  thresholds and freedom
Nussbaum and Nordenfelt both refer to thresholds. They are central to Nussbaum’s 
theory; the approach relies upon a threshold level of capability below which a life 
cannot be described as fully human. We should acknowledge, however, that 
although Nussbaum is concerned with capability, she also acknowledges that 
functioning itself is central to a fully human existence. For if we do not function in 
the valuable ways she indicates a life cannot properly be described as ‘fully human.’
Having the innate capability to function would not satisfy the requirements of 
Nussbaum’s list. Indeed Nussbaum (2000a) differentiates between three different 
types of capabilities. ‘Basic capabilities’ refer to the innate basis for our capabilities. 
Functioning does not necessarily follow a basic capability, we may, at birth, have the 
innate capability say for speech, but this requires development before we can 
actually exhibit the functioning (Nussbaum, 2000a: 84). ‘Internal capabilities’ refer 
to ‘developed states of person herself that are, so far as the person herself is 
concerned, sufficient conditions for the exercise of the requisite functions.’ 
(Nussbaum, 2000a: 84). The person can function in the desired way immediately, if 
the external circumstances allow. Finally Nussbaum refers to ‘combined
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capabilities’, ‘internal capabilities’ combined with the ‘suitable external conditions 
for the exercise of the function’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 85).
Let us take a capability on Nussbaum’s list as an example. If we are bom with the 
innate capability for some form of communication, and with the capability to love, 
and develop relationships with those around us, one could presume that we have the 
basic capability for affiliation. The internal capability would require the development 
of these capacities. This development would ensure our present ability to 
communicate, to love, to form attachments to those significant others around us. This 
internal capability, however, may be threatened in the absence of the appropriate 
external circumstances. A loving family, free from abuse, with adequate interaction 
with others during childhood provide examples of how such a capability could be 
supported. Yet the combined capability would require more than this. The capability 
of affiliation and the related capability of emotions would also require, as Nussbaum 
(2000a) indicates, being afforded equal respect, being treated as having equal worth 
to others, being able to speak freely, and to work in an environment that encourages 
meaningful attachments and mutual respect.
The list of central capabilities we have discussed throughout this thesis are combined 
capabilities. Nussbaum insists that governments ensure that we can all function in 
these valuable ways if we desire. Nussbaum is not seeking to promote the internal or 
innate aspect of capability. The first very basic point is for our capability to exceed 
the threshold Nussbaum speaks of, we must have the combined capability to 
function.
Nussbaum’s list is intended to facilitate our pursuit of well-being, to be capable in 
the fully human sense requires more than just being able to in its most raw sense. 
Recall that health constitutive of the fully human life must be suffused by practical 
reason. This represents another way in which the threshold may be developed, with 
reference to the special capability of practical reason. For the capabilities to be 
constitutive of a fully human life, they must instantiate the capability practical 
reason.
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Nordenfelt’s conception of health also relies upon the notion of threshold, ‘health is 
a dimension ranging from a state of complete health to a state of maximal illness’ 
(Nordenfelt, 2007b: 30). This helps Nordenfelt indicate when health but not illness 
can be impaired. Nordenfelt elsewhere talks of a ‘bottom line that people declared to 
be healthy must have reached’ stipulated for the purposes of healthcare (Nordenfelt, 
2007b: 31). He suggests that this may ‘for good reason change over time and place’ 
(ibid.).
This all demonstrates that health and well-being, understood here, are not something 
we have or do not have, they are not substantive concepts. Nussbaum is not 
particularly forthcoming in as to the details of where the thresholds should be laid 
down. Neither will I undertake this difficult task in any great depth, but I will make 
certain observations I feel necessary for the overall argument.
It seems certainly feasible that we can function in a valuable way yet be unhealthy. 
There is marked difference between struggling through pain and discomfort to 
function in those ways central to a life, and being truly capable, in the sense that 
Nussbaum requires for a life to be fully human. This is again an indication of the 
ability of humans to adapt and overcome obstacles.
That someone can be wracked with pain and yet function in these valuable ways 
need not threaten either our theory of health or well-being. It can be suggested that 
such an individual may have great difficulty achieving the desired threshold level of 
capability central to both our concepts of health and well-being. If capability is 
restricted this may be enough to argue for impaired health status and even illness. 
Diseases reduce our freedom to function in valuable ways. Being ill may not mean 
we are unable to, for example affiliate, but it may affect the quality of our 
relationships. The pain we feel may make it difficult to interact and indeed to get 
around, making it more difficult to visit people, restricting forms of contact to phone 
and e mail. The individual only has certain options open to them; they are forced into 
certain functionings.
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The thresholds for well-being and the related concept of health, I argue, concern 
more than just whether we can function in valuable ways. Of course, having reduced 
opportunity to function in valuable ways is likely to lead to reduce our actual 
functioning, and this is one clear way in which well-being would be reduced. A 
further related way is through reduced quality86 of a given functioning, our example 
of affiliating in some sort of restricted way because someone is house bound.
Finally, and moving away from the actual functioning, I contend that having a 
reduced capability to achieve valuable functionings is relevant to both the health and 
well-being threshold. Well-being and indeed health concern not just being able to do 
something, but our freedom to choose that option.
This contention seems to fit with our common usage of health. A skin condition may 
not prevent forming relationships, or engaging in recreational activities, but if the 
individual is conscious of how they look, they may be distracted and the quality of 
actual functioning may be reduced. The individual may consider their freedom to 
engage in certain activities restricted, seeking activities with reduced human contact. 
The condition may also become uncomfortable in extremes of weather, of course not 
preventing interaction with nature, or indeed expressing oneself, but perhaps 
reducing the ways in which this could be achieved. This provides a clear example of 
how health can be reduced, to something we would generally call illness, without a 
certain valuable functioning being prevented altogether.
This normative approach, or course, retains its prime concern with capability to 
achieve valuable functionings. If we take our example of a skin condition again, we 
can demonstrate how in other instances, this bodily state may not impact upon our 
lives at all, indeed an individual may not even know we have it. A small patch of 
eczema or psoriasis that the individual pays little attention to, may not frustrate 
functioning, or even reduce freedom to function in a valuable way. We would not 
consider the person ill or unhealthy, although there is the potential within
86 For the suggestion that there may be some variation of quality of function I am indebted to Thomas 
Schramme.
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Nordenfelt’s account to accept there are ‘trivial variants of a disease’ (Nordenfelt, 
2007b: 29). In line with his Reverse Theory of Disease and Illness, (although of 
course with significant differences) I understand impairment to health in terms of 
impact upon capability below a certain threshold. A particular bodily state we have 
come to recognise as often impacting in this manner need not necessarily inhibit an 
individual’s health if they have rather minor or trivial variant of the disease in 
question. The disease itself can be identified, on the basis of its implications more 
generally.
The threshold for health is affected by our actual functioning, our freedom to pursue 
valuable functionings, as well as some indicator of the quality of functioning. There 
is, however, one more matter to which we should turn our attention prior to 
examining the role of exercise in our well-being. This is the future-orientated nature 
of health. Our actual level of functioning, or even our freedom to function, at the 
present time, may not always be the best indicator of health. Human beings are 
forward looking and there is a question as to whether we would deem someone 
healthy who engages in behaviours that, whilst not reducing functioning now, are 
likely to have a negative impact upon function, and freedom to function in the future. 
Someone who is sedentary, drinks too much alcohol, consumes an excessive amount 
of fatty foods, may not be someone often referred to as healthy in everyday 
discourse. This, however, is likely to be referring more to the future consequences of 
such a lifestyle than current impact upon functioning which may be insignificant. 
Thus, I conclude that whether one has reached a threshold level to be deemed in 
good health, concerns not just present functioning, and freedom to function, but 
likely future functioning, and freedom to function in valuable ways. It is not an over­
extension of Nussbaum’s capability to suggest that the concept itself has a future, or 
forward-looking element. Nussbaum is, after all, concerned with the fulfilment of 
human potential. I suggest that health also concerns future capability and likely 
impairment.
We may wish to conclude that someone who engages in behaviour that does not 
seem to affect the relevant thresholds now, but we can reasonably state there is a
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good chance it will later, is unhealthy, but not ill. The whole issue, however, of 
future health implications is one that will be discussed in more depth in the 
following section. For now we should acknowledge that the uncertainty of the future 
urges caution in making such judgements. We cannot guarantee that ‘unhealthy 
behaviours’ will have a negative impact upon later functioning and capability.
7.3 The relationship between exercise and well-being: A philosophical 
analysis
The conclusions generated from earlier chapters in this thesis were of a more critical 
nature, concerned with the inadequacies of psychological stances on well-being and 
naturalistic approaches to health. Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, it is argued, 
offers a more defensible framework within which to consider human well-being, and 
indeed health.
The purpose of this pivotal section of the thesis is to apply these conclusions to the 
central problem, examining the relationship between exercise and well-being. In 
light of my contention that well-being and health are not substantive values but 
should be understood in ‘degrees’ this question requires some adjustment. I am 
concerned with whether exercise is necessary for the achievement of a threshold 
level of well-being. Exercise might well improve a life but is it constitutive of a 
certain threshold level of well-being where dropping below this threshold would 
mean well-being is significantly impaired?
In answering this question much would depend on where such a threshold is set. 
Determining thresholds is a lengthy and complex task, and a process influenced by a 
range of factors including for example context and a society’s history (Nussbaum, 
2006a). The task of setting thresholds is beyond the scope of this thesis, but I will 
follow Nussbaum in understanding a threshold level of well-being to be set as such 
that the individual has not had their potential as a human being stifled. The 
threshold, as I have indicated earlier, however, should not be held hostage to 
subjective considerations. We should not accept that if someone is happy with their
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level of capability and functioning they exceed a threshold level of well-being. This 
would be to diminish the critical powers of a substantive list. The task is rather to 
assess what level of capability and indeed functioning is required for it to be said that 
human potential has been fulfilled. This requires further understanding of those 
capabilities and functionings on the list, and the threshold below which we can 
question whether well-being objectively speaking has been achieved. Considerations 
may, for example, be the extent to which each capability facilitates the use of 
practical reason, an observation that Nussbaum makes in considering when a person 
can be deemed healthy.
There are other conceptual issues that require clarification before the relationship 
itself is considered. First, the distinction between functioning and capability, a 
distinction so central to the thesis it bears a reminder. A functioning is the actual 
‘being or doing’, engaging with friends, owning property. Capability concerns the 
opportunity to fulfil these functionings. One can have the opportunity to own 
property, or form meaningful relationships, but decide against functioning in these 
valuable ways. Nussbaum’s main focus is with capabilities, understandably, bearing 
in mind the political focus of her work. The promotion of functioning rather than 
capability would entail paternalistic intervention disrespectful of personal autonomy.
One cannot achieve a threshold level of well-being through capability alone. 
Nussbaum recognises this stating ‘functionings, not simply capabilities are what 
render a life fully human’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 87). One may have the capability, for 
example, to form significant friendships, produce self-expressive works, to play and 
interact with nature. Nevertheless, if an individual fails to function in these ways, 
despite such opportunity, we would not wish to conclude that a threshold level of 
well-being has been achieved, only that the individual has the opportunity to achieve 
this threshold and that the failure to do so is not a matter for government 
intervention.
This is not, however, to say that the capability or the freedom to function in these 
valuable ways is not important to well-being itself. Nussbaum recognises that certain
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capabilities require choice, play ceases to be play if it is coerced or forced in some 
way. Practical reason is central to Nussbaum’s approach, and this form of reflection 
surely requires a number of valuable ways of life to reflect upon. Sen is more 
forthright in his contention that freedom of choice makes an independent 
contribution to well-being.
For people who are in a position to choose in a reasoned way and value that 
freedom to choose, it is hard to think that their well-being achievement would 
never be affected if the freedom to choose were denied, even though the 
(unrefined) functioning vector (or midfare) were guaranteed by the actions of 
others.
(Sen, 1993: 44)
As we have seen Nussbaum (2006b) suggests Sen considers freedom a good per se, 
and criticises this understanding of freedom on the grounds that only certain central 
freedoms warrant political protection. This point seems to me to be relevant to the 
prudential domain. In defending an objective conception of well-being, I suggest that 
it is only the freedom to achieve certain valuable functionings that is important to 
well-being.
Exercise may instantiate certain functionings. This is one clear way in which 
exercise can be said to improve well-being. Sporting activities provide opportunities 
for social engagement and the forming of relationships, central to Nussbaum’s 
capabilities of both Emotions and Affiliation. There are, however, a number of other 
ways in which such relationships can be developed. Sport or physical activity, 
structured in the appropriate way, instantiates those valuable functionings Nussbaum 
stipulates. This will be addressed further in the final section (7.4) of this chapter.
There are numerous ways in which exercise might instantiate a certain functioning. 
These activities are likely to instantiate a number of valuable functionings, and also, 
bearing in mind the longer term benefits of being physically active, preserve the 
capability for future use, in non-active pursuits. Thus part of this investigation will 
be to address the extent to which the capabilities on the list imply a certain level of 
fitness or physical activity, and whether our continued capability requires a
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deliberate effort to exercise, as opposed to the minimal levels of physical activity we 
may maintain throughout a routine associated with someone often labelled 
‘sedentary’. I will now work through a range of ways in which exercise might be 
construed to improve well-being, asking whether we would drop below a threshold 
level of well-being if our physical activity levels dropped below a minimum, to use 
common discourse, if we failed to ‘do some exercise.’
7.3.1 Exercise expanding present capability to function
Does a satisfactory level of capability and indeed functioning necessitate exercise? 
Investigating the relationship between exercise and well-being requires attention to 
actual functioning. Being physically active may enable one to function in a valuable 
way more often, and indeed improve the quality of the functioning itself. The first 
point regarding actual functioning is distinct from the enhancement of well-being 
through improving our choice, or freedom to function in valuable ways. This 
increase in the capability set is, suggests Sen, (1993) valuable quite apart form any 
increase in actual valuable functionings that might result.
These observations regarding the ways in which well-being might be enhanced lead 
us to three related questions. First, does a threshold level of functioning, below 
which the level of well-being is deemed unsatisfactory, require exercise of some 
sort? This also relates to the quality of function. Secondly, can I achieve a threshold 
level of quality of function without taking any exercise? Finally I have spoken of 
how capability itself or freedom to pursue a range of valuable functionings might 
help set the threshold for well-being. In instances of disease and illness, one may still 
be able to fulfil a function on Nussbaum’s list, but a reduced freedom to function in 
this way will not only impact upon well-being through the likely reduced number of 
instances in which one can achieve this functioning. The actual foreclosure of 
options diminishes well-being. Exercise it seems expands the capability set, offering 
us a greater range of ways in which we might fulfil those functionings on 
Nussbaum’s list. But does this expansion directly relate to a threshold below which 
someone cannot be said to be fulfilling their potential as a human being?
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The concern in this first section is with one’s present capability to function. The 
contention of this section is that a sedentary person need not take up exercise in 
order to achieve a satisfactory level of capability in Nussbaum’s sense. It follows 
from this conclusion that one can function in valuable ways, exceeding a threshold 
set to indicate the fulfilment of human potential, without making the effort to ‘take 
exercise.’
Examining each of the capabilities enables a clear demonstration of how they do not 
require anything above a minimal level of physical activity. Nussbaum’s first 
capability is ‘life’ itself. This capability, however, mainly concerns life span and the 
prevention of premature death. I will not discuss this capability now; it belongs in 
the next section concerning the preservation of capability. The second capability on 
Nussbaum’s list is bodily health. I have, however, argued that health is better 
understood in reverse, starting from the capabilities, and therefore will not discuss 
this capability in isolation.
Bodily integrity refers to freedom of movement from place to place, to the respect of 
bodily boundaries, sexual satisfaction and reproductive autonomy. This movement, I 
presume, is intended in a political sense, to counter the sort of segregation seen in 
apartheid in South Africa rather than referring to locomotion per se. Freely moving 
between regions, states and countries of course is likely to require some sort of 
physical activity or mobility. This level however, could be minimal, and certainly 
achievable by someone who only engages in a very minimum level of physical 
activity. Nussbaum’s bodily integrity might indicate in most cases a certain minimal 
level of physical activity, being able to get around in some way or another. To 
conclude, other things being equal, that being physically active, as opposed to bed- 
bound, improves a life, however does not seem particularly interesting from the 
point of view of the thesis. I am certainly not asking whether we need to participate 
in sport to achieve a threshold level of well-being, but neither am I concerned with 
the bare minimum achieved by those who would be considered sedentary according 
to other criteria.
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Thus, as I have indicated, I seek to differentiate between physical activity and 
exercise. Exercise is understood as any form of activity above the minimum level of 
physical activity we require to go about our daily routines. The World Health 
Organisation (2003) detail the breadth of activities that ‘exercise’ might entail, from 
walking to work and climbing stairs to sports. This enables those who dislike formal 
exercise or sports to still achieve recommended activity levels. Engagement in 
certain activities, talking the stairs rather than the escalator, for example, may only 
be motivated by the publicised benefits, rather than any goods or values associated 
with the activity itself. Nevertheless, someone who chooses to walk over a mile to 
work and back each day is undertaking a certain level of exercise, and what started 
out as a chore motivated by the opportunity to bum calories may end up an enjoyable 
and relaxing walk, a chance to interact with nature, or even socialise if the individual 
walks with someone else.
Thicker activities, those that will be discussed in more depth in the final section are 
understood not just in terms of calorific expenditure but in terms of their internal 
goods (MacIntyre, 1985). Those who participate in certain sports or exercise 
regularly may enjoy the challenge, the sense of progress, mastery, and social 
interaction. These goods may serve as important motivators for continued 
participation. Examples of such activities are often within the sporting domain, but 
this need not always be the case. Some who attends the gymnasium, circuits, 
aerobics, or yoga classes may enjoy and embrace a range of internal goods, social 
aspects, the joy of mastering one’s body, learning new skills, immersing oneself in 
the activity, without taking part in competitive sport.
I argue that Nussbaum’s capabilities imply only a bare minimum of physical 
activity; achievable by someone who would typically be called sedentary by the 
healthcare profession. The capabilities I suggest can be sustained in the short term by 
a level of physical activity below that of, for example someone who chooses to walk 
rather than drive to work. How long someone can sustain a sedentary lifestyle 
without significant threat to capabilities is the topic of the next section. Prior to this I
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will continue in examining the other capabilities on Nussbaum’s list, demonstrating 
their decidedly unathletic nature.
The fourth capability ‘Senses, Imagination and Thought’ includes ‘Being able to use 
imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing self- 
expressive works’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 78). In explaining this capability further 
Nussbaum also refers to freedom of expression and searching for the meaning of life 
in one’s own way, as well as to pleasurable experiences and the avoidance of ‘non­
necessary pain.’ (ibid.). Nussbaum considers education essential for the truly human 
use of these faculties. Sport and thicker forms of physical activity could certainly 
represent one way of functioning in this valuable way. Players in games such as 
football speak of expressing themselves, many find mastering one’s own body and 
moving gracefully a joyful and pleasurable experience. These activities could also be 
understood as educating in the use of the senses, imagination and thought. These 
physical activities certainly represent one way in which the whole person, mind and 
body can be understood as expressing oneself, as in dance, tai chi or yoga for 
example.
Exercise and sport, however, do not represent the only instantiation of these 
functionings, or even the only way in which one might encourage the use of the 
mind and body together in producing self-expressive works. Playing a musical 
instrument includes the mastering of both physical and mental skills, can encourage 
self- expression, and be experienced as pleasurable. It requires, however, no more 
than a minimal level of physical activity. There is nothing to suggest that the 
sedentary musicians’ life will be improved in a meaningful way if their capability set 
is expanded to more rigorous activities. The musician, disinterested in exercise, is 
free to express him/herself, and this person seems perfectly capable of achieving a 
threshold level of well-being. The functioning associated with Nussbaum’s 
capability ‘Senses, Imagination and Thought’ may be both instantiated and 
cultivated by exercise and participation in sports, but this does not offer the only way 
in which this may be achieved. Nussbaum’s capabilities can be realised in multiple 
ways, exercise may not suit everyone’s disposition.
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This, however, should not be taken to indicate that exercise is merely one among an 
infinite number of means to pleasure or self-expression, where its exchange for 
another means would be insignificant. First, this would be to adapt a utilitarian 
conception of pleasure, understood in isolation from the activity with which it is 
associated. The pleasures of exercise are different from the pleasures of playing a 
musical instrument. The utilitarian understanding of pleasure as an end in itself, that 
can be isolated from the activities with which it is associated has already been 
criticised. Conceiving of pleasure in this fashion seems to devalue the activity 
enjoyed or found pleasurable. It is more than just a means to pleasure. Exercise 
should not be understood as just one of many means to those values, including 
pleasure, on Nussbaum’s list, but as a unique way in which such values are 
instantiated.
Many are not motivated by the pleasure, or indeed the potential exercise may have to 
expand capabilities. We should not understand sport or exercise solely as 
instantiations of Nussbaum’s capabilities. This is perhaps a danger of focusing upon 
an objective list stipulating the goods of well-being, we begin to look for these goods 
in certain activities, without really analysing the activities any further. Sport and 
exercise do not just represent any way in which the functionings associated with the 
capabilities might be realised. Midgley (1974) insists upon this point, we should not 
understand games and indeed love in terms of general needs, disregarding the form 
they take.
The restraining rules are not something foreign to the needs or emotions 
involved, they are simply the shape which the desired activity takes. The chess 
player’s desire is not a desire for general abstract intellectual activity, curbed 
and frustrated by a particular set of rules. It is a desire for a particular kind of 
intellectual activity, whose channel is the rules of chess. (Similarly human love 
is not a general need, curbed and frustrated by the particular forms offered to 
it. It is a need for a specific kind of relation -  say a permanent one -  with a 
particular person, and for this purpose only some kinds of behaviour will do.)
(Midgley, 1974: 243).
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Midgley’s insistence that games should not be understood as merely a vessel for the 
realisation of general values is borne out of her dismissal that games are closed off 
from the rest of society. For Midgley (1974: 337) games are ‘continuous with the life 
around them’ and the needs these games represent reflect our context. Our motives 
for participating are not general, but for the satisfaction of a very particular need for 
a very particular type of game.
In the case of football or chess, to treat the traditional concern as accidental 
would mean that it could just as well be attached to something else; that the 
pattern of life surrounding them demands some game, but is quite indifferent 
what game it is. Well then, we will try substituting halma for chess and lawn 
tennis for football. Will there be any difficulties? There will. These rituals will 
not be suitable forms for the conflicts they are designed to ritualize.
(Midgley, 1974: 237).
We will not concern ourselves here with whether ritualized conflict is the only or 
indeed the best way in which to understand the development of games such as 
football. Midgley speaks of needs but let us now bring the discussion back to 
capabilities and functionings, needs in the sense that they are necessary, Nussbaum 
states, for a life to be fully human. Exercise and sport are not just a means to a 
general sort of capability or functioning, but a very specific way in which we might 
realise a very specific form of a capability or function.
Indeed Nussbaum intends her list to be more fully specified, she refers to its 
‘multiple realizability: its members can be more concretely specified in accordance 
with local beliefs and circumstances.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 77). The capabilities and 
functionings on the list are very general categories, that do not exhaust the ways in 
which we should understand the activities that instantiate them. Sport and exercise 
may not be the only ways in which we find pleasure, joy, or indeed feel able to 
express ourselves. They do, however, represent special ways in which to achieve a 
very specific form of such values, ways developed from the context and history 
within which they are situated.
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With regard to our emotions, and our ability to have attachments to others, again this 
may imply a certain minimal level of physical activity. Some level of mobility would 
facilitate the being able to meet and visit others. The related capability of affiliation 
may also require some sort of minimal level of physical activity, although this would 
not be necessary in all instances. If someone is housebound they may struggle to 
keep up the relationships that they had previously maintained. They may remain able 
to engage with others, but their capability to do so may be restricted to the extent that 
we might consider life diminished, reliant as they would be upon the visits of others. 
Nevertheless, upon examination of these capabilities my original observation stands. 
Someone would be perfectly capable of affiliating and developing the emotional 
attachments Nussbaum considers central to a fully human life, whilst only 
undertaking the minimum in terms of physical activity.
The same can be said of the capability and corresponding function practical reason. 
Our ability to reason and form a conception of the good may be reliant upon a 
minimal level of physical activity. As Schramme indicates ‘Complete paralysis 
withdraws our capacity to interact with our surroundings, and, therefore, hinders us 
in finding out what is good or bad for us.’ (Schramme, 2002: 66). This level of 
physical activity, however, would again need to be no more than the minimum. 
Neither does exercise seem especially important to the capability Control Over 
One’s Environment, referring to political choice and ability to hold property.
The capabilities ‘Play’ and ‘Other Species’ may, in some instances, imply a level of 
physical activity beyond a minimum. Physically active ways of playing certainly 
encompass a broad range of activities, that are often enjoyed and also instantiate 
other functionings, such as ‘Affiliation’, and the use of our ‘Senses, Imagination and 
Thought.’ Midgley has insisted that playing games should not, however, be 
understood as merely a means to such valuable functionings, replaceable by other 
non-active forms of play without loss. It is better to recognise that active forms of 
play reflect a very specific need in the individual for a particular form of those 
values it instantiates, a need likely to be related to the social context in which the 
game or activity has arisen.
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To argue that active forms of play are merely one means of fulfilling certain values 
does not do justice to the activities and the needs they fulfil. It is questionable 
however, whether playing in an active way is necessary for the threshold level of 
well-being we are concerned with. Those who engage in and enjoy more sedentary 
pursuits, playing computer games for example, may miss out on the range of benefits 
associated with more physically active forms of play, mastery of one’s body, the joy 
of movement, greater social interaction (although computer games may prompt 
social engagement, in certain contexts). These sedentary pursuits, however, may 
represent the preferred way of playing for a sedentary individual, within a balanced 
life, in which a threshold level of all the capabilities is achieved with minimal 
physical activity. There seems no need to insist that active forms of play are essential 
to a threshold level of well-being.
Finally the ‘Other Species’ capability ‘Being able to live with concern for and in 
relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature’ (Nussbaum, 2006a) may require 
exercise in certain instances, if one for example imagines taking a long walk in the 
woods. There are doubtless, however, less active ways of engaging with nature. A 
musician, essentially sedentary in that she makes no effort to be physically active, 
may have the current fitness to both play and interact with nature in a way that 
ensures these capabilities exceed the threshold for a fully human life, or a threshold 
level of well-being.
The capabilities and functionings on Nussbaum’s list do require a certain minimal 
level of physical activity in many instances, in order to reach a threshold level of 
well-being after which one can be said to be fully human, or be fulfilling human 
potential. It does not follow from the significance of this minimal level, however, 
that the kind of exercise discussed in this thesis is necessary for a threshold level of 
well-being, or would even offer current improvements to a life if undertaken 
immediately. More physically active ways of playing, or expressing oneself may be 
important ways in which the functionings can be instantiated, but exercise will not
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necessarily improve the lives of those who engage in play, or use their senses and 
imagination in different ways.
7.3.2 The Preservation of capabilities
We can reach a threshold level without ‘taking exercise’. We have, however, 
ascertained that certain lesser levels of physical activity are required for capability to 
exceed an acceptable threshold. This section investigates the extent to which 
inactivity might threaten our capability over a longer term view.
We have spoken both of the potential of human beings, and of the future-orientated 
nature of health. Does a failure to exercise impact upon our potential in some way? 
This line of argument suggests that physical inactivity now risks later loss of 
capability, and a corresponding threat to achieving one’s potential throughout life. 
This stronger argument for the value of exercise relates to its ability to preserve 
capability.
This argument draws upon Nussbaum’s (2000a) distinction between basic, internal 
and innate capability. In referring to an internal capability to be physically active, I 
refer to a level of physical activity that one is capable of functioning at currently. 
Nussbaum’s framework does not require this internal capability for physical activity 
to be particularly high in order for a threshold level of well-being to be achieved. But 
what of continued inactivity? This would reduce our internal capability to be 
physically active, threatening our way of life, our ability to function in valuable ways 
that we had previously taken for granted.
The most obvious way in which the level of physical activity would be threatened is 
through the onset of disease and illness, and pain associated with inactivity. 
Conditions such as heart disease, osteoporosis, and back pain, (all referred to in the 
WHO rationale) all reflect serious capability frustration. When we consider 
Nussbaum’s central capabilities, one may still manage to function in these valuable 
ways with a bad back, or chronic pain, but our capabilities will be diminished below
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a certain threshold, suggesting ill health. An individual may only be able to work for 
short periods because of chronic pain; interaction with others may be more difficult, 
so might engaging in recreational activities. The time spent in such valuable 
functionings would be reduced if one is left just trying to get through the day, the 
quality of the function itself is impaired, and the capability set diminished.
Disease not only represents a reduction in actual functioning in many instances, it 
reduces the number of ways in which we may function valuably, our capability. 
Disease and illness seem to narrow our options, a routine developed to alleviate 
symptoms such as pain may restrict opportunities to function in other valuable ways. 
Diseases may reflect significant impairment of the central capabilities, as well as a 
threat to the capability Life.
These diseases and illnesses impact upon our internal capability to be physically 
active. Movement without pain may be difficult, working, previously not considered 
an exertion at all may become tiring. It may be more difficult to maintain 
relationships because of immobility. These diseases and illnesses will also impact 
more directly upon capability and functioning, not just reducing our activity levels. 
They threaten the capability life. If we are in pain may cloud thought, and reduce our 
capacity to experience pleasure. The fear and anxiety associated with serious illness 
may affect our relationships in a range of ways. This more direct impact upon 
capability and functioning, however, may still be associated with earlier inactivity, 
suggests the sort of rationale provided by the World Health Organisation earlier.
There are a range of ways in which our capability, indeed our internal capabilities 
are threatened by disease and illness. The impact of course is upon the mental and 
bodily aspect of our capability, these are health concerns essentially. Our being 
embodied human beings can limit our capability, and such limits need not be 
confined to the reduction in capacities associated with old age, or indeed disease. 
Children who engage in no exercise whatsoever may threaten an internal capability 
to be physically active, and as we have discussed a low level of physical activity 
underpins many capabilities. The concerns over childhood obesity must be viewed
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with a critical eye, especially bearing in mind the uncertain association with health 
alluded to earlier. Nevertheless, if someone in their late teens is incapable of even 
the lowest levels of physical activity they are likely to have their options reduced to a 
significant extent. If getting to work, or getting upstairs becomes an effort, if one is 
constantly tired, then functioning will be diminished to an unacceptable level. ‘Use it 
or lose it’ might be the slogan, indicating that if we do not make the effort to be 
physically active we threaten that level of capability and functioning we might take 
for granted. Again, even in younger age inactivity might be associated with illness 
and disease that impact more directly upon the central capabilities and functionings, 
not just via the internal capability to be physically active.
The idea of an individual, participating in exercise and sport in a prudent fashion, 
valuing its ability to preserve capabilities, may paint a somewhat conservative 
picture. McNamee (2007) expresses some concerns with such prudence, associating 
it with a time neutral approach to well-being. I recognise that the future is uncertain, 
we cannot plan with certainty for the future, neither will we know how our projects 
and goals might change as we age. The purpose of Nussbaum’s list of central 
capabilities is to illustrate that being free to function in these valuable ways is central 
to any conception of well-being. A wholehearted engagement with those activities 
considered central to one’s well-being is not precluded by this argument for the 
value of exercise. Instead I question those activities that threaten, beyond a 
reasonable point those capabilities central to living any form of good life.
Neither do I encourage the idea that we should carefully plan our lives, so as to 
maximise the goods we achieve throughout their duration. This recognition of how 
exercise preserves central capabilities need not follow from even a conscious 
awareness of this on the part of the exerciser. Indeed some of the best things in life 
are unexpected. Again this is not precluded by an approach that understands 
exercise as preserving those central capabilities. To take advantage of the most 
unexpected goods fully, we must surely be capable in Nussbaum’s sense.
87 Larmore (1999) makes this point forcibly. McNamee (2007), having referred to Larmore speculates 
that adventure sports mark an alternative to our often predictable, cautious lives.
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Whether we should value each point in a life equally in relation to our well-being 
requires a more extensive discussion than that required here. It would, however, be 
an interesting and valuable area for further research. One could argue, as McNamee 
(2007) does, that the natural arc of life might question the time neutrality of well­
being. During the latter parts of our life we may be less capable of experiencing the 
joys and thrills that would be more fully attended to at one’s peak. We could allow a 
certain amount of time preference within a conception for well-being, a life might be 
better for the person who lived it if goods were secured at one’s peak, through for 
example, a wholehearted engagement with one’s sport, even if impacted negatively 
upon later life.
A rejection that we should value all time periods of our life equally need not 
necessarily entail a rejection of my argument. I argue that the most significant way in 
which exercise contributes to our well-being is in the preservation of those 
functionings and capabilities necessary for a threshold level of well-being. This in 
turn allows us to function in those ways valuable to well-being. This, of course, does 
not just apply to the preservation of capability in later life; we have discussed the 
possibility of children’s capabilities dropping below a threshold level as a result of 
inactivity. There is definitely, however, a forward thinking element to this argument, 
a prudence that suggests ensuring one’s capability is retained throughout life. Slote 
(1983: 23) has suggested that ‘what comes later in life’ is of special significance in 
assessing the goodness of a life. Evidence for this, suggests Slote, is provided by the 
language we use in describing lives.
We may say that later political success can ‘compensate’ or ‘make up’ for 
(someone’s) years in the political wilderness; but it would be an abuse of 
language to describe early successes as ‘compensating’ or ‘making up’ for 
later failures or miseries. And lest someone reply that this is merely a fact of 
linguistic convention, can it not be said further that the very fact that we have 
expressions for the way later goods can counterbalance earlier evils, but none 
at all for the counterbalancing of later evils by earlier goods, is a rather good 
indication of our common belief in the greater intrinsic importance (value or 
disvalue) of what comes later in life?
(Slote, 1983: 25).
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A full discussion of well-being, and whether we consider it to be time neutral, or 
whether there are certain times periods that make a greater contribution to a life 
overall is beyond the scope of this thesis. I have introduced the above to indicate the 
possibility that a criticism of time neutral approaches to well-being may not damage 
my own argument. Slote’s comments suggest that how we view a life overall, and 
indeed how we might view our own lives, as we live them, may reflect preference 
for later time periods.
The objective stance on the importance of the stipulated capabilities and functionings 
to a life I take allows me to criticise a similar set of preferences for a certain period 
of life. Consider the prudent athlete who regrets this choice in later life. Wishing he 
had been more impulsive as a youth, and sacrificed later capability to a significant 
extent in order to prolong sporting success during his twenties. The individual does 
not value his capabilities now; he thinks that he could put up with ill health, pain, 
perhaps arthritis, if he could look back with fondness at his sporting achievements. 
He wishes perhaps that he had played through injury, not retired early because of the 
long-term damage continuing to play might do. The value of the functionings and 
capabilities to the individual’s life is not negated by his apparent failure to endorse 
their continued importance. A certain threshold of the capabilities is required for the 
pursuit of any conception of the good life. The individual has perhaps not fully 
contemplated the consequences of capability dropping below such a threshold. There 
are of course also other questions. Would, in a state of ill health, with reduced 
opportunity to enjoy life, engage with others, experience pleasure, the individual in 
question view the past sporting successes with such fondness. Older players in the 
football team I play for often remark ‘you are a long time not playing.’ But to turn 
this observation on its head, could those few years of athletic excellence compensate 
for the extended capability loss in later life. I point to Slote’s recognition of the 
importance of later times in life as evidence that such capability loss cannot be 
compensated by earlier sporting achievement.
2 3 1
Exercise, I argue, is central to the preservation of our capabilities. If we fail to 
exercise, our capabilities may shrink, indicative of the sort of diseases spoken of in 
the WHO rationale, and indeed reduced muscle strength and flexibility as a result of 
ageing. Exercise can help preserve our capabilities as best we can, of course 
allowing for the natural aging process. Being physically active, above a minimum, 
can be understood as preserving our capabilities, and thus, through its impact upon 
the body, as central to health. Indeed, we have referred to health being associated 
with the bodily and mental processes (Nordenfelt, 2007c), and indeed this aspect of 
our capability seems closely aligned to how we understand our health. Exercise 
appears to be one of a limited number of ways in which we might preserve capability 
through the body. This argument remains instrumental, but does suggest an 
important role for physical activity, exercise and sport, as one of few ways in which 
to preserve the bodily aspect of capability.
In a sense this argument retains the focus of the naturalistic rationale for the value of 
physical activity in terms of health. Embracing the normative conception of health, 
however, I am primarily concerned with the impact of physical inactivity might have 
on capability and functioning. Disease and illness, it is argued, are entangled 
concepts, representing a frustration of those capabilities central to a threshold level 
of well-being.
7.3.3 Exercise and capability: some examples
I will conclude this section with range of examples to illustrate the argument 
presented above. First, alluding to a point made throughout the sections above, 
someone who is bed bound and unable to achieve any level of physical activity. This 
person will be unable to achieve a threshold level of well-being, or in Nussbaum’s 
terms live a fully human life. Those capabilities on Nussbaum’s list would be 
severely diminished. First one would have reduced opportunities to function in 
valuable ways, reducing actual functioning. Being bed-bound would, other things 
being equal, mean less interaction with others, and limited ways in which one could 
reason, plan and enjoy one’s life. Second one’s quality of functioning may be
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severely impaired. Those items on Nussbaum’s list such as play or interacting with 
nature may be pursued in very restricted ways. Finally, freedom to function, 
capability would be severely impacted upon. Capability reduction below a certain 
threshold is significant to well-being in itself, quite apart from the functioning with 
which it is associated.
Now let us take Griffin’s example of a scholar who rejects the value of exercise to 
well-being. Extending this example I understand the scholars as arguing they need 
not take any exercise in order to achieve and indeed maintain a threshold level of 
well-being. To elaborate upon this, such individuals may only value their intellectual 
activities.
With regard to present levels of capability and functioning, the ‘sedentary person’ 
who does not ‘take any exercise’ may well be capable of functioning in a valuable 
way to the extent that she can be said to have achieved a threshold level of well­
being, or be living a good life. Let us take a fictional scholar, who makes no effort to 
be physically active. This person has no problems forming relationships, can move 
around as they wish without pain, there is no reason that being physically inactive 
now means capability reduction to the extent of disease or illness now, i.e. the 
scholar may be able to sit at a desk all day with no current back pain. If their 
capability set were presently reduced to the point that they can only work for short 
periods because of back pain, or they struggle to begin a lecture after a long walk up 
the stairs they may consider taking more exercise. Many, however, perhaps through 
eating well, adequate relaxation, or indeed through no special effort whatsoever, 
manage to maintain current capability without being at all active. The scholar seems 
to have a level of capability that Nussbaum would be satisfied with; able to pursue 
their own conception of well-being, from a range of valuable options.
The stronger argument for the value of exercise, I have already indicated, is that it 
preserves capabilities and functionings. Exercise is of instrumental value to well­
being. It offers one of a restricted number of ways in which we might preserve the
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bodily aspect of those capabilities essential for the pursuit of any conception of well­
being.
The individual who rejects the value of exercise, focusing exclusively upon her 
intellectual pastimes will not necessarily suffer from significant reduced current 
capability because of this physical inactivity. Continued inactivity, however, as 
evidenced in chapter three, increases the likelihood of capability loss, possibly to the 
extent of illness and disease. An almost exclusive focus on sedentary intellectual 
work, sitting at a desk, perhaps even in poor posture, with no significant exercise 
undertaken may threaten the individual pursuing this very same life plan in later life. 
The scholar may, for example, later suffer from back pain, inhibiting concentration 
over long periods of work. Some exercise undertaken previously may have 
prevented this reduction in capability; indeed some exercise undertaken now may 
alleviate it.
This argument need not only apply to the impact of physical inactivity on older age. 
Exercise in childhood may also ensure the ability to function as an adult. Capability 
in adulthood may to some extent have been influenced by activity at a younger age. 
Compulsory physical education in the young may develop strength that prevents pain 
and enables easy movement in adulthood. This not only enables a lifetime of 
physical activity, but the ability to pursue a range of non-active life plans, without 
physical symptoms. Of course, over activity at a young age (or indeed at any age), or 
pursuit of an activity with scant regard for the capability loss it may result in may 
have a long-term negative impact upon well-being.
The argument that an intellectual who rejects the value of exercise outright can reach 
the threshold level of well-being relies upon certain underpinning assumptions. The 
individual at this stage must be in good health, i.e. they must be capable in 
Nussbaum’s sense and the maintenance of such capabilities must not require 
exercise. For example I must undertake certain stretches and other exercises, even 
during busy times at work in order to prevent back pain. That the individual enjoys 
this level of capability without making any exercise provision may, although not
234
necessarily, indicate some exercise undertaken at a younger age ensuring easy 
movement as an adult. Thus the rejection of the value of exercise is much easier 
when the minimal levels required to pursue any conception of the good life are not 
under threat. The individual does not suffer from health problems or weight 
problems for example.
Arguments regarding the preservation of capability are complicated by the 
uncertainty of the future. I have noted how a failure of the intellectual, for example, 
to exercise now, may inhibit the range of valuable life plans open to them later. The 
implications of their inactivity, the capability loss they may suffer, may entail the 
diseases associated with physical inactivity in chapter three, threatening not only 
alternative active ways of life, but pursuit of intellectual achievements. All we can 
say is that physical inactivity increases the chances of capability loss below a 
threshold with which we would associate with well-being. The ability of that 
individual to fulfil their potential would be inhibited.
Exercise preserves those capabilities and functionings central to well-being. The 
contention that exercise is constitutive of well-being cannot be justified. Well-being 
and health may well be future-oriented, i.e. being inactive may be said to be 
unhealthy because of its likely impact upon capability later. The forward-looking 
nature of this argument, however, suffers from the obvious uncertainty of the future. 
We cannot guarantee that failing to exercise now impacts upon capability at some 
stage, and thus we cannot conclude that failing to exercise results in well-being 
dropping below a threshold level, that exercise is constitutive of well-being.
Neither can it be concluded exercise offers the only way in which to preserve or 
indeed expand capability. Indeed, there are numerous ways in which we preserve or 
expand internal capability; through education for example. It should also be noted 
that Nussbaum’s list of capabilities central for a fully human life are ‘combined 
capabilities’ requiring the external environment to ensure these central freedoms. 
Activities that act upon our internal capability will not ensure well-being exceeds a 
threshold in the absence of the appropriate external environment. Ultimately for the
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capabilities to constitute a threshold level of well-being, the internal must combine 
with the external. Exercise, however, represents one of very few ways in which we 
might impact upon our capability via our bodies. The health benefits of exercise in 
this respect indicate the strongest argument for its value. Exercise preserves the 
central capabilities throughout life. There are not many ways in which we can help 
our body retain such capability, accounting for, of course the natural aging process. 
Other ways in which we might seek to ensure our bodies allow a certain threshold 
level of capability may be through eating well, and by taking medication. Allowing 
adequate time for relaxation and meditation are also thought to impact favourably 
upon the body and mind, facilitating the pursuit well-being.
The bodily and mental precondition of capability is impacted upon via a restricted 
number of ways, including exercise. It may be too strong to suggest that exercise is 
constitutive of a certain threshold level of capability throughout life. These other 
ways, good diet for example, combined with the normal activities of everyday life 
may be enough for some to maintain the threshold level of capability under 
discussion. Again we are struck by the sheer unpredictability of certain aspects of the 
argument. Some individuals may be able to retain capability over a life, without 
taking exercise; some may suffer for such inactivity, despite eating well and looking 
after themselves in other ways. Of course, exercise and good diet, cannot guarantee 
against ill health. Thus I think it permissable to stipulate the relationship in only 
instrumental terms. Exercise preserves those capabilities central to well-being over a 
life time. Exercising represents one of a restricted number of ways in which we can 
impact upon health, and in particular that part of our capability which relies upon the 
body.
This apparently limited conclusion offers, however, a genuine extension of previous 
work in the area. The naturalistic argument for the value of physical activity failed to 
recognise the entanglement of fact and value inherent in concepts such as health, 
disease and illness. Having argued for an objective conception of well-being, and 
then Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as the best available conception, I have 
suggested the capabilities as the primary concept for the understanding of health,
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illness and disease. This extends upon Nussbaum’s understanding of health within 
her account, an area not fully explored by her. The approach of course, also extends 
Nussbaum’s account in a different direction, asking about the role of exercise in a 
life -  its contribution to well-being. This argument shifts focus away from the 
political objectivity the capabilities approach aspires to, suggesting the capabilities 
and functionings are constitutive of our objective well-being, objective being 
understood in Putnam and indeed Dewey’s sense.
As promised in chapter three, recognising the entanglement of fact and value 
inherent in concepts such as health, disease and illness enables a more positive, 
integrated rationale for the value of exercise, as preserving those capabilities central 
to well-being. I understand the value of exercise directly in terms of the constituents 
of a threshold level of well-being. Failing to exercise is likely to result in a drop 
below the threshold. This significant capability loss may sometimes, but not always 
be attributed to disease.
I have also elaborated upon the role capability may play in both well-being and 
health. It is not enough to just be able to function in the valuable ways. A life above 
the threshold level of well-being must entail a certain choice over valuable 
functionings, not just because this increases the likelihood of achieving valuable 
functionings, but because the freedom to function in valuable ways is important to 
well-being in itself.
The above indicates the value of exercise in preserving capability. It resonates with 
the WHO and its consideration of physical activity in broad terms. Any form of 
exercise could be said to preserve capability in these ways. Health enhancing 
exercise, that which preserves the bodily and mental aspect of our capability, could 
include climbing the stairs rather than taking the lift or the escalator for example. 
Exercise and particularly sport, however, is important to our well-being apart from 
its influence on the body. Ways in which sport may provide instantiations of those 
functionings central to our well-being will be addressed in the following.
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7.4 Exercise, sport and the capabilities approach. How else might physical 
activity enhance well-being?
Sport and exercise are not necessarily participated in because of their potential to 
preserve capabilities, indeed some may not be concerned with the apparent health 
benefits, or indeed disbenefits. Nevertheless, the above provides a strong argument 
for the value of exercise that is quite distinct from the issue of what motivates those 
who participate in sport. This section perhaps gets closer to those values that attract 
those who participate in sport, the social element for example. The individual, 
however, need not be aware of the general value category, included for example on 
an objective list theory of well-being. They may, as Midgley (1974) has suggested be 
more concerned with the specific form of the value provided by the activity itself. 
The individual may of course, not contemplate the inherent values in the activity, 
merely remarking that they enjoy participating. All of these justifications for 
participation can be incorporated within an analysis of exercise that suggests it 
enhances well-being by instantiating specific forms of those values on an objective 
list.
Health has played an integral role in this argument for the value of exercise to well­
being. Earlier sections, however, arguing for an objective conception of well-being 
also have direct implications for how we might understand exercise to improve our 
lives. The first, and perhaps most obvious way in which an acceptance of an 
objective conception of well-being improves our understanding of the role of 
exercise in our lives is through its recognition of mistaken judgments. Ferrand et al. 
(2007) found signs of disordered eating in adolescent synchronised swimmers, who 
perceived themselves to be overweight and engaged in a number of weight reducing 
strategies including excessive exercise, fasting and skipping meals. Such behaviours, 
despite their satisfying desires, or at times even being experienced as pleasurable, 
can be criticised with use of an objective conception of well-being. Nussbaum’s list 
of central capabilities can also be used to question satisfaction expressed in the 
absence of those capabilities and functionings essential to our well-being.
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Nussbaum’s capabilities are also understood to be of value quite apart from the 
satisfaction or pleasure with which they may be associated. Again this has 
implications for how we understand the value of exercise to well-being. Exercise 
does not only enhance our lives because we enjoy it, or because it is pleasurable. The 
capabilities and functionings Nussbaum stipulates are central to our lives apart from 
these subjective factors. Affiliation, or play, for example, ought not be reduced 
entirely to the subjective states they promote.
It is in this way that the insights into well-being achieved through this inquiry can 
help us to understand how sport and exercise might be structured to best promote 
well-being. Subjective conceptions can say little more than that sport and exercise 
should be enjoyable, or satisfying. This is no doubt important, but to repeat questions 
asked earlier, are all the pleasures and enjoyments of sport and exercise of equal 
merit? And are there instances in which sport and exercise might enhance well-being 
in the absence of such enjoyment? The following provides some examples of how 
sport can be seen to instantiate those functionings central to our well-being. An 
objective conception would make the promotion of such functionings central to any 
sport or physical activity intended to enhance well-being. Bearing in mind the 
convergence with informed desire that Nussbaum expects of her list of capabilities 
(Nussbaum, 2000a), we can hypothesise that sport or exercise structured in this way 
would be enjoyed as well.
It is not my intention here to work through the entirety of Nussbaum’s capabilities 
list and highlight some of the no doubt infinite ways in which sport and exercise may 
help us achieve those functionings central to well-being. It will suffice to provide 
some examples of how an objective list helps us to understand how sport and 
exercise can be structured to best promote well-being.
Practical reason is, of course, central to Nussbaum’s conception of the fully human 
life. Activities that promote this critical reflection and enable planning of one’s life 
would be in the best interests of our well-being. The list could be used to criticise 
sport or exercise that fails to encourage the use of the function, and this criticism
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could apply even if those partaking in the activity still report levels of satisfaction or 
enjoyment.
Practical reason, and encouraging its use, has special significance for youth sport. 
Within this domain coaches and parents may, even with the best intentions, inhibit 
the decision-making role of the young athlete. David (2005) citing the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, has illustrated the importance of increasing 
the decision-making power of young elite athletes. It is interesting that an objective 
conception of well-being in which practical reason is central, does not justify 
paternalistic action, but questions it, on the grounds of it failing to properly respect 
the agency of the young athlete.
My own experience of football coaching with young soccer players may contribute 
to this discussion. It is of course central to the well-being of the young player that 
they learn to think and reflect upon the game itself, make their own decisions, and 
take responsibility for these decisions. This promotes the use of practical reason both 
within and outside sport throughout life. Many coaches, however, employ a fairly 
authoritarian stance with young football players. On the pitch they may effectively 
talk them through the game, instructing upon passes as the game progresses. The 
decision-making powers of the young players are not promoted either on or off the 
pitch. This authoritarian stance is often justified by result. The players ultimately 
enjoy winning and that is what we are here to do, the argument goes. Now it is not 
entirely clear that the young players want to win quite as much as their respective 
coaches and parents, but nevertheless, even if this were the case, we could question 
this enjoyment if it comes at the expense of certain central functionings such as 
practical reason. A longer term view, in the interests of the young player, would be 
to promote agency, enable a role in decision making both on and off the pitch, 
perhaps facilitating a different but more valuable type of enjoyment.
Sport structured appropriately may provide opportunity for athletes to retain control 
over decision making, with relation to their training schedule, diet, and performance 
for example, and thus experience sport as empowering. The importance of practical
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reason to exercise ultimately intended to enhance well-being cannot only be seen in 
these elite settings. An exercise intervention for inactive older adults (Hardcastle and 
Taylor, 2005) refers to how exercise may for some entail taking ‘control of one’s 
body’ (Hardcastle and Taylor, 2005). The quote below shows how exercise may 
promote feelings of control, when life appears to be somewhat spiralling out of 
control.
As your family grow up and move away all of a sudden you’re hit with this 
sort of who am I .. .1 have to re-invent myself.. .1 hit crisis point about two 
years ago when everything seemed to be disappearing from me.. .1 was way 
out of control before I started the exercise programme. I mean nothing seemed 
to matter really. There was no motivation for anything. When you’ve got kids 
you’ve got to look after them and that’s your motivation. When you’ve got a 
family that’s your motivation. When you’ve got a job that’s your motivation 
and I seemed to lose the whole lot.. .It’s gaining control of something. You 
have to gain control of something.. .1 had no control over anything least of all 
myself so I had to get something back so that’s what I went for. I got myself 
back. (Belinda, four months post exit)
(Hardcastle and Taylor, 2005).
Sport may in some instances provide a greater number of ‘uncontrollables’, (team 
mates, opponents etc.) than the exercise environment, but this example serves to 
illustrate the value of an appropriately structured exercise intervention in enhancing 
perceptions of control. Such perceptions may provide a starting point from which to 
build, and enhance one’s control over other domains in one’s life. Neither is it just 
the perception of control that is important to well-being, although this no doubt has a 
role to play. The individual above sounds as if they were lost; they had no focus, 
direction or life plan. The exercise intervention provided something that they could 
get their teeth into; employ some critical thinking and planning. This is valuable 
quite apart from the satisfactions or feelings of control it may provoke.
The second capability afforded special status within Nussbaum’s approach is 
affiliation. The sports and exercise arena has long been associated with its capacity 
to build relationships. Hardcastle and Taylor (2005) have illustrated the capacity of 
an exercise programme to overcome social isolation:
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It’s a different environment. You see different faces.. .more of a social thing 
besides it gets you out and probably at this time of day I’d be sitting around 
doing nothing or reading (Margaret aged 57, week 10)
(Hardcastle and Taylor, 2005).
Again, a lot will depend on the particular sport and exercise environment. The 
intervention above had obvious success, but examples are rife (David, 2005) of how 
sport and in particular the coach athlete relationship can entail manipulation, 
pressure and humiliation. (David, 2005). The capabilities approach, and in particular 
a recognition of how the sports and exercise environment may promote or denigrate 
a number of interdependent capabilities, provides a starting point for anyone 
concerned with how sport and exercise can best serve the well-being of its 
participants.
I have provided examples of two capabilities, affiliation and practical reason, and 
suggested ways in which the sports and exercise environment may promote or 
indeed frustrate these functionings. It is appropriate that I have focused on the two 
capabilities that Nussbaum’s affords a special status within her account. That these 
capabilities are said to ‘organize and suffuse all the others making their pursuit truly 
human.’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 82), not only reminds us of their centrality to our well­
being but of the connected nature of all the capabilities. A coach failing to properly 
encourage the decision making of a young athlete will not only impact upon the 
ability of the individual to reason, but to use their Senses, Imagination and Thought. 
This capability entails ‘Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with 
experiencing and producing self-expressive works’ (Nussbaum, 2000a: 79). The role 
of affiliation and practical reason within the approach means that any activity that 
denigrates these capacities cannot be suitable for a fully human existence. We could 
question whether a life within which such activities are prominent could be seen to 
have reached a threshold level of well-being.
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7.5 Conclusion
The argument for the value of exercise to well-being provided here has two main 
parts. I have suggested that exercise preserves those capabilities central to our well­
being, ensuring not just that we can continue to function in valuable ways, but that 
we have a freedom to function in these valuable ways. Achieving a threshold level of 
well-being requires not just functioning, but also a certain level of capability. Indeed 
one cannot be deemed to have achieved a threshold level of well-being solely on the 
basis that an individual is capable of some specification of the functionings on 
Nussbaum’s list. The threshold must be set higher than that, to ensure that an 
individual has not been forced into certain functionings through a particular illness, 
for example.
The second part of the argument draws on earlier chapters in the thesis criticising 
subjective theories of well-being. Subjective judgements of well-being can be 
flawed. That which we desire may not be good for us and our failure to endorse a 
good we have achieved may indicate nothing more than the flawed reasoning of the 
individual. Subjective theories also fail to offer a guide for public policy because of 
their inability to reason over matters of value. If I claim that something enhances my 
well-being, subjective theories accept this at face value, with all sorts of difficult 
consequences. This thesis has not been intended to address public policy directly, but 
an argument for an objective conception of well-being does offer greater interest for 
those involved in exercise and sport through coaching, education or policy making. 
An objective conception, or more specifically the capabilities approach advocated 
here, suggests how sport and exercise could be structured to best serve our well­
being, and offers a firm critique of those activities that fail to respect those goods on 
Nussbaum’s list. Arguments that certain sporting or physical activities are not ‘fully 
human’ or do not genuinely enhance well-being, may seem, to those in the grip of 
the fact/value dichotomy, somewhat unfounded, or no more than strong opinion. The 
rejection of the fact/value dichotomy however, and a defence of both objective 
theories of well-being, and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach specifically, offers an 
alternative standpoint from which such conclusions look reasonable. This offers
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policy makers an alternative to rationales for exercise grounded in either the 
psychological concepts of affect and satisfaction, or the naturalist focus on disease 
prevention.
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